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Walter Feinberg - Eric Hanushek
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LABYRINTHS

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FIRST PART
EDUCATIONAL LABYRINTH

Introduction

The chapters in the first part of this work show the ambition of the goals and obstacles that education is currently facing. The second part takes a look at the results of the education that has been given. On one hand, the importance and value of education is often stressed publicly, with the social demand for training increasing. In fact, in a great part of countries, schooling has been generalized with the incorporation of women and the working classes. But, as I indicate in my chapter, "information" and "knowledge" are two terms that are still very often mistaken, and there is a lot of confusion surrounding the role of the different social actors and institutions playing a part in the orientation of education.

The different studies presented here raise the problems that derive from the diversity of educational agents and the models coming into conflict they imply. I also show how the crisis of the educational function of the family structure is inadequate to approach the challenges facing the current world.

From a global perspective of education's social function, the following question is raised: Who should educate parents? Both parents and teachers are saturated with the activities of their respective vital roles. The answer cannot be other than the fatherhood and motherhood learning process must occur in the student age, esentially through the example of their behaviour within the family and the classrooms. On the other hand, schools have been creating more and more ambitious expectations, not only aspiring to pass on knowledge, but also aiming to shape the attitudes and values, the emotions and social criticism. However, on a practical level, a renunciation of the will to progress can be perceived, which entails the renuncuation of the confidence in rationality and scientific knowledge obtained in a long fight against obscurantism.

In her review of the comparative international studies, Blanca Heredia emphasizes that the internationally accepted aim to achieve education for all, together with its positive effects on development and welfare, are far from being accessible in many underdeveloped countries and will be hard to achieve given the world's current economical and political structures. Eric Hanushek also addresses this issue in his extended chapter along with the importance of education

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which is not only based on its quantity, but on its quality, that is, in what is learned, which learning techniques are used and what results the students obtain.

And both in their positions, Blanca Heredia in OECD and PISA, and Hanushek in his teaching experience and his obsessive focus on gaging the impact of education as an evolutionary economical factor, insisting on the methods for studying the influence of this education not only on the development of general civilization, but also acting upon the tangible issues of production and personal, collective, cultural and economical productivity.

Walter Feinberg and Laia Carol tackle the obstacle of religion. From the values of a liberal democracy, they argue that the parents' preference for a religious education for their children, if it exists, must be restricted both by the autonomous interest of the children and the liberal democratic society's interest in equity. A democratic government is obliged to discriminate in favour of schools which have an explicit interest in promoting autonomy, equity and fraternity. The right to educate one's own children within a liberal society should be considered a public right that is granted to parents only when certain conditions are met, not in an absolute way. Governments must discriminate favouring public schools and those private or religious schools which promote values of autonomy, equity, and fraternity.

The disctinction between teaching and training is crucial in order to shape an educational process for the future, as is stressed in various chapters. The technological advances made in the teaching field allow giving priority to training tasks. Specifically, that which flows through the web and is freely accessible, should no longer be using up teaching time inside classrooms. The existing shortcomings in education show that the two widely accepted goals of expanding access to schools and improving its quality are difficult to combine. Hanushek warns that if the governments' policies simply pretend to force youngsters to remain in schools longer, without changing the fundamental qualitative aspects of schools, the general goals of development, welfare and civilization which are usually associated with education shall not be achieved.

Among the short-term reforms, I personally propose communication plans that regulate the internal and external communication flows between families, schools and the rest of institutions that contribute to education.

José Antonio Marina notices we live in a circle of excuses, in which parents accuse schools of being inefficient, schools complain about parents sending their kids without the adequate courtesy. Then they all agree and put the blame on television and, lastly, the complaints are directed towards the government, that usually changes the law, and the cicle begins again. In order to break this "hideous circle", according to Marina, everyone must try to act from their scope of possibilities. Thus, he proposes a civic agreement on education as a previous step for a state agreement on education.

Collectively, the different chapters on the labyrinth of education presented in this work indicate the shortcomings of education in the current world and identify the main obstacles to its progress. Likewise, they propose some basic lines of collective action to advance towards a generalized education, understood as teaching and training, which is worthy of the project and of the possibility of culminating the civilizing evolution of mankind.

Education needs to adapt to the characteristics of each human group. Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff introduces an idea of classifying human diversity which should be considered. Artur Mosegui and Elisa Soler do something similar with regard to the number of human beings the Earth can shelter, sharing Malthus' idea, which is more valid today than when it was first envisaged. And finally Jean Antonio Stella and Sergio Rizzo synthesize the consequence of an inappropriate education that hinders the socio-political evolution of the species.

Salvador Cardús
Barcelona, 2009

1
The cultural value of education

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In order to avoid turning a text about "the value of education" into a trivial exercise that merely reiterates the topics we associate with our acclaimed society of knowledge —as some like to name it in a rather pedantic way—, we need to make an issue of the wording. In other words, we need to analyze the weak point that explains why defending the value of education is still necessary. And I believe the best way of doing it is by displaying a paradox that has been discovered with astonishment in recent years within the western advanced societies: although the importance and value of education had never been publicly defended with such vehemence, at the same time we one could say that the individual adhesion to the promises offered by this education had never reached such low levels. Indeed, the objective demand for more and more information currently coexists with the presence of apparently insurmountable obstacles, and at the same time the general interest in the remarkable efforts put towards the citizens' education is awakened.

That education has obtained a status of basic right and fundamental need is clearly shown by the fact that universal schooling has become generalized and compulsory for age groups becoming wider, besides an extension of professional education reaching levels never seen before. And this has occurred in the developed world, but a fast incorporation of the underdeveloped countries has also happened. And a growing public awareness of the need to receive permanent training throughout life is still confirmed. On the other hand, the results that have been obtained do not match the educational efforts, as the available statistics indicate, showing the recent rates of school failure, the inadequacy between school curriculums and the needs of the labour market and, in general, the deep concern about an educational "crisis" which openly displays itself in a permanent state of public debate on the shortcomings of the educational system, the relaxation of

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the family resposibilities or, even more, the negative role played by the media and the culture of masses.

Surely, in each national context, the debate adopts its particular forms and is usually analyzed in relation to these internal circumstances. Let's mention, as an example, the concern about school failure in France, which brought about the creation of a "Journée du refus de l'échec scolaire" in the year 2008, in a context of debate that had been spearheaded by the president of the Republic himself, Nicolas Sarkozy, with the famous "Letter to the teachers" in september of 2007. Or, even more, the existing debate within german society, also featuring the direct intervention of the president of the federal government, Angela Merkel, and which was precisely reported by an article in The Economist "Bottom of the form. The chancellor looks for ways to improve Germanys's mediocre schools" published on the 18 of October, 2008. And, not to go into details, it's enough seeing the interest that the The McKinsey Report on Education, published on September of 2007, has aroused which shows this erosion between the increase of public expenditure on education and the poor quality of the results obtained, or the complaints fueled by each new issue of the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) reports by the OECD. But, beyond each case, a compared analysis of the discourses, shows the universal scope of the problem and the similarity of the topics to be discussed.

We shall have the chance to consider in detail which are the obstacles that hold back progress in education and even explain the backward movements. But the fact is, indeed, that there exists a growing distance between the social awareness of the importance of education and the expectations on its results, both with regard to the support among the citizenship —with a huge number of individuals that do not seem to share the promise offered by education—, and the excellence that was expected to be obtained in return for the high public expenditure in educational policies.

I would like to say that I do not assume that ours is a "society of knowledge". The remarkable inequality in the distribution of this knowledge questions everything this definition has in terms of self-condescendence. But we also need to bear in mind —as has been said repeatedly— that "information" should not be so easily mistaken for "knowledge", and that a society which is "very much informed" as ours happens to be is not yet a "well informed"

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society, and even less does it automatically become a society of "knowledge". The informational confusion that occurs caused by the excess of available data; the circulation of garbage —of "noise"— which is masked amidst the information; the easy manipulation of information which is difficult to compare because of the lack of sources of recognized authority or, even more, the difficulties to apply this available information and make rational use of it —especially because of the speed by which it is passed on, of the continuous appearance of new data and the obsolescence and its rapid substitution—, are determining aspects of the reasonable doubts on whether one can speak correctly about a society of knowledge or not.

In fact, these same reasons explain the existence of remarkable spaces of "informational illiteracy" which has consequences as serious or even more serious than the ones generated by the illiteracy of those who did not know how to read during the beginning and middle of last century. Yes: we are a society that is "very much informed" but also very "badly informed" and, above all, "unequally informed". So we should only accept this term if when speaking about "society of knowledge" we understand that knowledge has become a factor for social differentiation, as relevantas the aristocratic privileges of past times or the advantages that a good economic fortune still renders in the present time. In any case, and to put it another way, the society of knowledge is a challenge yet again for the principles of equality and justice which, up until now, have only had average results.

Logically, a society in which information and its intelligent and critical use —that is, converting it into knowledge—, is a factor of hierarchization and social progress, must necessarily place the citizens' education as one of the main engines for its correct development. And the truth is that all the data show how developed societies have taken this direction all along the XX century, especially during its second half. The universalization of schooling with the obligatory incorporation of women and popular classes that were previously excluded from the same training levels as men and the middle and upper classes, with all the inefficiencies that one may want to point out, is an undisputable fact. And we could say that the new awareness of the relevance of permanent training throughout one's life has been reached by a major part of the younger and middle-aged population.

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At the same time, as I mentioned earlier, the fact is that the generalised social awareness of the relevance of education does not seem to stem from an individual attitude that is especially involved with the goals of education. All the evidence point towards the opposite conclusion. We could talk about a lack of confidence in the eduactional system or a lack of affection regarding the educational promise and the instrumental value that knowledge may really have. I believe that the term that describes best the situation that has evolved during this first decade of the XXI century is "educational confusion" (Cardús, 2000). To put it bluntly: never has there been so many educational opportunities available for so many people, and never had there been so many wasted opportunities. One could argue that some of the social groups, once they finally have had the chance to satisfy the aspirations they could never reach before, do no longer share the ideals of a society in which education is an indispensible value for seeking emancipation and progress.

Using the classical metaphor, we could say we now possess the best social elevator ever imagined, that now there are vacancies available for everyone, that now the principle of equal opportunities does not look like a chimaera, but it is also now that one can observe a minimum interest in climbing to the highest positions. At least in Europe, there exists a generalised conviction that regards education as a right, but there is no such determination when considering it an obligation of the citizen towards the community.

Apparently, one could reach the following conclusion: facts show that at a point when education has been valued more than ever before, least interest in being educated has been shown. Or to be more precise: at first glance one could say that the expansion of the awareness of the importance of education has serious limits when it comes to being shared by those who should be the main beneficiaries. In short, there exists a great awareness of the value of education and, simultaneously, a growing educational lack of affection. This is the paradox we must consider. And I shall make myself clear right now: I refuse —even if it is only because of reasons related to methodological caution— to seek for easy answers through the use of moral judgements on alleged unsympathetic individualism or on the crisis of alleged traditional values like sacrifice.

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Education and its enemies
It's not easy listing all the "enemies" of the value of education in an orderly way, because we are dealing with diverse factors of uneven relevance depending on social, political context and the specific national traditional culture. A society that has to give a response to the diversity created by a continuous flow of immigration is not the same as a demographically stable society. A territory of Nordic Europe that has a cultural tradition of calvinist origin is not the same as a southern society which is marked by catholic tradition. A powerful nation capable of generating its own symbolic instruments —fundamentally passed on through the school system— to guarantee social and political cohesion, is not the same as a nation that cannot ensure an internal configuration that is enough because of external dependence, that is, facing difficulties when it comes to defending the authority of its own schooling system. This way I shall establish five great obstacles I believe hinder seriously the confidence in the value of education and that could explain, at least to a certain extent, the "lack of affection" I am talking about.

1. Diversity of educational agents and conflicting models
To begin with, we can state unreservedly that the growing complexity and fragmentation of current society has definitely divided the consensus over which should be the profiles and contents of this right to education, the universalization of which has been so tenaciously defended and so sadly obtained throughout the XX century. The diversity of social models and, above all, the expectations that are associated to it, have raised questions with regard to the possibility of establishing which should be the standard of contents and procedures on which educational programmes should be organized. In fact, the idea of standard itself has been questioned, a circumstance that has often been substituted by the "learn to learn" confusing slogan, according to which the precise contents could be obviated in the name of the training of certain abilities and attitudes open to any need. I would like to make clear that I am not referring so much to the pedagogical model on which the principle is based as to its social use, a kind of escape in order to deviate attention in an uncomfortable debate. On the other hand, and surprisingly, the *learn to learn* approach, that seems to have been created to serve the instrumental side of

education, has been defended from supposedly "progressive" positions, while the defense of the intrinsic value of knowledge with a certain autonomy with regard to its practical usefulness, has been considered typical of an indeologically conservative position. No matter what is the case, debates like the ones that have existed, for example, between an understanding pedagogy or one which is oriented towards clearly defined educational contents, are not merely pedagogical discussions but are a response to the stresses which have been introduced into education by the complexity of current societies. The discussion has reached the university itself, and the truth is that all the traditional schemes are being revised. The issue of "how" to educate, then, which is by no means independent of "who" should do it or of "what" and "with what goal" we must teach. I mean to say that these are not merely theoretical or academic debates, they also reveal struggles for power to control the educational systems, directed towards the imposition of certain social models.

Particularly, the social complexity has been transferred to the educational front, on the one hand, with the incorporation of new educating agents that have occupied relevant positions in direct competition with the traditional ones, that is, the family or the school. On the other hand, the multiplicity of agents has entailed the coexistence of contradictory educational strategies. I am referring, for instance, to the role played by the broadcasting media and the information and communication technologies (ITCs), which I will consider in detail further on. But new ways of social relationship have also developed, much more opened to the interaction between diverse groups from early ages and therefore more exposed to emotional influences, the impact of which is enormous. We cannot obviate either the disappearance —in some cases— of other agents that had been truly relevant, like religious organizations. Or, because of the importance it has had in some countries, we should mention the army itself, with a particularly significant role in patriotic indoctrination which, for the time, we shall more lightly call "civic education".

However, as I said before, the multiplicity of socialising institutions, competing among each other, has meant that the educational world has entered inside a supermarket of contradictory offers that add and subtract each other in terms of prestige, influence and orientation. Some offers rival to attract the attention and time —and resources, of course— of

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students and transgress the spaces that they had previously occupied. The analysis of the distribution and occupation of educational spaces and times would clearly show this framework of difficult relationships, with contradictory messages (Cardús, 2004). In short, this conflict has stemmed from a deep lack of confidence, in a situation of all against all and in a practically impossible conciliation of interests and perspectives. To be more specific: the fact that thirty years ago the schools and families had a lack of confidence in the new educational agents such as television, or that twenty years ago they distrusted computing, all of them being preceived as intruders was something one could expect. But schools and families ending up in confrontation, blaming each other for general educational failure is not as predictable.

Very often, the conflict arises from the discussion to obtain more responsibilities, as occurs when the state considers itself legitimate to impose certain contents related to civic or patiotic education, or when a church demands a significant presence in the educational public space. But, in a more usual way, the majority of conflicts arise from the complete opposite: from the transfer of responsibilities which had been traditionally assigned in a clear and defined way to each institution. And, certainly, the nostalgia of a new consensus between all parts is an illusion, no matter how much it forces a dialogue between the different institutions that come into play. One thing is families and schools sharing the conviction of considering education as a value, and a different thing alltogether is that they reach an agreement over which should be the strategies and organizational models that form the foundations of education. In short, the confusion surrounding who should educate, what, how and where, is the sign of this first great obstacle of the current teaching process.

2. Generational break up in the educational transmission
In second place, due to the importance it traditionally had, we must mention the crisis of the educational function of the family structure. On the other hand, and very significantly, the family no only maintains but has increased its vigour as an economic unity at the same pace as the consumption habits have increased. Traditionally, the solidity of the family educating trends came from an inter-generational transmission learnt within a framework of affection which had no validity outside itself. In spite of this fact, this model worked within a

hypothetical process of moderate change and in the absence of intruders in the private sphere, with the exception of the institutions which, like the church —where this situation occurred—, acted, precisely, to ensure its stability. But, suddenly, fathers and mothers have encountered a series of break ups in lifestyles that turns the old traditional models they learned into obsolete models. Also, supporting the new lifestyles very often demands precisely the explicit rejection of the old models accusing them —rightly or wrongly— of being authoritarian or abusive with regard to how the rights and obligations of the new society are defined. In such circumstances, the family units —subjected to changes that multiply their heterogeneity of forms—, are unable to rebuild autonomously new educational practices which are born without a common framework of legitimate imposition. At least the first generation of the break could operate against that which was considered to be wrong in the lifestyles of the preceding generation. But the second generation is left without guidelines, and ends up searching for sources of poor authorship: a magazine on education of dubious rigor, a self-help manual by some uncertain author, "parents' training school" organized by an association of disoriented fathers and mothers, anonymous pages on Internet...

This is where the issue which apparently has more to do with common sense, but at the same time the most dangerous within a plural society one could imagine, emerges: Who should teach the parents? It would seem to be a logical question insofar as it shows a lack of ability that one could never have imagined up until two generations ago: one knew how to behave like a father or mother thanks to the generational transmission of the trade, but also because of the proximity of the preceding generation that allowed the guidance of the new parents in their new responsibility towards the new generation. So, at the same time, the issue regarding who should teach the parents leads to a dangerous question: Who has the right to indicate, or to impose, in a legitimate way, a specific educational model? Shall we end up asking for some type of credentials in order to practise as a parent? Could the state forbid, for example, the option carried out by a minority, but more and more extended, of home schooling? Or, should the state be the regulator of the modes of punishment that parents can exert, as happens already in the name of the protection of infancy? To what extent may the state be allowed to do so? And, should the appearance of all sorts of self-help manuals or

web pages, some of them openly prone to esoteric indoctrination driven by dangerous educational gurus be regulated?

Nowadays, the family is the target of all sorts of suspicious looks that transform its impotence into blame. The supposition of parents that give up their responsibilities represents a serious moral disqualification of that which is usually only, either a discrepancy of models, —it is not always easy to distinguish a bad education from educating in a different way—, or the expression of the lack of ability to educate due to incompetence. All of this, of course, without mentioning the stress to which the family structures are subjected to, both by the labour market that is less and less regulated with regard to timetables, and by a model of leisure time occupation that invades the domestic space. The working timetables which are incompatible with the family educational responsibilities and this penetration of non-familiar discourses and logics in the domestic time caused by the invading offers of leisure, explain like none other the educational weakness of the families. The family, inevitably, lives this educational impotence in a contradictory way, inosofar as it stems from the economical role it is expected to play as an engine of consumption and that implies the necessary flexibilization of domestic organizational models in order to meet these needs. In short: the family is expected to impose a certain educational order and, at the same time, contribute to the lack of regulation of lifestyles to acommodate them into the market's impositions (Cardús, 2003 y 2009).

3. Schools and their loss of legitimacy

In third place, we must talk about the educational system itself. It could seem completely inappropriate to include the educational institution among the "enemies" of education. And, indeed, it would be unsuitable if we forgot we are talking about the determining factors that impede the effective assimilation of the educational promise. And, in this sense, the educational system cannot be excluded from the list of agents that show great intrinsic difficulties to obtain the results they seek. I already mentioned that we cannot generalise, given the great diversity of models, situations and results of the different educational systems, even when we focus on the developed western societies. Therefore, I realize that the remarks I am about to make must be kept on a level that is wide enough for

them to be applicable to the majority of cases, but at the same time I will need to make sure they do not become irrelevant.

The first observation must refer to the dramatic discovery the world of teaching has had to assume involving its own limitations with regard to the mission of transforming social reality it had imposed on itself, following the enlightened model. The great pedagogical utopias born in the second half of the XX century have exhausted all their transforming capacity which, it must be said, was much smaller than had been imagined. In many cases, these pedagogical utopias even managed to portray the school as the basic instrument for a social revolution that could begin from the base, with popular roots. Complaints about the reproducing role of the established social models have been made from the traditional school, and the new school was expected to create the conditions of a break-up that freed it from its role as an "apparatus of the state whose purpose was to serve the dominant ideology", as the marxist critique had defined it. But now that the era of big ideologies is past, when the great value of education is being recognised, we cannot demand it plays a revolutionary role but we can expect it to adapt better to the emerging social models, which in spite of being "new", they are not a consequence of change in the revolutionary sense which had been described since the decade of the sixties. I mean to say that, when excellence is demanded from the educational system —for example, requesting that it exhibits the results obtained and introducing all sorts of evaluating— it's not the old goals of transformation which one has in mind but a contribution towards making the current system viable in the future. Those old principles of A. S. Neill in Summerhill (literally, a school "where kids have the freedom to be themselves"; "where success is not measured by academic achievements but by the definition of success itself expressed by the children"; "where you can play all day if that's what you want...") that inspired the most advanced educational projects of the last century, and laid the foundations of the pedagogical vocation of so many current teachers, surely, do not fit into the type of advantages which society expects education to deliver.

In a certain sense, one could say that schools are trapped inside a serious contradiction: while the awareness of its relevance has increased, as an institution, it has been progressively losing its social central role. Until the middle of the last century, schools hardly had any competition at all. Outside the family and religious spaces, and through the

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informal spaces —playing in the streets, for instance—, the educational institution *par excellence*, was the school. The authority of the teacher was seldom questioned and the knowledge he passed on had all the legitimacy of a perfectly established tradition of knowledge. However, if nobody questioned its legitimacy, the need for its existence was not a unanimous evidence. The exclusion from the school of important social groups was accompanied by a lack of awareness of its necessity beyond basic learning: elemental reading and writing, the four laws of arithmetic, brief notions of near-mythical national history... At the other extreme, we have the current school, both valued and questioned in all of its aspects. The importance of schooling has been accompanied by an increase of institutions that compete with it. Within the vital experience of the student, school only occupies a small part of it, and not necessarily the most important from a subjective point of view. And not only this, it is no longer the most relevant with regard to the capacity to present the outside world or provide the most complete and updated information. The first great competitor of schools might have been television, but at the present time it has become clear that it is the industries of culture and, above all, internet and the social networks that, rightly or wrongly, have overflown the hierarchy of value which schools used to possesss —and educational institutions in general— as a reference of authority in the distribution of knowledge.

It is within this contradictory framework of authority of new institutions, that are not considered legitimate in the educational process by schools that, to make things worse, has widened even more the expectations it offered. In other words: as they have been losing progressively their central role caused by the appearance of serious competitors, schools have been creating more and more ambitious expectations. Now it is no longer committed only to passing on the formal knowledge over which it had authority, but it aims to educate globally, on attitudes and values, from the classrooms to the streets, from emotivity to social criticism, from mathematics to inter-culturality, from writing to pacifism. I am not judging this phenomenon. I only state that something similar to a flight forward has occurred: maybe schools thought that the loss of relevance would be compensated by an increase of promises. The consequence, inevitably, has been a feeling of failure

caused by the distance between the real capacity of influence and the created expectations.

The current situation is contradictory. On the one hand, schooling education continues to be relevant. In fact, it is more relevant now than it had ever been, because of the wide time-span and the universalization of the service. But the social preception is the exact opposite. And my thesis is that the cause of it all is, precisely, the excess of expectations I was referring to before. But that is not the only cause. It is also true that the loss of authority of the institution and its agents is related to the difficulties of presenting new responsibilities for schools beyond knowledge that was based on scientific and rational tradition, in the literary and artistic traditions, of universal and, to a great extent, national recognition. Discussing a literary canon is not easy for the bulk of the population and, at least among those who are not experts, that which is proposed by the schooling system is commonly accepted. But when it comes to educating in terms of values or attitudes, How many of us would not be capable of challenging the options of each school and, even more, each specific teacher?

In this new situation, the school is no longer prepared to arouse admiration (Lacroix, 2006) towards new knowledge that does not have the support of a unanimous tradition. When the transmission of knowledge is directed towards the future, novelty, and challenging the present, then it is very difficult for schools to continue erecting securely the foundations of a society suffering a deep crisis. Here lies the terrible paradox: if schools turn their backs on the world, against its current challenges, it becomes irrelevant. If they go with the flow, adhering with no criticism, they lose their main source of legitimacy.

4. The renunciation of opportunities
One of the great principles of the educational promise was, and continues to be, to guarantee equal oportunities. And, in fact, a good deal of the pedagogical efforts and the educational policies have been directed towards making this goal possible. However: this principle is based on an aprioristic supposition: the individual and collective will to progress, both material and spìritual. Or, at least, it assumes a confidence in the advantages this progress can offer. In any case, it becomes clear that this aprioristic supposition cannot be taken for granted. And the consequences are really serious. Surely,

there can be a certain dissappointment related to the relative failure of the promises associated to the idea of progress, but this doesn't seem to be the main cause of desertion. In any case, we would need to point out the difficulties to maintain enough social cohesion to keep on making the possibility of a general interest surpassing personal ambitions credible. The faith in progress, which also produces its "victims", needs to be linked to the confidence in the benefits that can be obtained by the community, for the latter to be willing to accept the price.

Let's look at the specific case of the idea of progress which is represented by the Welfare State, understood the european way. The Welfare State is only sustainable from the perspective of a solid collective civic solidarity. Public healthcare, universal and free, is based on the assumption that people really are concerned about being healthy and they will not expose themselves to risks gratuitously. And, at the same time, is based on the assumption that the principle of "solidarity" on which it is based shall not be abused. But, what happens when the irresponsible behaviour regarding health itself becomes generalised? Is it necessary for the state to deal with the consequences? What should be the response to the breach of the non-written but implicit agreement by which a system that caters for general interest must not be abused? This type of attitude is not only found in the lack of interest for a long and healthy life and the preference for lifestyles oriented towards "making the most" of the present, forgetting the consequences in the future. In fact, it is the same attitude that can be found with regard to the expectations of economic welfare, very often limited to living like there's no tomorrow. Therefore, we cannot simply dedicate our efforts to making pessimistic predictions on whether or not the later generations will live a better life than the preceding ones. The big question is if these new generations will be willing to make the same sacrifices their parents did in order to achieve and even surpass the old levels of health, education or material welfare.

And there still is one last dramatic discovery related to the value of education. This renunciation in the will to progress also implies, in many occasions, the renunciation of the confidence in rationality, in scientific knowledge obtained through a long battle fought against obscurantism. The success of all sorts of esoterical views that extend themselves with complete impunity, challenges the classic hierarchies of

knowledge on which this progress has been built. What space is left for education as a means of social and personal emancipation when the future is determined by tarot? What confidence shall we have in schools if as we teach Galileo, the student believes a birth chart? To finish describing the nature of the resignations regarding the promise of economical progress, of a better health, of a more complete education or the confidence in scientific rationality, it is worth observing that the alternatives to rational knowledge are no longer presented with the support of a well-structured ideological discourse nor by an identifiable religious tradition, an author or an acronym. On the contrary, we're dealing with a silent renunciation, which is discrete, experienced in a way that lacks clarity, and expressed in a vague —and confusing— manner in a great part of the current attitudes and lifestyles.

In short, if as I believe the majority does not clearly support any longer the desire of progress, neither spiritual nor material, it is notorious that one of the main spheres that will be affected is that of education. The problem is not, therefore, related to an alleged crisis of the culture of sacrifice, but the shift in the priorities when it comes to orienting our efforts and the question of whether or not we can assume that everybody, or at least a sufficient majority, wants to become more educated, wealthier, healthier, more cultured, more free. We cannot blame individual will for the educational failure that, in different proportions, grows in the majority of western countries. But neither can we transfer it only to the alleged failure of the eduational system. My opinion, as I have intended to prove, is that it could well be that there has been a loss of credibility of some of the classic aspirations that assumed the importance of education. In this case, the "opportunities" education had to offer, would have ceased to be interesting, or would be in danger of becoming irrelevant for many individuals. This would mean that the old "elevator" that allowed compensating the sacrifice of participating in the competitiveness demanded by the model of society, based on progress and that punished the lack of affection and disloyalty towards the system, would have stopped working for social sectors which, on the other hand, are very diverse. We would not be referring only to the groups that have been historically condemned to the margins of society, but also of niches of population located within the middle classes, using the journalistic term, we could call them "anti-system", and also

minority groups which are highly significant as "deserters" of the competitive compromise which is implied by modernity.

5. Mass media and ITCs

The broadcasting media for the masses, especially television, up until recently had been the main scapegoat of the educational crisis. The emergence of a culture of masses shook the traditional dominance of high culture and of national cultures, the ultimate sources of school contents. This created a true battle of legitimacies, as Edgar Morin (1962) analysed brilliantly. On the other hand, the appearance of television in the everyday life of boys and girls represented audiovisual culture entering competition against school culture, which is basically oral and written. The seductive power of images endangered the classic devices of school transmission, forcing a deep renewal of teaching strategies to try and catch the attention of pupils. The need to "motivate" the student —by entertaining him— becomes generalised within this competitive framework introduced by the audiovisual world (Postman, 1985).

If that weren't enough, television represented a moral crack in the educational rhetoric. Indeed, the triumph of television culture, also among teachers, introduced the awareness of a double language, of double morals, inasmuch as what was perceived as an enemy of the school at work, at the same time, was part of the personal domestic scene. This remorse suffered by teachers in their relationship with television is part of a generational experience, and is currently only residual. Still, it has marked the educational discourse for some decades and beyond those who actually lived it as a personal experience. Now, the new teachers are perfectly embedded in television culture in an uninhibited way. And this means that, finally, television enters the classrooms without many difficulties. Televisions and, of course, computers.

However, the dominance of mass culture is not just related to this symbolical battle with television as its main enemy, it goes way beyond. In the first place, because mass culture is not only a certain type of content, but a lifestyle, a form of relationship. The mass culture provides organization and hierarchy, it channels the conflict, it offers identity and, in short, it gives consistency to an alternative world to that of families and schools. The leisure of youth is no longer only the marginal and broken up "street life", but an institution with its

own times and spaces, its ideology, its "sacred cosmos" and, naturally, its market. The case of the role played by music as a "juvenile geography" directed towards orienting the vital itinerary, the world of senses and symbolic juvenile fights (Martínez, 2007) exemplifies perfectly what I believe. If that weren't enough, thanks to Internet, lately the socialising networks have emerged, taking the strength of this institution even further, with it becoming absolutely significant for young people, excluding even further the role played by families and schools. The competition, therefore, is no longer limited to the fact of an alternative of languages and contents, but to the fact of ITCs allowing the creation of alternative virtual worlds, radically oriented towards the present time, subjectively much more gratifying than what the educational promise has to offer, which demands the effort of a postponed satisfaction that only materialises in the (uncertain) future time.

In second place, the mass culture, especially the one that develops through ITCs, uses a language and communication strategies that are, in short, those of the society of information and communication. Traditional education is represented, according to cliché, by the old furniture, the desk and blackboard, while mass culture uses the mobile phone, the screen and the digital blackboard. And, if that weren't enough, when the mediaphobic prejudices are left behind, one discovers that these new technologies are not responsible for the general "stupidization", but are efficient bearers of devices for intelectual development, for sociability and even for learning processes linked to memory or the procrastination of satisfaction (Johnson, 2009). But, it could be that the highest degree of this clash displays itself through the participation of higher education in the world of Internet while it abandons the old amphitheatres that used to host the traditional lectures.   Experiences like "Academic Earth" — awarded "year 2009 webpage" by Time magazine— or the "OpenCourseWare", have placed the great lessons of the best universities of the world on Internet, with audiences that one could never had imagined before.

The great challenge of mass culture and ITCs regarding the value of traditional education is not to figure out who will replace who, but how to integrate the former in the educational aims of the latter. A logic of confrontation that places education on the opposite side of ITCs, would only condemn it to disrepute. However, a strict submission of schools to mass culture and ITCs, would not save it from a rapid

process of substitution. The alternative is to add the audiovisual language to classical morality and writing; the tradition of school knowledge should display its ability to discern critically regarding the new cultural productions of masses and to have portable phones and screens contributing to school strategies with their advantages as northamerican universities have already been doing, in a pioneering way, uploading their contents on websites like YouTube or distributing them through I-Tunes.

6. A pragmatic defence of the value of education
Although one could argue that any consideration about education and any sort of educational policy has ideological dimensions, the great danger of educational debates is that ideological confrontation conceals the rest of organizational challenges that exist. When I have expressed some doubts about the practical translation of theoretical concepts like those of "motivation" or the "learn to learn" approach, I have been accused of failing to understand those terms in all of their formal complexity. I accept the criticism, of course. But the question is whether the teachers have also failed to understand it and whether its practical translation has rendered, on many occasions, consequences which are opposite to the expected ones. And the truth is that, within the education world, over the last decades, an exchange of the discourse on authority built on the teaching experience for a discourse elaborated from the theoretical pedagogy, generally far from the classroom and close to the academic field, has taken place. It would be necessary to study, in each national context, how this process has evolved and what consequences it has had on teachers' training and on their teaching orientation. But, whatever the case is, the practical challenges only find an ideological formal response, —which is generally useless—, incapable of compromising with everyday reality, basically, because it is unaware of it, and the cause of this, according to my experience, is the shift of authority.

If the educational debate usually clashes against this first level of psychopedagogical rhetoric, the second obstacle it fails to overcome is the moralistic debate. The endless production of discourses on an alleged crisis of values, hypothetical cause and consequence —something that is never quite clarified— of all the problems that affect education, has ended up curdling in ordinary common sense in such a way that

criticising becomes an impossible mission, condemned to failure. The moralistic temptation, not in the academic world but in the public opinion, concerning education, adds the idea of the "crisis of values" to the crisis of the "culture of sacrifice", oblivious to all the structural deciding factors of school failure and, more generally, educational failure, that as we have seen is above all the result of the contradictions of the model of society.

Gregorio Luri, in *La escuela contra el mundo* (2008) cites a sumerian text, written in cuneiform characters which are 3700 years old, that relates a small fragment of a long dispute between a father and a son. I cannot avoid the temptation of transcribing:

-Where have you been?
-Nowhere.
-Don't give me any stories, get yourself over to school right now and go and see your teacher. I hope you've got your homework done correctly, and I hope there aren't any complaints about your behaviour. As soon as you finish school come right back home and don't waste any time around in the streets. Did you understand?
-Yes. I have understood. If you want me to, I can repeat it.
-Go on then, repeat it.
-¿Do you think I cannot repeat it or what?
-¡Come on, then, repeat it!
-I shall do it whenever I want.
-¡Come on!

I cannot avoid either citing this other fragment of a chinese text from Nei Ching, a collection of writings from the Chou dynasty (1030 to 221 b.C) written on small bamboo canes, that gathers the reflections of the wise man Chi Po (Guido Majno, 1991):
(...) before people used to live according to the rules of restraint when eating and drinking, and they went to sleep and woke up early. Unlike nowadays. Now, people (the youngsters) drink, and have adopted sloppy lifestyles.
(...) They are only interested in having fun: they go to sleep late and they wake up late. It seems pretty clear that this way we shall only be able to reach half the hundred years of age that the people before used to live. We are degenerating!

And, furthermore, notice this sentence attributed to Hippocrates (approx. 460 – approx. 370 bC): "The youth of today does not seem to show any respect for the past nor any hopes for the future".

Could we be experiencing a crisis of the "culture of sacrifice" that goes back to the year 1000 b.C? Are we subjected to the same "crisis of values" that was suffered in the age of Hippocrates? My answer is: absolutely not. The moralizing discourse only explains the personal crisis of the educator. The crisis of values justifies the conscience of failure, or that of the impotence, of both the teacher and the parent. In an identical way, it is not the sacrifice in itself that is in a state of crisis, but this perception occurs because it is directed towards other goals that are no longer those indicated by parents or teachers.

The moralizing and ideological drift in the educational debates, therefore, is the expression of the crisis of the value of education, and not an explanation of its causes. The educational restlessness is expressed in moral and political terms, yes, but to believe the crisis of values is the main cause of the confusion would be a serious simplification. In any case, when we mistake the symptom for the cause of an illness, any remedy one turns to is either useless or it accentuates the problem instead of solving it. In this sense, it is not surprising to know that the world of education, after falling in the temptation of indoctrination as the main therapy against the problem, that is, searching for the solution in what is termed as "the education of values" and that, in theory, should have put an end to all the confusion, has entailed an increase of the dissatisfaction caused by the alleged remedy.

The reason behind it all is that the aspiration to educate values regardless of the lifestyles in which these shall be experienced, is vain. On the contrary, the only chance of achieving an efficient education through the so-called values — I rather speak about "virtues"— is precisely the practical performance on lifestyles. It is worth observing the difference between value and virtue: the former is usually the rhetorical expression of a practical virtue. And the creative process, especially when it is located within the domestic domain —but also in the school—, is not very favourable for expert reflections. That is the reason why, the educational process can only go from virtue to value, from lifestyle to the conception of the world, from practical habits to abstract

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principle, but not the other way around. In other words, the virtue that is learnt as a lifestyle can end up being rationalized as a "value" on a more abstract plane. But the value that is defended outside a practical lifestyle, becomes educationally irrelevant.

I do not deny that the critical will to transform a lifestyle needs the reference of previous abstract "values". But education is not carried out by invoking these values, but by a transformation —carried out by the educators— of lifestyles in order to transmit the virtues these possess to the students. And it's just the same whether we are referring to parents, teachers, politicians, businessmen, religious leaders or jpournalists, all of them are educators in their respective positions. On the other hand, we must not forget that lifestyles will continue to change throughout time, and with them, the implicit values. And education cannot aspire to indoctrinate within a gathering of values enclosed within themselves, uselessly invoking untouchable and permanent principles, it must be capable of displaying this close link between that which is considered to be valuable and the consequences which are generated. That is, with its virtue. The great issue, therefore, is how through education individuals can achieve a sense of responsibility over their own destiny and choose voluntarily and actively lifestyles that are coherent and consistent. The challenge is to avoid falling into the temptation of wanting meek individuals in the indoctrination and in the politically correct rhetoric of the present and that, simultaneously, are indifferent towards thte incosistency of defending a set of rhetorical values that are sistematically contradicted by their lifestyles.

7. Organization *versus* indoctrination
In this paper I have already indicated the main structural and cultural factors that I take into consideration in this crisis. But now I would like to finish with some lines of intervention at a practical, organizational level. That is, I would like to make a practical defence of education. Some modest guidelines to return, through the path of facts, even if it is only partially and modestly, to the value of education. And the first is to observe that a big part of the weakness of the classical educational institutions, family and school, is organizational. In the case of the family organization there is, in the first place, a serious problem of temporary disorganization. And from this disorganization stems an absence of good educational routines

that, at the end of the day, are that which educates. With regard to schools, I would point out an organizational structure —timetables, courses, holidays…— enourmously rigid, that has suffered few changes over the course of fifty years. And, finally, it has a very serious problem of communication with its surroundings, a fact that provides confusion and generates many conflicts that could be perfectly avoided, aspects that will help us to illustrate the next section.

With regard to the family organization required for education, I believe that the consultancy services should be generalised, but organized independently from schools. The aim should not be to adapt the functioning of the family to the interests of the school, but to find an autonomous operational behaviour of the domestic structure that can satisfy, depending on its circumstances, the eduactional responsibilities. The policy of offering families more and more sevices, to liberate them from their responsibilities, does not seem to be the most convenient, unless it is in exceptional situations. On the contrary, it's about trying to materialize formulas of flexibility of working timetables to adapt them to family commitments. For its part, educational domestic advice must be strictly separated from the teaching function, precisely in order to avoid confusions between the different institutional levels and avoid any feeling of interference in the respective spaces. Establishing the adequate educational routines in the domestic field is the first step towards an adequate disposition towards the other educational domains. Guaranteeing there is adequate time to rest, a balanced diet, a mature emotional education, the domestication of time spent on ITCs and their use or some clear patterns of respect in interpersonal relationships, are the educational starting point on which to build the rest of experiences.

8. Good education, good communication

Following the same path of searching for strategies that favour a better positioning of the educational institution in relation to the whole of society, I believe it is essential and urgent to review the communicational logics among the different intervening agents. My suspicion is that the structural changes we have been widely referring to, have not been linked to the necessary changes in the schools' institutional patterns of communication to counteract them. The causes of schools' communication crisis should be found in the confusion of

expectations we already mentioned, but also in the organizational weakness of schools, which generally have very limited human and material resources, and given the lack of an advanced culture of management which is sensitive to the new communicational needs. We probably need to add the existence of an ideological resistence against the terminology used by experts in communication, and that lead to believe they are not compatible with the traditional educational values.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, communication plans should be implemented for the whole education system, but also in the programme of each school, communication plans that shall regulate the internal and external communication flow and that, in the first place, shall avoid misunderstandings and in the second place, shall favour a change in the disposition of all actors —parents, teachers, students and external agents— so that everybody knew, with maximum precision, what was to be expected from them and what they could expect from the rest.

In short, the basic idea is that the new complexity in which the educational activity develops, more and more interdependent, demands more sophisticated strategies of communication to guarantee the clarity of messages and the complements of co-ordinated actions. From my point of view, just to name an example, when teachers commonly complain about the lack of engagement of parents in the school's goals the reason behind it is, above all, linked to the fact that certain criteria are taken for granted when, actually, they are not shared by the entire educating community. The same thing occurs between what a father believes should be demanded from his son in school and what the teacher is willing to demand. I am not suggesting that a good education can resolve these conflicts, but it would contribute decisively towards making them more transparent. Maybe we should not expect a fusion of interests and agreement, but the understanding of the root of the disagreements would allow a more efficient dialogue.

9. Conclusions: education as a virtue

There is a non-written agreement in the use of the term "value", in ordinary language, to use it when we want to refer to that which is considered important, that which is of great trascendence. In any case, as I have mentioned, implicitly, the term "value" places us on a discursive level that forces us to think about value as a conscious support for a principle which is

considered irrelevant and, therefore, demands taking actions accordingly. And the main obstacle, as I have also sustained, comes from the fact that, even though the value of education can be assumed retorically, if the rules of social gameplaying do not confirm the practical importance, in the end a dissociation occurs between one thing and the other.

So, even though I am aware that this could look like a simple play on words, my conclusion is that education will only function as a value whenever it is incorporated as a social virtue into culture, into the lifestyles of the majority of citizens. I mean to say that the relevance of education is so big that it will need to be separated from specific procedures, specialized institutions, schools or families, or certain ages or specific goals. Education, in a society of knowledge like the one we apparently intend to become, must be a lifestyle, a way of relating to the world, a space that will occupy everything, a time that will extend itself throughout someone's lifetime. And it won't be limited to depending exclusively on a conscious attitude, a a certain will, it will be a basic disposition that, indeed, will be trained as one should be trained to learn to walk or learn to talk.

Within this new framework, in a time where "everything educates", everything must also be reviewed. From the role of the school to the role of the university. From the training that the educating agents require to the legitimate limits in which the public administration can intervene. From the place that should be occupied by the tradition of knowledge, to the range of action defined by the communication networks. When the main North American universities place all the basic traditional knowledge they possess, that could have been sold for great quantities of money, at the disposal of the entire society (for free) —check out Academic Herat's experience—, when these same institutions consider offering openly the contents of the most advanced science magazines with the belief that knowledge should travel freely, then it becomes clear that the basis of education is not the possession of knowledge, but the ability to use it.

A chinese proverb says: "that which can be taught, is not worth learning". It seems to be a very adequate saying for the times we are now living, and particularly coherent with the intentions of these big universities with regard to what their specific role will be. The contents that will travel freely on internet, will not need to be repeated within the classrooms.

That is all very good. But what is yet to be defined is the role played by the rest of educating agents when education stops being a value to become the main virtue of our time.

2
Education for development

Blanca Heredia
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The diffusion of education is widely considered to be a relevant factor to promote economic development and social welfare. The direct effects of education on economic growth are displayed in an increase of productivity and educated people. Experience indicates, nonetheless, that in order to obtain satisfactory result, the quantity of invested resources to provide education services allocated by governments is not enough, the quality is also important, in other words, that which is studied and the learning techniques that are used.

Up until now, the goals that have been unanimously agreed upon by the governmets of the world's countries to achieve universal primary schooling and the equality of boys and girls in education have not been met within the predicted deadlines. The historical experience of the currently developed countries suggests that the diffusion of education does not depend mechanically on governmental policies, but on economical, social and cultural changes that can span over several decades. This article reviews some tasks that have rendered positive results from the governmental actions directed towards an increase of children's education, especially in the underdeveloped countries. But it also came to the conclusion that internationally accepted aim of achieving education for all, as its positive effects on development and welfare, are far from being accessible with the current economic and political structures of the world.

1. Economic Development and Education
Economic development and social welfare are near universal goals that have been considered to be widely desirable by the contemporary civilization. To reach an advanced stage of development in a country, it is necessary to have high rates of economic growth throughout a long period. In other words, only a growth of the product which is higher than the increase of the population can improve the quality of life and the welfare

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of a nation. However, some countries have reached advanced stages of development much earlier than others. Likewise, among the poor or developing countries, some grow at annual rates that are far superior to others (for example, according to official figures, China and India have grown at a rate of eight or ten per cent annually for more than a decade, while a big part of the african subsaharian countries are in stagnation).

There are many hypothesis and models that try to explain why some countries grow more than others and, in short, why some countries reach levels of economic development and social welfare before others and why many remain in poverty. Traditionally, the neoclassical economists and other scholars had considered that the economic growth of a country depended above all on its initial amount of natural resources (raw materials and sources of energy) and its production capacity. However, since the decade of 1960's, education started to be considered as a factor in economic growth.

Both in the research on what came to be known as "economy of education" and in the same studies on economic growth, education was included as a "human investment". Education went in to being considered as one of the elements that can explain part of the residuals of the models of growth created until then (Bowman, 1960, Schultz 1961, Denison 1962). The key factors are no longer only the natural resources and machinery, but also the ability of the people to produce more and better goods and services. Towards that goal, economic theory has coined and applied the "human capital" concept, that basically can be measured by the level of education of the people. (Becker 1964, Lucas 1998).

Education, firstly, increases the private income of those who receive it. As a consequence, this increase in the individual income entails an increase in the contry's general economoc level, usually measured by the average or per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Benhabib & Spiegel 1994, Temple 1999, Rehme 2007).

Stressing this device —from education to individual income and from these to average collective growth— allows us to realize that a global estimate of the growth of a country can entail the existence or increase of inequalities of income between groups within the same country —precisely between those who are educated and those who do not have access to education.

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The shift in the role played by education in the studies on economic growth reflects a change that occurred mainly during the XX Century. During the first stages of the industrial revolution, first in England, a bit later in Germany and later on in other countries, the main factors that caused the flight and growth of economy were the introduction of machinery and the access to certain raw materials and sources of energy. On the other hand, since the middle of the XX Century, the technical and scientific advances have been determining factors for the introduction of new modes of production and the creation of new goods and services. In recent decades, the success of a nation with regard to its growth and development depends, of course, on its investment in physical capital, and on certain favourable environmental conditions. But it also depends to a great extent on how the most advanced knowledge and tools are used, which requires certain levels of training and teaching for the workforce.

Many research studies exist on the relationship between the economic growth of countries and the diffusion of education, which very often use quantitative measurable variables. Among them, public expenditure on education and the years of average schooling of the population must be emphasized. The results of these investigations, and of the periodical reports and studies carried out by governments and international organizations that focus on this issue, are quite varied and not very conclusive.

For example, a research that included 29 developing countries in the 1980's showed that education's contribution in explaining the differences in economic growth between countries ranged from 1 per cent in Mexico to 23 per cent in Ghana (Psacharopoulos 1984). Another study including 128 developed and developing countries showed that an additional year of education in an adult male can increase his productivity by 19 per cent. In order to measure how this individual increase translates into collective growth one has to consider the cost of schooling, including the building of schools and the salaries of the teaching staff, controlling if the available workforce has been modified caused by demographical changes and examining the potential institutional obstacles that could hinder the projection of individual work on economy. According to all of this, globally, an additional year of schooling in the male population older than 25 years entails on average an increase in

the contry's economic growth rate of 0,44 per cent (Barro 2001).

As a consequence of the new economic role played by education, the governments of the majority of countries have modified the goals of their public policies to invest not only on physical capital and helping private businesses to carry out these type of investments, but also to invest in human capital. For an economy to be able to integrate in the global markets and compete in the production of goods and services, it is necessary to increase the innovation rates, increasing productivity, improving the methods of production and promoting the introduction of new technologies. To achieve this, the country's population must be educated and must possess the cognitive tools and basic competences to solve problems at work, and in order to innovate. The XXI Century is becoming, even more that the previous one, the century of the acquisition of knowledge.

The relationship between economic development and diffusion of education is complex. A process of development in which the investment increases and that has a good system of decision-making with regard to public policies, which in turn implies a favourable social context and efficient public institutions, can generate a wide diffusion of education within a country. At the same time, the opening up of a country, both with regard to economic exchanges with other countries and to the cultural aspect, the quality of its political system, rulers and administrators, promotes the diffusion of education. In short, there is much empirical evidence that shows a positive correlation between the levels of education of a country's population and the levels of economic and social welfare. But there are no conclusive studies on the priority of each one of these aspects in the global dynamics, that is, ob the relationships of cause-effect between the different variables that have been mentioned.

2. The diffuse effects of education

There are several aspects that are very important in the relationship between education and economic growth that are not grasped by the studies that are based on the quantitative measurement of public expenditure, the years of schooling of the population and the annual rates of growth of a country's gross domestic product. Among them we find the following, which shall be reviewed next:

- Firstly, the importance of education is not only based on its quantity, but on its quality, that is, that which is studied, the learning techniques that are used and the results obtained by the students.
- Secondly, although the effects of education on growth can be direct, because of the professional and work qualifications education generates and the resulting increases in productivity and in the admission of educated people, and can also be indirect, since education modifies other behaviours and social structures that, in turn, can have an influence in the dynamics of growth.
- Lastly, while some of the consequences of the diffusion of education can be measured quantitatively with the available data and operations, others can be more difficult to measure.

3. Quantity vs. quality of education

Let's begin with the first point. As we said, the investment in education is usually measured by the public expenditure in education as a percentage of the GDP. Also, the diffusion of education is usually measured by the years of average schooling of the adult population of a country. But although the existence of schools and teachers and mere education can influence the way a person faces the world, the quality of the knowledge acquired by students can be more important. To put it somewhat more focused: "To consider schooling as an indicator of education is delicate, because it does not guarantee that the quality of the learnings obtained is good enough in order to have a real impact on the development of the abilities and capacities of people" (Hanushek 2005).

This idea has been present in literature for many years (Solmon 1975, Wachtel 1975, Rizzuto 1980). In fact, the quality of education could explain the gap that still exists between developed and underdeveloped countries, because although in the recent years the number of years that children spend at school has increased, this increase has not had a great impact on the growth of the economy. The operative process of gathering data on the quality of education has been provided mainly by the reports of The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The number of tested countries has been increasing, from 43 in the year 2000 to 62 in

2009. Each test assesses fifteen year old students (including between 4,500 and 10,000 samples of students in each country), particularly with regard to the results in the learning of reading, maths and science. There is also comparative data from forty countries in the TIMSS reports (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).

These studies show that the expenditure on education is not strongly linked to the quality of education, according to the assessment carried out by PISA, as can be seen on Chart n° 1. Some countries in which the two variables are strongly deviated ar, for instance, Canada, that in spite of having a relatively low level of expenditure within the developed countries, obtains the highest score in the PISA test on quality of education, and, on the other hand, Portugal and Mexico, both with relatively high levels of public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, but with results that rank among the poor quality countries assessed by PISA.

Chart 1. Expenditure on education and quality of education.

The interesting part of this issue is that the quality of education is more clearly linked than public expenditure in schools or number of years at school to personal income and

economic growth   —so, focusing on the mentioned cases, education in Canada would favour economic growth more than in Mexico. Some research has shown that the better the results are achieved by a student in the educational assessments of PISA and TIMSS, greater are the chances of him obtaining a higher salary. Specifically, a standard deviation above the average in the completion of standard tests on maths entails an increase of 12 per cent in annual income. This percentage in the increase of the salary tends to be higher in the developing countries than in the developed countries. (Mulligan 1999, Lazear 2003).

As we mentioned previously, the influence of education on collective economic growth involves more complex relationships than its impact on individual income. But the quality of education seems to have a bigger impact on economic growth than years at school. A study considered the international differences of knowledge on maths and science and found that a standard deviation of difference in these abilites between countries is translated into a difference of 1 per cent in the rates of annual growth of the GDP per capita (Hanushek y Kimko 2000). Another study compared, separately, the PISA assessment on science and the years of schooling for each country with the economic growth and found that the former is much more significant than the latter. As occurs in the mentioned study, an increase in the standard deviation in the results in science of the male students entails an increase of 1 per cent in the growth rate. But a standard deviation of the years of schooling only increases the growth rate 0,2 per cent. (Barro 2001).

The available studies show that the results of the students in maths are also linked positively and in a statistically significat way with the rates of economic growth, although less than the results in science. Unfortunately, the data on students' learning of reading are insufficient in several countries in order to draw significant links in this apect. The average of the three subjects that have been tested (reading, maths and science) shows, globally, a positive link with the rates of economic growth, as can be seen on Chart 2.

Chart 2. Quality of education and economic growth.

Tasa de crecimiento económico

Resultados de las pruebas internacionales de educación

4. Direct and indirect consequences of education

The direct effects of the quantity and quality of education on economic growth are related above all to an increase of productivity of educated people, as we have suggested. Specifically, in agriculture, the basic training and education of farmers promotes the use of modern technology. In the industry, employees need a certain ability to adapt to technological change. Even the "non-qualified" workers of a modern factory need teachings of basic literacy, the numberization and the discipline that can be acquired in primary and secondary schools. In services, an ability to obtain and manage information and knowledge is crucial, as it is to be open minded about changes and novelties, which definitely depend on education. Generally speaking, a company's investments in physical capital are usually much more productive and efficient if they are paired with a high availability of human capital.

But together with these direct effects, the indirect effects of education on the economy and welfare of societies can be even more important. A first clue that indicates this fact is given by the studies that show how the schooling of

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women does not have the same short-term impact on economic growth that is shown for the education of men (Barro y Sala 1995). This occurs because many underdeveloped countries have policies of seclusion and discrimination of women that prevent the use of educated women's abilities in the formal labour market.

However, these same studies show an important effect of women's education on the family structure, which in turn has a very clear mid-term to long-term impact on economic growth. Firstly, educated women tend to reduce their fertility through the use of contraceptives, postponing the age of pregnancy and reducing the number of children, while at the same time the diffusion of education reduces the rates of infant mortality (as was seen in, for instance, the studies of Cochrane 1979 y de Cochrane, Leslie y O'Hara 1980).

These changes are more noticeable in the underdeveloped countries. Various studies on 14 african countries showed that by introducing women to primary and above all secondary schools, their fertility decreased. Among these countries, Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe had the higher levels of females schooling and the lower rates of infant mortality. (Behraman y Wolfe 1987, Birdsall 1995).

All these changes reduce significantly the time dedicated by women to caring for the children, and especially the time dedicated by mothers to their daughters, which liberates a huge female productive workforce. The education of women promotes their participation in the labour market. Collectively, the effect on the increase of the GDP per capita is two-fold: on the one hand, production increases because of women's work (numerator); on the other, the growth of the population decreases (denominator).

At the same time, educated mothers tend to improve the conditions of health at home, increasing the quality of the family's diet, reducing smoking and promoting healthier habits. Likewise, in families with educated mothers the activities and learnings given to the children before they start attending school and the early development of abilities that will later improve their performance become more important. (Slowsky 1982). All of this reduces health care costs and indirectly favours an improvement of productivity.

5. Non measurable effects

The quantitative measurement of the effects of education on economic development and social welfare suffers from certain shortages related to the difficulty of including some significant phenomena in the usual data and statistical relationships. Generally, the multiple dimensions of social welfare cannot be grasped by national accounting if it only focuses on economic income. But even with regard to the usual quantitative variables, there are latent phenomena that can distort the vision of the consequences of schooling.

Specifically, the measurement of the effects of education is very precarious when we consider individual incomes. In many studies, salaries from people with different levels of schooling are regarded as an index. But in the developing countries the majority of the population does not receive formal salaries, but make their living from agriculture production or from the informal sector of economy. Some partial studies indicate a positive relation between the education of farmers and the productivity of agriculture. Thus, it has been proved that the productivity of a farmer increases 8,7 per cent when he completes four years of primary education (Jamison y Lau 1982). In Thailand, the probability of a farmer adopting a technology that uses chemical consumables is 60 per cent greater if he has completed four years of education (Birdsall 1993). In Nepal, finishing the first seven years of education increases the production of corn by 25 per cent and rice by 13 per cent (Jamison y Moock 1994). However, this evidence has not been integrated into the general economic models, which usually estimate the impact of education on urban salaries, and this underestimates its importance in rural zones.

Another aspect that is commonly ignored is the indirect impact of education on extending the productive life of people. The interaction between the different processes is actually difficult to establish: on the one hand, economic growth extends people's lifes, by improving health and hygienic conditions; on the other hand, the diffusion of education is both the cause and effect of economic growth; and lastly, extending the working life can be promoted by development and education and at the same time contributes to increase a country's production. Growth, education and an extended productive life are interconnected, although short-term measurements tend not to consider long-term changes in the size of the economically active population.

The aspects we have mentioned —non-economic welfare, agricultural income, extension of life—would increase the estimations of the positive effects on education. In an opposite sense, education can promote emigration in the poor countries and in this way have a negative impact on its productive capacity. Each country cerainly has a different context and the decision to emigrate does not only depend on the person's degree of schooling. But education provides more information on the existence of other ways of life and on the possiblity of achieving them, which can incite educated people to emigrate in search of better opportunities (Schwartz 1971). Insofar as people with a better education tend to emigrate, public expenditure on education can even have a negative effect on economic growth, as probably is the case of some countries that have mass emigration. In fact, there could be a transfer of resources from the poor countries to the rich ones, since the latter are the beneficiaries of the economic and cultural effects caused by the investment of the former in the education of their sharpest and most ambitious citizens.

The biggest problem when facing the measurement of economic and social effects of the diffusion of education is that a great part of them can only be observed over a long-term period of time. If we analyse retrospectively the processes of economic development in the most advanced countries, especially in western Europe, United States and Japan, we shall realize that the diffusion of education was a historical process that spanned over a very long period. The changes in these countries took place since the end of the XIX Century or beginning of the XX Century, when they had levels of schooling that were comparable to the current levels of the poor countries. In the currently developed countries, the shift from a rate of 10 per cent to 90 per cent of population literacy required an average period of 50 years, while the diffusion of primary school took 100 years to reach a 90 per cent rate. (Meyer et al. 1992).

Compared to these countries, both the concern for the diffusion of education and the focus on its economic consequences in the underdeveloped countries or those that are at a developing stage, are still too recent for us to reach satisfactory conclusions. In the last forty years there have been many campaigns driven by international organizations, and changes in the policies of many underdeveloped countries favouring greater investments in education. In the majority of

countries from Eastern Europe, Central and East Asia and South America, the relative increase in public expenditure and schooling of children and youngsters has been very significant, reaching an average of nine or ten years of schooling per person —a level that should have a visible economic impact. In North Africa, Middle East and South Asia the changes are also noticeable, but those levels of schooling still have not been achieved. Lastly, Sub-saharan Africa is still very backward in these aspects. But, generally speaking, the impact of the investment in education on growth has been limited.

In a recent research, Hanushek (2009) shows that the implementation of a programme that improves the quality of education that is applied in, for instance, year 2005, and succeeds in improving moderately the students' abilities, would only render positive effects towards the year 2040. We must consider that a high and sustained expenditure on education will only be convered by the dividends of the education investment some thirty years later, as Chart 3 suggests. Beyond that period, the economic benefits of the expense on education are clearly increasing. But governmental programmes that are only ten or twenty years long can generate insufficient results.

Chart 3. Long-term effects of education expenditure

Because of this, a global assessment of the effects of the new policies and education expenditure adopted in the last decades on economic development can cause some disappointment. The truth is that in many underdeveloped countries the quantitative changes have been big in scale, both as regards public expenditure and years of schooling. But the economic and social differences between those countries and the most developed in the world, which continue taking strides

in their process of growth and innovation, are not only very big, but also up until now tend to increase.

6. Governmental and international action

For many years, a number of inter-governmental meetings have promised to reach universal primary education in the underdeveloped countries within a period of time. One of the first international meetings of this kind took place in Geneva in 1951, and was followed by a meeting of ministers of education and those in charge of economic planning under the sponsorship of UNESCO in Santiago de Chile in 1962, the gatherings of the International Development Strategy sponsored by the United Nations for the Second and Third Decades, in New York in 1970 and 1980, respectively, and, more recently, the Millenium Summit, also in New York in the year 2000. During this period, the UNESCO has also organized a number of meetings of ministers for the development of education in Asia, Africa, in the arab countries and in South America, which, together with many other gatherings, have produced the "Karachi plan", "the Adis Abeba plan", the "Santiago Plan", the "Jomtien declaration", the "Delhi declaration", the "Dakar declaration" (named after the cities which hosted the meetings) and, more recently, the "Millenium Declaration".

In all these meetings, the participating governments pledged to reach the goals of complete schooling and gender equality in education within a concrete deadline of ten to twenty years. Specifically, the biggest meeting of heads of state that has ever taken place, in New York in 2000, approved unanimously to include among the Millenium Development Goals that "towards the year 2015... ensure that... children anywhere , boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling, and that girls and boys have equal access to all levels of education".

Generally speaking, the commitments made by governments have been materialized in of certain sums of public expenditure, according to the calculations made at the time. For the Millenium Goals an estimated 9 thousand million dollars increase in the annual expenditure on education in the world (Delamonica et al 2001). In several moments it has been stressed that a disarmament of the states would liberate more resources for a greater expenditure on education, which could be included among the "returns of peace". As we have mentioned, the governmental expenditure on education has

increased noticeably in the past decades. With the available data, the average expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in 2006 is, for the 41 more developed countries, of 5 per cent, while for the remaining 158 less developd countries is 4,3 per cent.

It must be pointed out that the proportions are very similar to military expenditure, that at a world level have been reduced to nearly a third of what they had reached towards the end of the eighties, at the height of the Cold War, so it doesn't seem likely that greater transfers between these two headings could be decisive (military expenditure is currently 2,7 per cent of GDP in the 41 more developed countries and 2,4 in the rest).

The series of meetings and declarations presented previously indicates that the goals set in each one of them have not been met. It must be considered that there are currently in some 100 million children who do not have access to schools in the world. In view of the gap between the established goals and the results that have been obtained, it is clear that governments can take a few steps in order to promote the diffusion of education, but achieving universal schooling efficiently seems to be out of their hands.

Among the most efficient policies that a government can implement, the following can be identified.

Firstly, governments can reduce the private expenses of the investment of parents in education. This can be reached through the reduction of the distance to schools in the rural regions, or the reduction of enrollment fees, school materials and maintenance, including the distribution of food in schools.

Secondly, the training of teachers must be improved. The basic goals include ensuring that teachers know and use adequate pedagogical methods, directed towards teaching to learn, the use of english as a lingua franca, the use of appropriate text books, computing, and audiovisual media and the assignments to be carried out at home by students. It has been suggested that the training of teachers in developed countries to practice their profession in poor countries should be promoted. But one has to consider that in many poor countries, the first goal with regard to teachers is as basic as reducing absenteeism. Teachers' unions are usually obligatory negotiators for introducing and sustaining these measures, but they are not always willing to cooperate and sometimes they even represent a major obstacle for innovation and the monitoring of performance at school.

Lastly, governments can also make transfers of money to parents, on the condition of a regular attendance to school and an efficient performance of children at school. These kind of programmes became famous thanks to the pilot experience of the PROGRESA (also known as the "Opportunities" programme) in Mexico and has been imitated succesfully in other countries. The governmental distribution of monetary bonds to be spent in schools chosen by parents and other measures that promote competition between public and private schools have also obtained well recorded results in Colombia, Ethiopia and India. In short, as an expert on the subject says, governments can build fountains of water and take the citizens to them, but it cannot force them to drink.

It is not an easy task to value the performance of international aid, that is, of the monetary transfers for education made by the developed countries to the underdeveloped countries. The main problem is the absence of control over the commitments of both the developed countries (donors) and the poor countries (recipients), since there is no institutional or democratic framework of accountability at an international level. On the one hand, for the governments of the rich countries, the aid can be explained to their voters as constrained by the commitments made by the governments of the poor countries to use it correctly and efficiently. But the rulers know that the compliance with this condition can only be verified after one or several terms of office, with scarce consequences for them. On the other hand, for the governments of some poor countries, the aid can be used to pay the ruling class and to replace other expenses, particularly of unproductive consumption, or to indoctrinate the youth with the basic myths of nationalism giving support to the existing regime. In fact, an important part of the international aid is assigned to dictatorships whicha are not formally commited with its use.

The total aid managed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD has quadruplicated in the past ten years. Of the total sum, nearly one third is dedicated to education (while another third is dedicated to humanitarian aid and peacemaking and another third to improving the government and civil society). This means that in the year 2007 some 7 thousand million dollars of international aid were alloted to education. A systematic research of the efficiency of the aid in the sector of education concluded that, globally, it

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has had a "positive effect" in assisting the development of primary schooling.

> "However, not even the most optimistic estimates show clearly that, considering any realistic rate of economic growth, the aid may never be able to move the world closer to the internationally accepted goal of education for all. Universal primary education requires an increase of the efficiency of expenditure on education both from donors and national governments. The political and institutional conditions of the recipient countries are also important. In conditions of bad government, the impact of the schooling aid could in fact be negative." (Michaelowa 2004)

7. The egg and the hen

The inconclusive character of the studies on the effects of policies of diffusion of education on economic growth suggests the possibility of the alternative line of causality becoming important: from development to education. In order to understand this, we must adopt a point of view that considers the degree of diffusion of education, as it is measured, for example, by the years of schooling, and by the improvements of its quality, is a result of both the offer and the demand of education. Until now a lot of attention has been paid to the offer, that is, to governmental policies of expenditure on schools and teacher, as we have seen in the previous section. But the other side of the relationship, the demand of education by parents and families can be a key factor.

We can consider that individuals and families invest in education, as in any other good or service, only insofar as the private benefits they can hope to obtain from the investment are higher than the private expenses it entails. In a society's long-term transition from an underdeveloped level to a developed level, the private benefits of education can be translated into an increase of salaries and other income received by the educated citizens, from which one must subtract the benefits obtained from child labour that is typical of societies with no education, which disappear, and the costs of schooling. These benefits will be clearly positive if families can expect the existence of a demand of qualified labour in the labour market that compensates only too well for the benefits of traditional child labour for the family. But these expectations of working prosperity depend on the existence of

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a minimum level of economic development, that is, they are to a great extent independent from the individual decision to invest in education.

The accumulated experience would allow us to suspect that although governmental policies can increase the offer of schools and teachers, they are incapable of generating a wide demand for education among the population when the circumstances are not favourable. Some authors have compared the educational transition of a society with its demographic shift, which depends more on the individual decision of having less children than on public rules and regulations on family and birthrate. Generally, individual decisions regarding the number of members of a family depend to great extent on the economic expectations of their members. Only a totalitarian government can try to regulate family and sexual behaviour to the point of provoking an accelerated demographic transition (as has been attempted by China's communist government, for example).

Similarly, only through coercive means could an educational policy based on modifying radically and in the short-term the behaviour of individuals and families with regard to children's schooling be succesful. In the past times of the currently developed countries, the legal establishment of compulsory primary education was either only a mere announcement of intentions that took several decades to materialize (as happened in France and other European countries), or when in practice a near-universal schooling had been attained (as is the case of the United States), so governmental legislation was not a decisive factor of real change. Universal schooling in these countries was attained with levels of per capita income somewhat highers than the current levels of the poorer countries. Something similar could be said in terms of the laws that forbid child labour.

An ambitious study on the expansion of schooling in the currently developed countries over a period of a hundred and fifty years, significantly titled "Does the state expand the school?", came to the following conclusions:

> "The available empirical evidence suggests that the actions of the state, whether material or symbolical, can have an influence in schooling under certain conditions. In conclusion, the forms of effective action can include the political regulation of labour structures; the opening-

up of a structure of opportunities and signs that indicate that more schooling will render economic benefits; increasing directly the offer of schools and vacancies; generating links between schooling and the western ideals of universal suffrage, national integration and individual development; and reducing the opportunity cost received by the restriction on child labour and legitimizing schools as the regulatory setting for socialization":

However, the authors stressed that these actions can only be carried out by strong governments. "And the underlying political and economical conditions define the chances of these types of measures being adopted and having real effects on the expansion of schooling." (Fuller and Robinson 1992).

Mentioning political and economical conditions leads us to indicate that many authoritarian political regimes are not especially keen in the diffusion of education among the population, because of the dangers that training and information could imply in terms of generating more demands of freedom, participation and control over the rulers. Therefore, the hypothesis of an educational transition promoted by the government, that is, by the side of the offer (let's say chinese style), is not very realistic for certain countries. But even if it does happen within open societies, its success will surely be limited, since the results depend above all on the response from the demand, that is, on the behaviour of the population.

So, although the connection between education and development can seem so uncertain as the dilemma of the egg and the hen, the opposite line of causality to that which has been considered to this point could be quite relevant. As the increase of per capita income gets bigger, the demand for education of their children also increases. In other words, low levels of income generate low levels of demand for education; only where there are high levels of income can we expect there will be a wide and sustained demand for education. According to this approach, economic growth, demographical maturity and political and institutional stability will generate a bigger demand for education, playing a more decisive role than the offer schools and teachers created by the government.

Some available studies show, indeed, that the main factors that could explain childrens' schooling are the previous economic development, which implies relatively high levels of

income and welfare in families, and the levels of education attained by the parents, which in turn depend on the structure of the family (with active women outside the household). This line of thought is more powerful than the opposed one, that is, the one that assumes that schooling (promoted by governmental policies) will generate economic and social development (Clemens 2004). A notorious illustration of this connection has been observed in some countries undergoing a stage of development, as for instance in Mexico, where, in spite of the sustained governmental policies of educational expenditure, economical stagnation and recession during the eighties translated directly into a temporary stagnation of the expansion of schooling.

The problem is that economical development and family changes take place at a very slow pace and they only produce accumulative effects on a long-term, so their consequences on the demand for childrens' education also tend to appear slowly. Because of this, the goal of achieving education for all, widely advocated by governments and international organizations, together with its positive effects on development and welfare, are far from being accessible with the current economical, social and political structures of the world.

3
The Importance of School Quality

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Most empirical analyses of human capital have concentrated solely on the quantity of schooling attained by individuals, ignoring quality differences. This focus contrasts sharply with policy considerations that almost exclusively consider school quality issues. This paper presents basic evidence about the impact of school quality on individual earnings, on the distribution of income, and on economic growth. In assessing these effects, special attention is given to variations across countries at different levels of development.

The importance of schooling is widely accepted. Both individuals and governments around the world have focused attention and resources on obtaining more schooling. On a global level, there has been an effort – captured by the popular campaigns of "Education for All" and the "Millennium Development Goals – to ensure access to minimal schooling for all children of the world.[1] Yet the focus of much of this attention has remained on school attainment. Much less attention has focused on quality issues. Recent research, however, shows that the quality dimension is most important.

Economists have devoted considerable attention to understanding how human capital affects a variety of economic outcomes. The underlying notion is that individuals make investment decisions in themselves through schooling and other routes. The accumulated skills that are relevant for the labor market from these investments over time represent an important component of the human capital of an individual. The investments made to improve skills then return future economic benefits in much the same way that a firm's investment in a set of machines (physical capital) returns future production and income. In the case of public education, parents and public officials act as trustees for their children in setting many aspects of the investment paths.

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[1] Both policy efforts include a goal of universal middle school education. Both also have substantial institutional backing from the United Nations and UNESCO. See United Nations (2009), UNESCO (2008).

Around the world, schools are given a special role in human capital investments. Even though extensive research indicates knowledge and skills come from a variety of sources – families, friends, and neighbors in addition to schools – most governments see their largest leverage as coming through schools. And, most governments heavily subsidize if not completely pay for public schooling for their citizens. Thus, both the benefits and the costs of schooling must be considered from an individual viewpoint and from a societal viewpoint.

The plan of this paper is to present the evidence on the economic impacts of school attainment and of cognitive skills – the knowledge resulting from schools and other sources. Particular emphasis is placed on the impact of cognitive skills on economic growth of nations, because this discussion has largely been overlooked in previous analyses. It then turns to how schools can be used to improve cognitive skills. The later discussion is necessarily largely focused on research from the United States, reflecting the available evidence from around the world.

1. Quantity of Schooling

In the United States, at the beginning of the twentieth century, only six percent of the adult population had finished high school. After the first world war, high school graduation rates began to increase rapidly. But changes in education work their way only slowly through the overall population. By 1940, only half of Americans aged 25 or older had completed more than eight years of school, that is, had had any high school education at all. Not until 1967 did attainment of the median adult aged 25 or over exceed high school.[2] Since 1967, however, the increase in the number of years of schooling completed by Americans has slowed. The young adult population, aged 25 to 29, has had stable completion rates for almost two decades. At the turn of the 21st century, over 80 percent of Americans over 25 had completed high school or more (Heckman and LaFontaine (2007)).

The changes in other nations have been even more dramatic. Table 1 shows the percentages of different age groups completing upper secondary schools for a sample of

[2]See U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, (2000), Goldin (1998), and Goldin and Katz (2008).

more developed countries in 2006.[3] The different age groups effectively trace the normal schooling in different decades in the past, so that the changes with age show the rate of increase in schooling. While the United States has been stable since the 1960s, most of the other countries have undergone massive increases in high school completion – mirroring the historical developments in the U.S. before and immediately after World War II (Goldin (1998)).

The benefits of education to individuals are also clear. The average incomes of workers with a high school education remain significantly above those of the less educated, and the average income of workers with a college education now dwarf those of the high school educated. In the U.S., the rapidly increasing earnings of college-educated workers during the past two decades currently provides them with a premium of more than 70 percent higher earnings than a high school graduate with similar job experience.[4]

The earnings patterns elsewhere in the world appear quantitatively more varied, but there is a strong similarity in the earnings effects associated with more schooling. While the earning distribution is more compressed in some countries than others – probably reflecting characteristics of labor markets – invariably there are obvious gains in earnings to more schooling. Not only are wages higher for the better educated, but they also tend to enjoy greater job opportunities and suffer less unemployment (U.S. Department of Education (1996); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008)).

For individuals the increased relative incomes of more educated people have been sufficient to offset the costs. An individual can expect significant financial benefit from extended schooling, even after appropriately considering

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[3] A comprehensive comparison of schooling across nations can be found in Barro and Lee (2001).

[4] More detail on the patterns of earnings can be found in Murphy and Welch (1989, (1992), Kosters (1991), Pierce and Welch (1996), Deere (2001), and Deere and Vesovic (2006). McMahon (1991) reports slightly lower private rates of return for high school completion than for college completion, although they remain substantial. These calculations all rely on just salary differentials, and greater equality in the provision of fringe benefits may act to compress the differences for total compensation. However, no analysis of schooling returns in terms of total compensation is available.

costs.[5] Individuals also gain non-financial benefits from education. For example, there is evidence that more educated people make better choices concerning health, so they tend to live longer and to have healthier lives. There is also evidence that the children of more educated parents get more out of school. They attend longer and learn more. Such benefits of schooling simply reinforce those from the labor market.[6]

The common interpretation of the overall returns is that high technology economies produce large demands for skilled workers, workers who can adapt to new technologies and manage complicated production processes effectively. Formal models with this character are developed in Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Welch (1970) and summarized in the ideas of dealing with disequilibrium in Schultz (1975).

Society as a whole also benefits from education. National income rises directly with earnings from workers with more and better skills. The more educated are more prone to be civically involved, to vote in local and national elections, and to be a better informed and more responsible electorate.[7]

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[5] While most economists think of schooling as involving the production of human capital in individuals, the screening or signaling perspective is a clear alternative (e.g., Spence (1973), Wolpin (1977), Weiss (1995)). The screening model in the extreme suggests that individuals begin schooling with differing abilities and that schooling merely allows employers to identify those with more ability. From the individual's viewpoint, it does not matter what the source of earnings enhancement is, be it production by schools or screening. The individual will be equally induced to make schooling investments based on the comparison of returns and costs. The two may, however, yield quite different incentives to governments to invest, because signaling may lead to different social and private returns to schooling. As a general matter, these models are not identified with just labor market outcome data. A variety of specialized tests under different maintained assumptions about individual motivations and firm behavior have been conducted but have not provided clear support for screening. These tests include looking for "sheepskin effects," particularly high returns to completing given institutional levels, as in Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974). Some support of screening does come from analysis of incentives to complete high school when there are fewer college graduates Bedard (2001). See Riley (2001) for a review of general theoretical and empirical work. The key difficulty with these tests, however, remains that they focus on labor market outcomes, where the private returns to schooling are generally expected to exist independent of the underlying causal mechanism. The analysis below concentrates importantly on outcomes that relate directly to the schooling process (the point where the two models are hypothesized to differ significantly).

[6] See, for example, Michael (1982); Haveman and Wolfe (1984); Wolfe and Zuvekas (1995); and Leibowitz (1974). Many factors are unclear, however, because of questions of causality; see, for example, Farrell and Fuchs (1982).

[7] The pattern of U.S. voting over time can be found inStanley and Niemi (2000). An analysis of the partial effects of educational attainment (which are

Increases in the level of education are associated with reductions in crime (e.g., Ehrlich (1975), Lochner and Moretti (2001)).

Recent economic studies argue that education may provide economic benefits to society greater than the sum of its benefits to individuals – by providing a rich environment for innovation, scientific discovery, education can accelerate the growth rate of the economy; see, for example, the analyses of growth by Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Barro (1991), Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). The growth effects depending on the aggregate level of education in the economy enter as an externality to the individual. (Estimation by Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), however, questions this effect, at least at the state level).

Education appears also to have helped to achieve both greater social equality and greater equity in the distribution of economic resources. Schooling was a centerpiece of the U.S. War on Poverty in the 1960s, and the benefits of improved schooling are demonstrated in comparisons of the earnings of different social and ethnic groups. Earnings by blacks and whites have converged noticeably since the Second World War, and much of this convergence is attributable to improved educational opportunities for African-Americans (see Smith and Welch (1989); Jaynes and Williams (1989)). However, as discussed below, that convergence slowed down noticeably in the 1980s with skill differences being cited as a prime determinant (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)).

Nonetheless, while there are many well-documented associations between amount of schooling – either individually or in the aggregate – and desirable economic outcomes, significant questions remain about the magnitude and interpretation of these relationships. Most importantly, the association may misstate the causal impact of changes in schooling for individuals and the aggregate.[8] Moreover, the measurement issues surrounding human capital and the use of school attainment, as highlighted in the next section, are significant.

positive in the face of overall declines in voter turnout over time) is presented in Teixeira (1992).

[8] For example, Bils and Klenow (2000) question the importance of education as a cause of growth, as opposed to the relationship going the other way around. See also the perspectives in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). At the individual level, see Card (1999).

2. Impacts of Quality on Individual Incomes—Developed Countries

One of the most significant challenges in understanding the impact of quality differences in human capital has been simply knowing how to measure quality. Much of the discussion of quality—in part related to new efforts to provide better accountability—has identified cognitive skills as the important dimension. And, while there is ongoing debate about the testing and measurement of these skills, most parents and policy makers alike accept the notion that cognitive skills are a key dimension of schooling outcomes. The question is whether this proxy for the quality of human capital—students' performance on standardized tests—is correlated with individuals' performance in the labor market and the economy's ability to grow. Until recently, little comprehensive data have been available to show any relationship between differences in cognitive skills and any related economic outcomes. Such data are now becoming available.

Much of the work by economists on differences in worker skills has actually been directed at the issue of determining the average labor market returns to additional schooling and the possible influence of differences in ability. The argument has been that higher-ability students are more likely to continue in schooling. Therefore, part of the higher earnings observed for those with additional schooling really reflects pay for added ability and not for the additional schooling. Economists have pursued a variety of analytical approaches for dealing with this, including adjusting for measured cognitive test scores, but this work generally ignores issues of variation in school quality.[9]

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[9] Much of the work by economists on differences in worker skills has actually been directed at the issue of determining the average labor market returns to additional schooling. The argument has been that higher-ability students are more likely to continue in schooling. Therefore, part of the higher earnings observed for those with additional schooling really reflects pay for added ability and not for the additional schooling. Economists have pursued a variety of analytical approaches for dealing with this, including adjusting for measured cognitive test scores, but this work generally ignores issues of variation in school quality. The approaches have included looking for circumstances where the amount of schooling is affected by things other than the student's valuation of continuing and considering the income differences among twins (see Card (1999)). The various adjustments for ability differences typically make small differences on the estimates of the value of schooling, and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) argue that it is not possible to separate the effects of ability and schooling. The only explicit consideration of school quality typically investigates expenditure and resource differences across schools, but these are known to be poor measures of school quality differences (Hanushek (2003a)).

There is mounting evidence that quality measured by test scores is directly related to individual earnings, productivity, and economic growth. A variety of researchers documents that the earnings advantages to higher achievement on standardized tests are quite substantial.[10] While these analyses emphasize different aspects of individual earnings, they typically find that measured achievement has a clear impact on earnings after allowing for differences in the quantity of schooling, the experiences of workers, and other factors that might also influence earnings. In other words, higher quality as measured by tests similar to those currently being used in accountability systems around the country is closely related to individual productivity and earnings.

Three recently published U.S. studies provide direct and quite consistent estimates of the impact of test performance on earnings (Mulligan (1999); Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000);Lazear (2003)). These studies employ different nationally representative data sets that follow students after they leave schooling and enter the labor force. When scores are standardized, they suggest that one standard deviation increase in mathematics performance at the end of high schools translates into 12 percent higher annual earnings.

Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000) provide evidence from the High School and Beyond and the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972. Their estimates suggest some variation with males obtaining a 15 percent increase and females a 10 percent increase per standard deviation of test performance. Lazear (2003), relying on a somewhat younger sample from NELS88, provides a single estimate of 12 percent. These estimates are also very close to those in Mulligan (1999), who finds 11 percent for the normalized AFQT score in the NLSY data. By way of

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[10] These results are derived from different specific approaches, but the basic underlying analysis involves estimating a standard "Mincer" earnings function and adding a measure of individual cognitive skills. This approach relates the logarithm of earnings to years of schooling, experience, and other factors that might yield individual earnings differences. The clearest analyses are found in the following references (which are analyzed in Hanushek (2002)). See Bishop (1989, (1991); O'Neill (1990); Grogger and Eide (1993); Blackburn and Neumark (1993, (1995); Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995); Neal and Johnson (1996); Mulligan (1999); Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000); Altonji and Pierret (2001); Murnane, Willett, Braatz, and Duhaldeborde (2001); and Lazear (2003).

comparison, estimates of the value of an additional year of school attainment are typically 7-10 percent.

There are reasons to believe that these estimates provide a lower bound on the impact of higher achievement. First, these estimates are obtained fairly early in the work career (mid20's to early 30s), and other analysis suggests that the impact of test performance becomes larger with experience.[11] Second, the labor market experiences that are observed begin the mid1980's and extend into the mid1990s, but other evidence suggests that the value of skills and of schooling has grown throughout and past that period. Third, future general improvements in productivity are likely to lead to larger returns to skill.[12]

A limited number of additional studies are available for developed countries outside of the United States. McIntosh and Vignoles (2001) study wages in the United Kingdom and find strong returns to both numeracy and literacy.[13] Finnie and Meng (2002) and Green and Riddell (2003) investigate returns to cognitive skills in Canada. Both suggest that literacy has a significant return, but Finnie and Meng (2002) find an insignificant return to numeracy. This latter finding stands at odds with most other analyses that have emphasized numeracy or math skills.

Hanushek and Zhang (2008) provide an additional comparative study. Consistent data on basic skills of literacy and numeracy for a representative sample of the population aged 15-65 were collected for a sample of 13 countries between 1994 and 1998.[14] The analysis here combines the different IALS scores on skills into a single measure of literacy and numeracy (referred to simply as literacy scores). These data permit direct comparisons of the relative importance of

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[11] Altonji and Pierret (2001) find that the impact of achievement grows with experience, because the employer has a chance to observe the performance of workers.

[12] These analyses typically compare workers of different ages at one point in time to obtain an estimate of how earnings will change for any individual. If, however, productivity improvements occur in the economy, these will tend to raise the earnings of individuals over time. Thus, the impact of improvements in student skills are likely to rise over the work life instead of being constant as portrayed here.

[13] Because they look at discrete levels of skills, it is difficult to compare the quantitative magnitudes directly to the U.S. work.

[14] The included countries are Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States.

school attainment and cognitive skills across countries, although the bias toward developed economies remains.

As in the prior analyses, both school attainment and cognitive skills enter into the determination of individual incomes. With the exception of Poland, literacy scores have a consistent positive impact on earnings. The (unweighted) average of the impact of literacy scores is 0.093, only slightly less than found previously for the U.S. studies. The U.S. is noticeably higher than other countries and the previous U.S. studies, perhaps reflecting that these earnings are obtained across the entire work life.[15] The average excluding the U.S. is still 0.08. Again, the similarity to the prior estimates of the return to cognitive skills, coming from very different sampling schemes in different economic markets, lends more support to the significance of cognitive skills as a consistent measure of human capital.

Another part of the return to school quality comes through continuation in school. There is substantial U.S. evidence that students who do better in school, either through grades or scores on standardized achievement tests, tend to go farther in school.[16] Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000) separate the direct returns to measured skill from the indirect returns of more schooling and suggest that perhaps one-third to one-half of the full return to higher achievement

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[15] The previous discussion of the analysis by Altonji and Pierret (2001) can reconcile the difference in quantitative magnitudes of the impact of cognitive skills on U.S. earnings. Hanushek and Zhang (2008) find that the impact of literacy scores rises from that for the youngest workers, consistent with Altonji and Pierret. They do not, however, find support for this statistical discrimination hypothesis in the remaining 12 countries.

[16] See, for example, Dugan (1976); Manski and Wise (1983)). Rivkin (1995) finds that variations in test scores capture a considerable proportion of the systematic variation in high school completion and in college continuation, so that test score differences can fully explain black-white differences in schooling. Bishop (1991) and Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996), in considering the factors that influence school attainment, find that individual achievement scores are highly correlated with continued school attendance. Neal and Johnson (1996) in part use the impact of achievement differences of blacks and whites on school attainment to explain racial differences in incomes. Their point estimates of the impact of cognitive skills (AFQT) on earnings and school attendance appear to be roughly comparable to that found in Murnane, Willett, Duhaldeborde, and Tyler (2000). Behrman, Kletzer, McPherson, and Schapiro (1998) find strong achievement effects on both continuation into college and quality of college; moreover, the effects are larger when proper account is taken of the various determinants of achievement. Hanushek and Pace (1995) find that college completion is significantly related to higher test scores at the end of high school.

comes from further schooling. Note also that the effect of quality improvements on school attainment incorporates concerns about drop out rates. Specifically, higher student achievement keeps students in school longer, which will lead among other things to higher graduation rates at all levels of schooling.

This work has not, however, investigated how achievement affects the ultimate outcomes of additional schooling. For example, if over time lower-achieving students tend increasingly to attend further schooling, these schools may be forced to offer more remedial courses, and the variation of what students know and can do at the end of school may expand commensurately.

The impact of test performance on individual earnings provides a simple summary of the primary economic rewards to an individual. This estimate combines the impacts on hourly wages and on employment/hours worked. It does not include any differences in fringe benefits or nonmonetary aspects of jobs. Nor does it make any allowance for aggregate changes in the labor market that might occur over time.

3. Impacts of Quality on Individual Incomes—Developing Countries

Questions remain about whether the clear impacts of quality in the U.S. generalize to other countries, particularly developing countries. The literature on returns to cognitive skills in developing countries is restricted to a relatively limited number of countries: Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, and Tanzania. Moreover, a number of studies actually employ the same basic data, albeit with different analytical approaches, but come up with somewhat different results. Table 2 provides a simple summary to the quantitative estimates available for developing countries.

The summary of the evidence permits a tentative conclusion that the returns to quality may be even larger in developing countries than in developed countries. This of course would be consistent with the range of estimates for returns to quantity of schooling (e.g,., Psacharopoulos (1994)), which are frequently interpreted as indicating diminishing marginal returns to schooling.

There are some reasons for caution in interpreting the precise magnitude of estimates. First, the estimates appear to be quite sensitive to the estimation methodology itself. Both within individual studies and across studies using the same

basic data, the results are quite sensitive to the techniques employed in uncovering the fundamental parameter for cognitive skills.[17] Second, the evidence on variations within developing countries is not entirely clear. For example, Jolliffe (1998) finds little impact of skills on farm income, while Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (2008) suggest an equivalence across sectors at least on theoretical grounds.

Nonetheless, the overall summary is that the available estimates of the impact of cognitive skills on outcomes suggest strong economic returns within developing countries. The substantial magnitude of the typical estimates indicates that quality concerns are very real for developing countries and that this aspect of schools simply cannot be ignored – a topic that comes up below.

One implication of the impact of cognitive skills on individual earnings is that the distribution of those skills in the economy will have a direct effect on the distribution of income. Cognitive skills by themselves do not of course determine the full distribution, because other factors such as labor market institutions, taxes, and the like enter. But the importance of skills is becoming increasingly evident.

Very suggestive evidence on the impact of skills on the income distribution comes from Nickell (2004). Nickell, using the IALS data, considers how differences in the distribution of incomes across countries are affected by the distribution of skills and by institutional factors including unionization and minimum wages. While union coverage is statistically significant, he concludes that "the bulk of the variation in earnings dispersion is generated by skill dispersion" (page C11).[18] Indeed, the simple correlation at the country level between test score dispersion and earnings dispersion in 0.85 (Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)).

Other studies have also concluded that skills have an increasing impact on the distribution of income (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)). In the U.S., the distribution of incomes within schooling groups has been rising (Levy and Murnane (1992)), i.e., holding constant schooling attainment,

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[17] The sensitivity to estimation approach is not always the case; see, for example, Jolliffe (1998). A critique and interpretation of the alternative approaches within a number of these studies can be found in Glewwe (2002).

[18] De Gregorio and Lee (2002) find a (somewhat weaker) positive association between inequality in years of schooling and income inequality.

the income distribution has become more dispersed in reflection of growing rewards to individual skills.

Again, these studies do not attempt to describe the causal structure, and it would be inappropriate to attribute the variance in earnings simply to differences in the quantity or quality of schooling. Nonetheless, to the extent that these contribute to variations in cognitive skills, it is fair to conclude that policies aimed at improving school quality (and educational outcomes) will affect the income distribution.

4. Impacts of Quality on Economic Growth

The relationship between measured labor force quality and economic growth is perhaps even more important than the impact of human capital and school quality on individual productivity and incomes. Economic growth determines how much improvement will occur in the overall standard of living of society. Moreover, the education of each individual has the possibility of making others better off (in addition to the individual benefits just discussed). Specifically, a more educated society may lead to higher rates of invention; may make everybody more productive through the ability of firms to introduce new and better production methods; and may lead to more rapid introduction of new technologies. These externalities provide extra reason for being concerned about the quality of schooling.

The potential effect of differences in growth rates on economic well-being is easy to see. Figure 1 begins with the value of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for a medium income country in the year 2000 and shows its value in 2050 under different growth rates. If it grows at one percent each year, this measure (in U.S. dollars) would increase from $5,500 to $9,000 – or increasing by almost two-thirds over the period. If it were to grow at two percent per year, it would reach $15,000 in 2050! Small differences in growth rates have huge implications for the income and wealth of society.

The current economic position of the United States, for example, is largely the result of its strong and steady growth over the twentieth century. Economists have developed a variety of models and ideas to explain differences in growth rates across countries – invariably featuring the importance of human capital.[19]

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[19] Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)review recent analyses and the range of factors that are included.

The empirical work supporting growth analyses has emphasized school attainment differences across countries. Again, this is natural because, while compiling comparable data on many things for different countries is difficult, assessing quantity of schooling is more straightforward. The typical study finds that quantity of schooling is highly related to economic growth rates. But, quantity of schooling is a very crude measure of the knowledge and cognitive skills of people – particularly in an international context.

Hanushek and Kimko (2000) go beyond simple quantity of schooling and delve into quality of schooling.[20] We incorporate the information about international differences in mathematics and science knowledge that has been developed through testing over the past four decades. And we find a remarkable impact of differences in school quality on economic growth.

The international comparisons of quality come from piecing together results of a series of tests administered over the past four decades. In 1963 and 1964, the International Association for the Evaluation of Education al Achievement (IEA) administered the first of a series of mathematics tests to a voluntary group of countries. These initial tests suffered from a number of problems, but they did prove the feasibility of such testing and set in motion a process to expand and improve on the undertaking.[21]

Subsequent testing, sponsored by the IEA, the OECD, and others, has included both math and science and has expanded on the group of countries that have been tested. Between 1964 and 2003, twelve separate test administrations covering a varying group of countries, subject matter, and age groups have been available. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only countries to participate in all of the testing. In each, the general model has been to develop a common assessment instrument for different age groups of students and to work at obtaining a representative group of students taking the tests. An easy summary of the participating countries and their test performance is found in figure 2. This

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[20] Barro and Lee (2001) provide an analysis of qualitative differences that also includes literacy.

[21] The problems included issues of developing an equivalent test across countries with different school structure, curricula, and language; issues of selectivity of the tested populations; and issues of selectivity of the nations that participated. The first tests did not document or even address these issues in any depth.

figure presents average scores by country and region over all available tests through scaled to a common test mean of 500.[22]

Kimko's and my analysis of economic growth was very straightforward. We combined all of the available earlier test scores into a single composite measure of quality and consider statistical models that explain differences in growth rates across nations during the period 1960 to 1990. Test data were available for 31 countries (and were projected to a larger number of countries). The basic statistical models, which include the initial level of income, the quantity of schooling, and population growth rates, explain a substantial portion of the variation in economic growth across countries.

Most important, the quality of the labor force as measured by math and science scores is extremely important. One standard deviation difference on test performance at the country level is related to 1 percent difference in annual growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.[23]

Extensions of the measure of Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and its imputation in Wößmann (2003) are also used in the cross-country growth regressions by Bosworth and Collins (2003) and in the cross-country industry-level analysis by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2005). Both also find that measured cognitive skills strongly dominate any effect of educational quantity on growth.[24] Coulombe, Tremblay, and Marchand (2004) and Coulombe and Tremblay (2006) use test-score data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (see Section 3.4 above) in a panel of 14 OECD countries, confirming the result that the test-score measure outperforms quantitative measures of education.

Jamison, Jamison, and Hanushek (2007) further extend the Hanushek and Kimko (2000) analysis by using the

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[22] The details of the tests and aggregation can be found Hanushek and Woessmann (2009b). Test scores are benchmarked to movements in U.S. performance on its National Assessment of Educational Progress and to the variation in performance across stable developed countries.

[23] The details of this work can be found in Hanushek and Kimko (2000) and Hanushek (2003b). Importantly, adding other factors potentially related to growth, including aspects of international trade, private and public investment, and political instability, leaves the effects of labor force quality unchanged.

[24] Bosworth and Collins (2003) cannot distinguish the effect of cognitive skills from the effect of quality of government institutions. The analysis in Section 5.6 below shows, however, that they can be separated when we use our new measure of cognitive skills that also extends the country sample by several additional data points on international tests scores.

mathematics component of the transformed and the extended set of countries shown in Figure 2. They replicate and strengthen the previous results by using test data from a larger number of countries, controlling for a larger number of potentially confounding variables, and extending the time period of the analysis. Using the panel structure of their growth data, they suggest that cognitive skills seem to improve income levels mainly though speeding up technological progress, rather than shifting the level of the production function or increasing the impact of an additional year of schooling.

In a further extension of this work, Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) expand on these efforts in several ways. The new evidence adds additional international student achievement tests not previously available and uses the most recent data on economic growth which allow an analysis for an even longer time period (1960-2000). Furthermore, the new data extend the sample of countries with available test-score and growth information from 31 countries in Hanushek and Kimko (2000) to 50 countries.

After controlling for the initial level of GDP per capita and for years of schooling, the test-score measure features a statistically significant effect on the growth in real GDP per capita in 1960-2000. According to this specification, test scores that are larger by one standard deviation (measured at the student level across all OECD countries in PISA) are associated with an average annual growth rate in GDP per capita that is two percentage points higher over the whole 40-year period.[25]

The same pattern of results is preserved when we ignore any variation between world regions – East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the industrial countries – by including five regional dummies.That is, even when considering just the variation that exists within each region, cognitive skills are significantly related to economic growth. Eliminating the between-region variance reduces the test-score coefficient (from two percent growth per standard deviation of test scores to 1.5 percent), but it remains strongly significant.

One of the most important fundamental determinants of economic growth discussed in the recent literature is the institutional framework of the. The most common and powerful

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[25] The quantitative estimate is very similar to those in Hanushek and Kimko (2000) because the standard deviation at the country level is roughly 40 percent of the standard deviation at the individual level.

measures of the institutional framework used in empirical work are the openness of the economy to international trade and the security of property rights.[26] These two institutional variables do affect economic growth, but the positive effect of cognitive skills on economic growth is very robust to the inclusion of these controls (see Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)).

In sum, the existing evidence suggests that what students know as depicted in tests of cognitive skills is substantially more important for economic growth than the mere quantity of schooling.

5. Importance of quality

The frequent focus of governmental programs has been increasing school attainment and expanding on the years of schooling of the population. The previous discussion, however, highlights the central importance of quality. While years of schooling attainment are important, that holds only if quality is maintained.

The impact of improved quality can be calculated from the considerations of how quality affects growth rates for economies. These estimates rely upon the historical patterns of cognitive skills and growth for the 1960-2000 period as found in Hanushek and Woessmann (2008).[27] Consider the effects of beginning a successful school improvement program in 2005. Of course school reform takes time. And, even if successful, it takes some time before the school graduates work their way into the labor force and thus some time before the impact will be felt.

Figure 3 illustrates the impact that reform could be expected to have over time if it is successful at achieving moderately strong knowledge improvement (corresponding to a 0.5 standard deviation increase in test score achievement). A

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[26] The proxy for openness used here is the fraction of years between 1960 and 1998 that a country was classified as having an economy open to international trade, based on five factors including tariffs, quotas, exchange rate controls, export controls, and whether or not a socialist economy (cf. Sachs and Warner (1995)). The proxy for security of property rights is an index of the protection against expropriation risk, averaged over 1985-1995, from Political Risk Services (a private company which assesses the risk that investments will be expropriated in different countries), ranging from 0 to 10 (high figures corresponding to low risk), as used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and provided in McArthur and Sachs (2001).

[27] The simulations of economic effects are based on the estimates that also consider the impact of economic institutions on growth. These estimates suggest approximately 1.3 percent higher annual growth for one standard deviation difference in individual test scores.

movement of this magnitude is roughly equivalent to the United States moving to the performance level of Canada or of Brazil moving half way to the OECD average on recent tests. The curves sketch out the path of GDP improvement that would occur with a reform plan that reaches its improvement goal within 10, 20, or 30 years.

Consider just the slow improvement of schools over a 30-year period. In 2040, the GDP would be almost four percent higher than projected without the schooling reforms. Of course, faster reforms would yield even greater gains in GDP. This magnitude would cover total school spending in most countries of the world.

6. Causality

One common concern in analysis such as this is that schooling might not be the actual cause of growth but, in fact, may just reflect other attributes of the economy that are beneficial to growth. Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a) provide an extended investigation of issues related to the causal effects of cognitive skills on growth. The general conclusion is that common concerns about causality in growth comparisons do not appear to be driving the results described above. Without going into detail, it is useful to consider some of the most commonly discussed issues.

Ti begin with, as seen in figure 2, the East Asian countries consistently score very highly on the international tests, and they also had extraordinarily high growth over the 1960–2000 period. It may be that other aspects of these East Asian economies have driven their growth and that the statistical analysis of labor force quality simply is picking out these countries. But in fact, even if the East Asian countries are excluded from the analysis, a strong—albeit slightly smaller—relationship is still observed with test performance (Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)). This test of sensitivity of the results seems to reflect a basic importance of school quality, a factor that contributes also to the observed growth of East Asian countries.

Another concern might be that other factors that affect growth, such as efficient market organizations, are also associated with efficient and productive schools—so that, again, the test measures are really a proxy for other attributes of the country. In order to investigate this, one can look at immigrants to the United States who received their education

in their home countries. In comparisons of immigrants from each country, an analysis of U.S. census data shows that immigrants who were schooled in countries that have higher scores on the international math and science examinations earn more in the United States – but this is not true for immigrants schooled in the United States. This analysis makes allowance for any differences in school attainment, labor market experience, or being native English-language speakers. In other words, skill differences as measured by the international tests are clearly rewarded in the United States labor market, reinforcing the validity of the tests as a measure of individual skills and productivity.

Finally, the observed relationships could simply reflect reverse causality, that is, that countries that are growing rapidly have the resources necessary to improve their schools and that better student performance is the result of growth, not the cause of growth. As a simple test of this, it is possible to test whether the international math and science test scores were systematically related to the resources devoted to the schools in the years prior to the tests. They were not according to the analysis of Hanushek and Kimko (2000). If anything, relatively better performance was found in those countries spending less on their schools.

In sum, the relationship between math and science skills on the one hand and productivity and growth on the other comes through clearly when investigated in a systematic manner across countries. This finding underscores the importance of high-quality schooling.

7. Why Has U.S. Growth Been So Strong?

Figure 2 on international test score differences does introduce an important issue of interpretation. Namely, the U.S. has not been competitive on an international level in terms of tests. It has scored below the median of countries taking the various tests. Moreover, this figure – which combines scores across different age groups – disguises the fact that performance on tests of U.S. students is much stronger at young ages but falls off dramatically at the end of high school (Hanushek (2003b)).

Earlier, we introduced the discussion of the importance of growth by recounting America's successful economic growth during the twentieth century. Yet, looking at figure 2, we see that the United States has been at best mediocre in mathematics and science ability. Regardless of the set of countries taking the test, the United States has performed in

the middle of the pack or below. Some people find this anomalous. How could math and science ability be important in light of the strong U.S. growth over a long period of time?

The answer is that quality of the labor force is just one aspect of the economy that enters into the determination of growth. A variety of factors clearly contribute, and these factors work to overcome any deficits in quality. These other factors may also be necessary for growth. In other words, simply providing more or higher-quality schooling may yield little in the way of economic growth in the absence of other elements, such as the appropriate market, legal, and governmental institutions to support a functioning modern economy. These are described in the previous discussion of the importance of economic institutions.

Past experiences investing in less developed countries that lack these institutional features demonstrates that schooling is not itself a sufficient engine of growth. Indeed, some have questioned the precise role of schooling in growth. Easterly (2002), for example, notes that education without other facilitating factors such as functioning institutions for markets and legal systems may not have much impact. He argues that World Bank investments in schooling for less developed countries that do not ensure that the other attributes of modern economies are in place have been quite unproductive. As discussed below, schooling clearly interacts with other factors, and these other factors have been important in supporting U.S. growth. They are also surely relevant for other countries.

It is useful to describe some of the other contributing factors to U.S. growth. This is done in part to understand more fully the character of economic growth, but more importantly to highlight some important related issues that are central to thinking about human capital policies.

A. Economic Structure

Almost certainly the most important factor sustaining the growth of the U.S. economy is the openness and fluidity of its markets. The United States maintains generally freer labor and product markets than most countries in the world. The government generally has less regulation on firms (both in terms of labor regulations and in terms of overall production), and trade unions are less extensive than those in many other countries. Even broader, the United States has less intrusion of

government in the operation of the economy—not only less regulation but also lower tax rates and minimal government production through nationalized industries. These factors encourage investment, permit the rapid development of new products and activities by firms, and allow U.S. workers to adjust to new opportunities. While identifying the precise importance of these factors is difficult, a variety of analyses suggest that such market differences could be very important explanations for differences in growth rates. [28]

Because of the generally favorable institutional conditions, U.S. growth has been strong, even if some of the underlying factors are not as competitive. In other words, the economic structure can mask problems within the economy. But this does not negate the fact that improving our schools and the quality of our labor force would enhance growth and incomes.

B. Substitution of Quantity for Quality

Over the twentieth century, as shown in Table 1, the expansion of the education system in the United States outpaced that around the world. The United States pushed to open secondary schools to all citizens. With this came also a move to expand higher education with the development of land grant universities, the G.I. bill, and direct grants and loans to students. In comparison with other nations of the world, the U.S. labor force has been better educated, even after allowing for the lesser achievement of its graduates. In other words, more schooling with less learning each year has yielded more human capital than found in other nations that have less schooling but learn more in each of those years.

This historical approach, however, appears on the verge of reaching its limits for the United States. Other nations of the world, both developed and developing, have rapidly expanded their schooling systems, and many now surpass the United States. Figure 4 shows secondary school completion rates for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in 2006.[29] Remarkably, the United States trailed a large number of other countries in 2006 and falls just

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[28] See, for example, Krueger (1974); World Bank (1993); Parente and Prescott (1994, (1999); and also the more recent in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
[29] Data come from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2001) which has made an effort to use standardized definitions. The non-OECD countries are included in the World Education Indicators project.

slightly below the OECD average completion rate. The United States gains some by having rates of college attendance above the typical OECD country. Nonetheless, U.S. students are still not likely to complete more schooling

The past advantage of the United States in amount of school completed has gone away as other nations have discovered the importance of schooling. Thus, going into the future, the United States appears unlikely to continue dominating others in human capital unless it can improve on the quality dimension.

Note, however, that this story about U.S. school quality does not generalize well to developing countries – countries that are often not close in any quality dimension. Thus, the U.S. success that expanding mediocre schools does not imply that the practice seen in many developing countries of expanding totally dysfunctional schools is the right path.[30] Indeed, as discussed below and as argued in Hanushek (1995) and Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), it appears to be a considerable mistake for developing countries to expand quantity or access to schools while ignoring quality. Indeed there is an argument that improving quality would actually make it easier to expand access by reducing repetition and other counterproductive aspects of schools Hanushek (1995).

C. Quality of U.S. Colleges

The analysis of growth rates across countries emphasizes quality of the elementary and secondary schools of the United States. It did not include any measures of the quality of U.S. colleges. By most evaluations, U.S. colleges and universities rank at the very top in the world. There are some attempts at direct measurements of quality of colleges across countries, and these place the U.S. at the top.[31] There is also indirect

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[30] A direct discussion and analysis of poor schools in rural Brazil is found in Harbison and Hanushek (1992).

[31] In the 2007 academic rankings of the world's research universities by the Institute of Higher Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the U.S. had 17 of the top 20 universities and 54 of the top 99 (see http://ed.sjtu.edu.cn/rank/2007/ARWU2007TOP500list.htm accessed January 12, 2008). In a 2007 professional ranking by the Ecole des mines de Paris based on graduates who were CEOs at Global Fortune 500 countries, U.S. institutions had 10 of the top 22 places and 24 of the top 59 places (see http://www.ensmp.fr/Actualites/PR/EMP-ranking.html accessed January 12, 2008). These remain, however, narrow measures of the quality of the overall higher education sector.

evidence. Foreign students by all accounts are not tempted to emigrate to the United States to attend elementary and secondary schools—except perhaps if they see this as a way of gaining entry into the country. They do emigrate in large numbers to attend U.S. colleges and universities. They even tend to pay full, unsubsidized tuitions at U.S. colleges, something that many fewer American citizens do.

A number of the economic models of economic growth in fact emphasize the importance of scientists and engineers as a key ingredient to growth. By these views, the technically trained college students who contribute to invention and to development of new products provide a special element to the growth equation. Here, again, the United States appears to have the best programs. If this view is correct, U.S. higher education may continue to provide a noticeable advantage over other countries.

But the raw material for U.S. colleges is the graduates of our elementary and secondary schools. As has been frequently noted, the lack of preparation of our students leads to extensive remedial education at the postsecondary level, detracting from the ability of colleges and universities to be most effective. And, pre-college preparation is likely an important factor driving the increased proportions of foreign born graduates from the science and engineering programs of U.S. colleges and universities.

D. Attraction of Skilled Immigrants
The final potentially important explanation of U.S. performance is its ability to attract highly skilled immigrants to work in the United States. An increasing portion of science and engineering students at U.S. colleges and universities are foreign students. Many of these stay and work in the United States. Additionally, other highly-trained immigrants educated abroad immigrate to the U.S. for work. Thus, the U.S. can substitute foreign trained skilled workers for domestic workers.

8. Generalizing to Developing Countries

The previous discussions have concentrated considerable attention on the United States and on other developed countries. Most developing countries look very dissimilar to these. Do these results generalize?

The modeling of economic growth in Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) relied upon the direct measures of math and science achievement that were portrayed in Figure 2. Within

the set of countries with observed test data, the growth models appear rather robust. A variety of tests indicates that the modeling applies to the range of countries (Hanushek and Woessmann (2009a)).

There are, however, still limited observations about developing countries. Questions remain about the wider range of countries. Clearly, many of the arguments made by Easterly (2002) obviously apply to the most destitute countries – those which also tend to lack a good structure of laws, which tend to have a variety of restrictions on labor and product markets, and so forth. These countries may not be able to fruitfully use schooling investments if the labor markets will not accommodate skilled workers.

The tentative conclusion would be that the previous results generalize if the other conditions for growth also exist. If they do not, it is much more uncertain. But it is also true in the latter cases, that investment in quantity of schooling is unlikely to be productive either.

9. Improving quality

Much of school policy is traditionally thought of as an exercise in selecting and ensuring that the optimal set of resources, somehow defined, is available. Matched with this policy perspective has been a line of research considering the relationship between resource usage and student performance. If the effectiveness of different resources or combinations of resources were known, it would be straightforward to define an optimal set of resources. Moreover, we could often decide about policies that would move us toward such an optimal set of resources. Unfortunately, this alludes us.

Schools in the United States have been the focus of extensive research. Both aggregate data about performance of schools over time and more detailed school and classroom data point to a simple conclusion: There is a lack of any consistent or systematic effect of resources on student achievement. While controversial, partly because of the conflict with existing school policies, the evidence is very extensive (Hanushek (2003a)).

Most other countries of the world have not tracked student performance over any length of time, making analyses comparable to the United States discussion impossible. Nonetheless, international testing over the past four decades permits an overview of spending across countries.   Seven

different mathematics and science tests (the data for the growth analysis in Hanushek and Kimko (2000)) were given between the early 1960s and 1995 to students at different grade levels in a varying set of voluntarily participating nations. Performance bears little relationship to the patterns of expenditure across the countries. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) estimate models that relate spending, family backgrounds, and other characteristics of countries to student performance for the tests prior to 1995. This estimation consistently indicates a statistically significant negative effect of added resources on performance after controlling for other influences. Similar findings hold for the OECD countries.

Existing statistical analyses in less developed countries have shown a similar inconsistency of estimated resource effects as that found in the United States (Hanushek (1995), Wößmann (2007), Hanushek and Woessmann (2007), Hanushek (2008)). In general, a minority of the available studies suggests much confidence that commonly identified resources – class size, teacher experience, and teacher salaries – positively influence student performance. There is generally somewhat stronger support for these resource policies than that existing in United States analyses, hinting that the importance of resources may vary with the level of resources. Nonetheless, the evidence does not indicate that pure resource policies can be expected to have a significant effect on student outcomes.

In sum, a wide range of analyses indicate that overall resource policies have not led to discernible improvements in student performance. It is important to understand what is and is not implied by this conclusion. First, it does not mean that money and resources *never* matter. There clearly are situations where small classes or added resources have an impact. It is just that no good description of when and where these situations occur is available, so that broad resource policies such as those legislated from central governments may hit some good uses but also hit bad uses that generally lead to offsetting outcomes. Second, this statement does not mean that money and resources *cannot* matter. Instead, as described below, altered sets of incentives could dramatically improve the use of resources.

The evidence on resources is remarkably consistent across countries, both developed and developing. Had there been distinctly different results for some subsets of countries, issues of what kinds of generalizations were possible would

naturally arise. Such conflicts do not appear particularly important.

Many countries have of course attempted to improve their schools. While some have succeeded, many have not. One explanation for past failure is simply that insufficient attention has been at to teacher quality. By many accounts, the quality of teachers is the key element to improving student performance. But the research evidence also suggests that many of the policies that have been pursued around the world have not been very productive. Specifically, the chosen policies of individual countries may have led to changes in measured aspects of teachers such as degrees or teacher qualifications, but they have not tended to improve the quality of teachers – at least when quality is identified by student performance.[32]

Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) describe estimates of differences in teacher quality on an output basis. Specifically, the concern is identifying good and bad teachers on the basis of their performance in obtaining gains in student achievement. An important element of that work is distinguishing the effects of teachers from the selection of schools by teachers and students and the matching of teachers and students in the classroom. In particular, highly motivated parents search out schools that they think are good, and they attempt to place their children in classrooms where they think the teacher is particularly able. Teachers follow a similar selection process (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004a, (2004b)). Thus, from an analytical viewpoint, it is difficult to sort out the quality of the teacher from the quality of the students that she has in her classroom. The analysis of teacher performance in Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) goes to great lengths to avoid contamination from any such selection and matching of kids and teachers.

Estimates that the differences in annual achievement growth between an average and a good teacher are large. Within one academic year, a good teacher can move a typical student up at least four percentiles in the overall distribution (equal to a change of 0.12 standard deviations of student achievement). From this, it is clear that having a series of

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[32] For a review of existing U.S. literature, see Hanushek and Rivkin (2004). This paper describes various attempts to estimate the impact of teacher quality on student achievement. Similar studies are currently much less available in other countries.

good teachers can dramatically affect the achievement of any student. In fact, a series of good teachers can erase the deficits associated with poor preparation for school.

The difficulty, as pointed out in the preceding discussion, is that hiring good teachers is not easily done. Teaching ability is not closely related to training or experience. Moreover, common salary systems do not target particularly high quality teachers.

From a policy viewpoint the primary objective should be improving the overall quality of the teaching force. If one were simply to redistribute existing teachers, the overall policy goals would not be achieved.

Hanushek (2009) provides estimates of the importance of teacher quality by looking at the impact of teachers at the bottom end of the quality distribution. That analysis shows that eliminating the worst 6-10 percent of teachers in terms of effectiveness would bring student achievement up by one-half standard deviation – the change simulated in Figure 3.

The estimates given here need to be put into the policy context. Consider a school with 30 typical teachers. These estimates suggest that eliminating the bottom two or three could boost student achievement up to the Canadian level for the U.S.

This kind of policy is very consistent with the McKinsey evaluation of the policies found in high performing school systems around the world (Barber and Mourshed (2007)). Their evaluation suggests that the best school systems do not allow ineffective teachers to remain in the classroom for long.[33] These conclusions are also consistent with more local evidence such as that for New York City in Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2006)and the related policy prescriptions in Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006).

Policies of making active decisions on retention and tenure are of course quite alien to the current school system. A number of states currently have laws and regulations that lead to tenure decisions as early as two years, with the mode being just three years (National Association of State Boards of Education (1997), National Council on Teacher Quality (2007)).

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[33] The method of ensuring good teachers, according to this study, does depend on the country. Some of the highest performing countries do thia largely at entry by selecting from the very top of the pool of college graduates. Others have particularly effective professional development programs. For the U.S., moving to selection of teachers from the top of the new graduate distribution appears quite infeasible. See Hanushek and Rivkin (2004).

On top of that, the teacher evaluation process as typically seen is very cursory (Toch and Rothman (2008)). Nonetheless, these are inconsistent with provding a quality education to all students, because some students must necessarily be relegated to these ineffective, and damaging, teachers.

10. Conclusions

In making decisions about schools, countries always face limited budgets. If there are the commonly accepted two objectives of expanding access and of improving quality, these objectives will conflict because they must compete for the same budget. Thus, by this standard formulation policy makers are faced with a particularly unpleasant dilemma: choose between broad availability of schools and good schools.

An alternative view, while apparently different, is actually quite closely related. Analyses of labor market implications and the rate of return to schooling in developing countries suggest strongly that schooling is a very good investment. A year of schooling typically shows a 25-30 percent real rate of return. Such a return often looks noticeably better than other investment alternatives. At the same time, school completion rates in low-income countries are very low. These two facts do not go together. If it is such a high rate of return activity, why aren't people taking advantage of those high returns?

Work on school quality has something to say about both elements of education policy. First, the simple trade-off story about access and quality is very misleading, if not wrong in important ways. In fact, in many circumstances there may not really be the trade-off suggested. Second, the unifying idea is that school quality may be an important explanation for the "strange" investment behavior that does not take advantage of the available high returns.

School quality is directly related to decisions about attending schools and to promotion through schools. High quality schools raise student achievement and speed students through primary (and perhaps secondary) schools, thus conserving on costs. Additionally, students respond to school quality in deciding whether or not to drop out of school. They tend to stay in high quality schools and drop out of low quality schools.

Both of these mechanisms indicate a direct relationship between the quantity of schooling attained and the quality of

that schooling. Thus, studies of the rate of return to schooling which only consider quantity of schooling produce a misleading estimate of the potential gains. Estimation of the rate of return to schooling that does not account for quality differences will systematically overstate the productivity gains that are associated with additional years of schooling, because the estimates will include quality differences that are correlated with quantity. If policy simply pushes people to stay in school longer, without changing the fundamental quality of the schools, the newly-induced school completers will only get the returns associated with years of schooling and not with quality. Thus, they will not be able to gain as much as the rate of return estimates suggest.

Table 1.
Population that has attained at least upper secondary education[1] (2006)
Percentage, by age group

	Age group				
	25 to 64	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64
Australia	67	80	68	63	52
Austria	80	87	84	77	71
Belgium	67	82	74	60	50
Canada	86	91	89	85	76
Czech Republic	90	94	94	89	84
Denmark	82	88	84	78	76
Finland	80	90	87	80	63
France	67	82	72	61	52
Germany	83	84	85	83	79
Greece	59	75	67	53	34
Hungary	78	86	82	77	66
Iceland	63	67	67	64	51
Ireland	66	82	71	58	41
Italy	51	67	55	47	32
Korea	77	97	90	62	37
Luxembourg	66	78	67	60	55
Mexico	32	39	36	28	17
Netherlands	72	81	76	70	60
New Zealand	69	78	72	69	55
Norway	79	83	79	77	75
Poland	53	64	51	49	44
Portugal	28	44	28	20	12
Slovak Republic	87	94	91	86	70
Spain	50	64	55	43	27
Sweden	84	91	90	82	73
Switzerland	85	88	87	84	80
Turkey	28	37	25	22	15
United Kingdom	69	76	70	67	61
United States	88	87	88	89	87
OECD average	**68**	**78**	**72**	**65**	**55**

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008)

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Table 2. Summary of Estimated Returns to a Standard Deviation Increase in Cognitive Skills

Country	Study	Estimated effect[a]	Notes
Ghana	Glewwe (1996)	0.21**-0.3** (government) 0.14-0.17 (private)	Alternative estimation approaches yield some differences; math effects shown generally more important than reading effects, and all hold even with Raven's test for ability.
Ghana	Jolliffe (1998)	0.05-0.07*	Household income related to average math score with relatively small variation by estimation approach; effect is only observed with off-farm income, and on-farm income is not significantly related to cognitive skills.
Ghana	Vijverberg (1999)	?	Income estimates for math and reading with nonfarm self-employment; highly variable estimates (including both positive and negative effects) but effects not generally statistically significant.
Kenya	Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985); Knight and Sabot (1990)	0.19**-0.22**	Total sample estimates: small variation by primary and secondary school leavers.
Morocco	Angrist and Lavy (1997)	?	Cannot convert to standardized scores because use indexes of performance; French writing skills appear most important for earnings, but results depend on estimation approach.

Pakistan	Alderman, Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (1996)	0.12-0.28*	Variation by alternative approaches and by controls for ability and health; larger and more significant without ability and health controls.
Pakistan	Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (2008)	0.25	Estimates of structural model with combined scores for cognitive skill; significant effects of combined math and reading scores which are instrumented by school inputs
South Africa	Moll (1998)	0.34**-0.48**	Depending on estimation method, varying impact of computation; comprehension (not shown) generally insignificant.
Tanzania	Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985); Knight and Sabot (1990)	0.07-0.13*	Total sample estimates: smaller for primary than secondary school leavers.

*significant at 0.05 level; **significant at 0.01 level.
a. Estimates indicate proportional increase in wages from a one standard deviation increase in measured test scores.

Figure 1: Effect of Economic Growth on GDP per Capita (medium income country)

Figure 2: Performance on international student achievement tests

Source: Hanushek and Woessmann (2009b)

Figure 3:   Improved GDP with Moderately Strong Knowledge
Improvement (0.5 s.d.)

Source: Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)

Figure 4. Secondary school completion rates, 2006

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (2008)

4
Family and Education

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Writing about the connections between family and education can produce a load of trites and common places. I hope that is not my case. The issue seems to be a difficult and urgent one. It is difficult because it brings into play the most complex educational issues, urgent because families have lost their educational authority and must recover it. Also, sociological changes, the appearance of new types of families, the fragility of its relationships, the increase of single-parent families, complicate the issue. The figures of the "emperor child", the "tyrannical child" or the "dictator child" produce a wider and wider bibliography, especially in France and Spain. I hear many parents say: "It's a pity kids come without an instructions manual" or "nobody taught me to be a mother or father", and, even more frequently, a painful complaint: "But what did I do wrong?". Being aware of these issues, I have dedicated the past two years to preparing the Parents Univeristy (UP), to investigate this matter, gathering information on actions taken all over the world, offering parents the aid to practice their educational authority adquately. The current study benefits from those investigations and from the experience obtained thanks to the courses given at the UP. The reader will find detailed summaries of the documents that have been used at www.universidaddepadres.es

1. An educational model
The educational discourse has become pessimistic and dramatic. We always seem to be talking about education in apocalytic terms. It is true that educating is difficult, but I believe we must recover a more optimistic and active attitude. We have the means, the knowledge and the chances to educate correctly, we only need the decision to do so. Where should this renovating movement emerge from? Undoubtedly, from the entire society, but the two figures, the two cores of the educational social consciousness, must be families and schools. Not separated, but united. Parents and teachers form the basic pedagogical team, and we must elaborate a shared pedagogy,

that prevents homes and schools from becoming conflicting spaces, allowing them to become cooperating spaces. Every day we hear more talk about "complementary learning" between both institutions, but such an elementary idea encounters many obstacles when it comes to materializing it. We must overcome laziness and distrust on both sides. That is why, this work intends to be a call to action addressed to the entire society, apart from offering a presentation of the causes. It is the entire society that provides a good or bad education, and benefits from or suffers the educational results, which have an influence on the global quality of life, not only on the economical domain. Because of this, it would be convenient to prepare a "Letter describing the educational obligations of society", which will specify the obligations of parents and teachers, media, civil servants, administration, healthcare system, security forces, politicians, judges, etc. As I like to say, "in order to educate a child, the whole tribe is needed" and, "to educate a child correctly, a good tribe is needed", that is, a tribe that is committed to education, that protects its schools. Education is a phenomenon that inevitably involves us all. Similarly to what occurs with health. Everyone must look after their own, and for that everyone must know how to do it and acquire good habits. But we also need everyone else to respect hygienic rules, we need an environment that isn't harmful, we need non-contaminated water, air and food, a good healthcare system and to lead healthy lives, driving and coexisting safely. Individual and social responsibilities are inevitably intertwined both with regard to health and education.

To obtain everyone's involvement in such a colossal task, we need to explain clearly what we are referring to when we speak about education, and how to achieve a higher quality in all of its levels. We need good educational marketing, because very frequently we make the mistake of believing that "what seems right and proper sells", and since there is no better product than education, we would not need to justify so vehemently its necessity. But that is not the case. Surveys indicate that education is not listed among citizens' main concrens. That is why it is convenient to refresh things we already know but may have forgotten.

I will begin by defining the goals of education. Through education we hope to provide our children with the necessary intellectual, emotional, volitive and moral resources to lead responsibly and adequately their lives, being able to take

advantage of the opportunities and face problems. All parents would like to be able to leave an "economic capital" to their children, because they know that would make life easier for them, that is why I often recommend they should also give them an "educational capital", a collection of personal resources that will allow them to live better. To put it another way, we all want our children to have the best conditions to achieve happiness and become good people. This includes the possibility of having a good job, the talent to maintain strong and satisfactory emotional relationships, the ability to enjoy life and being creative, and the willingness to contribute to general welfare. The goals of education are ambitious, but can be summarized in the following short formula:

Educational Capital = training + character forming.

Education is, undoubtedly, providing the child or adult with the necessary knowledge. That is what the educational system mainly takes care of. But it must also help to shape his character. Character is a collection of habits that a person adopts, and that will widen or narrow his vital possibilities. A good character increases a person's chances of development, autonomy, creativity and efficiency. Being optimistic, brave, withstanding sacrifice, enjoying good things, willing to learn constantly, being able to take on projects, to communicate, to cooperate, to maintain selfconfidence, all are resources that are included in a good character. We cannot solve our childrens' problems, we cannot even imagine what they will be. They will need to fight their own battles. Our obligation is to provide them with general competences; helping them to develop personal strengths. For instance, we can be sure that when they reach adolescence they will come into contact with a world which has a presence of drugs. We cannot avoid that. All we can do is educate them so they can make the most intelligent decision when the time comes.

Baltasar Gracián wrote: "There is no point having reasoning and understanding, if they are not accompanied by moral conviction". Indeed, it is useless if a person knows the solution to a problem if they do not have the courage to put it into practice. We do not only need to educate in terms of ideas, but also in terms of emotions. Promoting these basic competences for a good life is a splendid goal, but: how can we achieve it? Who should carry out such a complicated task?

2 .The educational function of families

Although the entire society has an influence on a child's education, the role played by the family is decisive. However, during the last century, its educational function was widely criticized. It was accused of being an authoritarian institution, that supressed the children's freedom and extended patriarchal injustice. As I explained in my book titled *La recuperación de la autoridad*, many psychologists and educationalists considered the family to be a castrating element and parents as a danger for the child. The school also suffered similar attacks, and renowned intellectuals even demanded the de-schooling of society, as the only way to obtain freedom from the ideological tyranny imposed by the ruling class through schools. In order to escape from authoritarianism, a permissive education was established, an education which was distrustful of parental authority and thus tried to restrain it. Freud's statement was dogmatically repeated time after time: "Whatever parents do, they shall do it wrongly". A feeling of guilt that embittered many people's lives, that even saw in the appearance of Judith R. Harris' book, *The Nurture Assumption*, some sort of liberation (a book that was translated in Spain with the following shocking title: *Why parents cannot educate)*. According to the author, the two great educational influences are the genes and the group of equals, what leaves a narrow field of action for parents. The book gave birth to a violent debate. Steven Pinker supported it, but many renowned experts on children's development even discredited the author and the book. Brazelton described it as an absurd thesis and Kagan said: "I feel shame for psychology".

In spite of its exaggerations, we must take into consideration some of Harris' thesis. They support our idea regarding family as having the obligation to educate *directly* (through direct action with their children) and *indirectly* (helping to build a convenient society for them in terms of education). The surroundings —which include schools, classmates or the media— have an influential role that can be decisive. That is why I often say to the parents of my students: "If you are worried about your child's gradings, you should also be worried about the gradings of his friends". That's the way things are: from adolescence onwards, the influence of the group of equals progressively substitutes the parents' influence.

As a reaction against these excesses, a powerful movement emerged in the United States ("From Zero to

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Three") defending that all important things that happen to a child occur before he is three years old. During that period the foundations of his future are built. The family regained an educational role, but once again that role provoked feelings of guilt. What if the parents hadn't done everything that is necessary before the baby's third birthday? What if they hadn't done enough reading or breastfed him adequately? The fate of the child was entirely in the hands of their parents. What an exhausting responsibility!

Fortunately, things have gone back to normal. It is commonly accepted that children are not born in equal conditions, but with a peculiar temperament , that can be educated to a certain extent. The educational efficiency is fully recognized, but also admitting the influence of the surroundings. One of the most famous educationalists of the XX Century, Urie Bronfenbrenner, wrote: "The family seems to be the most effective and economical system to promote and maintain the development of the child. Without the invilvement of the family, any intervention will probably be a failure, and the few effects that are obtained will probably disappear once the intervention ends". The importance of the first three years is valued, but accepting that the character of the child is takes shape all along the educational period. The importance given to the family explains the appearance of a new branch of pedagogy, *parenting*. It could also be termed as "breeding". It focuses on studying the role played by the parents in education and the need to educate parents for that purpose. The lengthy volumes of the *Handbook of parenting*, directed by Marc Bornstein, or books by Gottman, Kagan o Brazelton are a proof of this growing interest. This is the knowledge that provides scientific foundations for the programmes of the *Universidad de Padres*.

A great part of the habits that make up character are learnt through family coexistence, and we believe it is important to inform parents about the correct time and way to help the child in learning them. Aspects which are as important for his education and future as "enduring sacrifice", "facing problems", "being able to communicate adequately", "experiencing pro-social feelings", etc, cannot be improvised, they should be learnt slowly, over a long-term process that needs to be stimulated and directed. Sometimes we give vague advice —"motivate them to learn", "teach them to postpone the rewards"— that only increase the parents' distress, who

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feel they are subjected to obligations they do not know how to comply with. Sometimes, they receive contradictory messages, or hasty advices that can provoke more damage than benefits. For example, insisting on the need to promote self-esteem as an indispensible requirement for the child to accomplish a task, can incite the appearance of children who are incapable of overcoming the smallest frustration. That is why we must provide parents with a didactic system applied to the specific situation of their children, considering their age, temperament, and situation.

3.The educational styles

Parents educate their children in different styles, according to their character, their beliefs, their situation, and the education they received themselves. The research on educational styles tries to find out which dimensions of family life affect the development of the children, and if they do so in a positive or negative way, that is, which features predict good results in the development of children and which don't. According to the most reliable investigations, educational style can be described depending on two parameters:

1) *Degree of demand:* Very controlling parents, who impose a severe discipline as opposed to parents that do not demand anything from their children and do not set any boundaries.
2) *Degree of emotional warmth:* Parents who accept their children and are affectionate and kind as opposed to parents who reject their children and express little affection.

By combining both these aspects, four different educational styles emerge:

- *AUTHORITARIAN Educational style (Severity + coldness)*: Parents are demanding and lack affection. They try to shape, control and assess the child's behaviour and his attitudes according to traditional rules. They give priority to obeying authority and the do not favour communication, they are emotionally distant. They may use physical punishment when the child disobeys.

- **RESPONSIBLE Educational style (Severity + tenderness)**: *Parents are demanding and affectionate.* They are aware of the fact that they have more power in the relationship, they control the resources and they have more experience, but that doesn't prevent them from respecting their child. They show no tendency towards the use of physical punishment, and they do not pay too much attention to obedience *per se*, but as a requirement for good coexistence within the family. They exert control on their children in a reasonable and educational way, explaining to their children the need for discipline. They consider the child's point of view, even when they do not agree. They expect their children to behave correctly and they encourage them to develop their autonomy in a responsible way. They have high expectations set on their chidren.

- **PERMISSIVE Educational Style (laxity + tenderness)**: *They are not very demanding and they are affectionate.* They exert a lax control on their children, when compared to the two previous tyles, either because they believe children must learn for themselves or because they just can't be bothered with exerting discipline. They practically let their children do as they wish, they even let them decide on family rules. They have low expectations that their children will become mature and will achieve their goals in life.

- **NEGLECTFUL Educational Style (laxity + coldness)**. These are parents that do not control their children, and have low expectations regarding them and are affectionately cold.

Many investigations, especially those carried out by Diana Baumrid, enable us to —cautiously— relate the following effects to the different breeding styles:

- **Children of authoritative parents:** They tend to lack social ability, they often avoid social contact and they rarely show initiative. When they encounter a

conflict, they seek the authority of the adult in order to solve it. They lack spontaneity and curiosity.

- *Children of responsible parents*: They behave with a greater degree of confidence, they have more self-control, are more willing to explore and feel more satisfied. Because they have parents who are demanding with them they use a reasoned discipline, they understand and accept social rules more easily.

- *Children of permissive parents*: They tend to show features of inmaturity. They find it hard to control their impulses, to accept the responsibility of their actions and to act independently.

- *Children of neglectful parents*: The children do not learn how to control their impulses, they lack social ability and do not feel valued. They find it hard to respect rules, they are usually emotionally unstable.

The responsible style is the one that best suits the development of the child, and that is why we should recommend it parents. On many occasions it is not easy for them to follow it. Many parents are frightened from their children nowadays, not physical fear, but a fear of being emotionally abused by them if they do not let them have their way. In order to be firm against emotional manipulation which all children resort to (sulking, for example), parents need — according to Damon— "to have a certain degree of cultural support and to be convinced of doing the right thing for their child". Without this, parents yield to emotional pressure, giving in to the child's demands and to the concern of "not doing enough for them".

One of the most urgent tasks if we want to recover educational sense is to liberate parents from many fears. We must constantly tell them that they possess two powerful educational tools: tenderness and demand. Tendreness is unreserved acceptance. Demand is strength concerning expectations. Both tools are necessary. Without tenderness, the child grows surrounded by a harsh atmosphere that can provoke all sorts of fears; without demand, the child shall not learn to manage his behaviour adequately, and shall not know what is expected from him, or what he can achieve. Terry Brazelton, arguably the most prestigious pediatrician in the

United States, constantly insists on this issue. "After tenderness, discipline is the most important thing. Discipline means teaching, not punishing. The aim for the child is to get to know his limits. Each opportunity of discipline is a chance to learn. That is why, after you have given proof of your authority, you must sit next to your child to comfort him, telling him: "You must not do that. I must prevent you from doing it until you are able to restrain yourself". If parents manage to understand that a calm, consistent authority, is part of their love, they will stop feeling guilty.

4. The education of parents
We experts in the educational field are aware that we do not carry out an one-directional activity. We educate our students and, to a certain extent, are educated by them. Something similar happens to parents. Having a child and educating him is a "self-training" experience that should also have positive effects on parents. They shall have to face the world in a totally different way, reflecting on many different issues, making decisions, analysing their feelings. The couple's relationships themselves change through this experiece. The appearance of children turns a couple into a family. And parents are not only interested in their children's education and future, they also want to create a new reality, the family, a system of relationships that has its own special rules and from which ascending or descending effects arise. I have always been interested in "shared intelligence", that is, the one that emerges from the interaction of individual intellects. Well then, we all want to build and "intelligent family", that increases happiness, possibilities, moods, the ability to face the problems of each of its members. Children and parents benefit from this "field effect". An that is why, in order to educate correctly, besides promoting their childrens' abilities, parents must also be able to transform the family into an intelligent system of interactions. European books on education have paid little attention to this issue, perhaps a little bit more in North America. Jerome Kagan, for instance, a prestigious specialist from Harvard University, in his preface of Bornstein's *Handbook of Parenting*, wrote: "Parents influence their children in at least three different ways. The most obvious is related to the interactions with the child; the second comes from the child's identification with his parents' social and cultural status; the third is the most symbolical. Many parents

tell their children stories about their ancestors or relatives, to be used as a reference on certain occasions. Children usually show great interest in such stories, and use them to elaborate their own identity. Parents should appeal to family values more often: "We do not lie", "We are a team", "We do not get frightened", "We help others", because these statements become a part of the child, giving him strength and encouragement. And it also represents a commitment for the parents.

5. Parents and the schooling system

To this point, the parents' task takes place within privacy. They are providing the child with the basic emotional framework of personality. The child also learns his first habits at home, and the first rules. The situation changes when the child is taken to the nursery or begins school. From that moment onwards, the parents' educational interests seem to focus exclusively on academic results. If the child is a good students, they don't have nothing to worry about. However, results at school are only an incomplete test. Good results do not ensure a good education, bad results do not ensure a bad education. There are, for instance, docile children who study only in order to be obedient, and who are not developing their personal autonomy. And there are brilliant, inventive children who are incapable of adapting to school discipline. The model that has been previously proposed, that combines *training* with the *shaping of character,* enables us to assess education in a better way. A boy or girl who is very studious, but who cannot face his classmates, if this is required, or that has a difficulty to make friends, is not receiving a good education. And the same thing happens with the child that finds it easy to get good grades, and does not make an effort.

The involvement of families in education is a decisive factor for the child's success at school. The more serious investigations —for instance, the ones carried out by the "Harvard Family Research Project"— show that the involvement of families predicts academic succes and the social development of children until they enter a higher education. This involvement is three-fold: (1) "parenting" activites, (2) the relationships between family and school, (3) the educational responsibility of the families, that is, the emphasis put by parents on domestic activites that encourage learning. Reading at home, talkling with other children, playing with the child, providing a place for him to work, asking him about

school, all these activites are related to the motivation to learn, paying attention, the persistence when carrying out tasks, the richness of vocabulary, and the appearance of less behaviour related problems.

I shall mention some of the educational effects of parental involvement, citing the most influential researchers:

1.- When parents get involved in the education of their children at home, they obtain better results at school. And when parents get involved in the school, children remain longer within the educational system, and schools do better". (HENDERSON& BERLA)

2.- When children and parents talk regularly about school, the child's academic results are better (HO & WILMS). The way in which we talk is important: "Parents have the responsibility of instilling two ideas regarding the school. First, children need to understand that the school is a friendly and welcoming place. Secondly, children must understand that the school is a place where "one goes to work", school is their "job" and they need to do it the same as parents do theirs". (GERSTNER)

3.- Some of the parents' activities at home are firmly connected to the children's success at school: *Helping the child to organize his time, helping him with homework, and talking to him about school issues*. Making sure that children do their homework, reading them stories, and participating in voluntary activities, has a positive influence on the children's education. (JORDAN, OROZCO & AVERET)

4.- Parents who do reading with their children before the enter school favour their learning. Talking to children about books and stories also contributes to making progess as regards reading.

5.- The sooner the parents' involvement in the education of their children begins, the effects will be more powerful. (COTTON & WIKELUND 1997)

6.- The results of parental implication include improving the results at school, reducing absenteeism, improving the behaviour, and reinstores the confidence of the parents in the educational system. (*The Home-School Connection Selected Partnership Programs in Large Cities*, Institute for Responsive Education, Boston;

7.- When nursery schools or escuelas infantiles celebrate a meeting with parents in order to explain the importance of an early involvement in education, important improvements

are achieved regarding (1) time and frequency with which parents read with their children, (2) the number of times a parent visits the school, (3) the relationships between parents that have children of the same age. (KREIDER)

8.- The parents' expectations show a significant influence on the results of students in all academic areas and in all the courses of secondary school. (MARCHESI & MARTIN)

9.- How parents conceive education has an influence on their attitude and results. Jesús Palacios makes a distinction between a traditional idea and a modern one: "Traditional ideas are connected to belated evolutionary expectations, a hardly optimistic vision of the children's capacities, valuing obedience highly, educational procedures of imposing nature, an innate conception of the abilities of their children and pessimism concerning the power to have an influence on such abilities. The modern ideas represent the opposite extreme: more premature and optimistic evolutionary expectations, less coercive educational attitudes, a vision of development as something highly determined by education and by their actions as parents, etc. The children with less opportunities to acquire a conventional vocabulary are those whose mothers have a low social and cultural level and that also have traditional views. When they change these ideas, the children have more chances of reaching levels comparable to the rest of their classmates, regardless of the social, economical or educational level of their parents.

10.- *The distancing of the family from the school leads to academic failure.* Among other many factors that have an influence on academic failure, we must consider the "opposition of cultures between family and school. Those families whose culture, lifestyle regarding relationship and stimulation, is distant from academic culture, shall witness how their children encounter more difficulties in their voyage through the school system. Palacios has prepared a research on boys and girls aged four years old. There is a great variety of educational resources available for the child. These resources indicate a greater source of educational incentives (more questions, showing more interest in school activites, a greater tendency towards a symbolical distancing of that which is immediate, a greater stimulation of language), and a closer contact with activities related to school culture (puzzles, games involving numbers and words, storytelling). And a greater cooperative involvement of the father together with the mother.

To end with, I shall mention a very striking case. Many investigations have proven that american children of asian origin usually have an IQ nearly three points superior than white children. For their part, doctors and lawyers of asian-american origin behave, considered as a group, as if their IQ was far superior (the equivalent of 110 IQ for the japanese descendents and 120 for the chinese ones) to that of the white americans (FLYNN). The reason behind this seems to be that, during their first years at school, asian children study more than white children. Sandford Dorenbush, a sociologist from Stanford has investigated more than ten thousand students in high schools, discovering that asian-americans invest up to nearly 40 % more time in their homework that the rest of students. "The attitude of asian parents is "if you do not know this you shall study tonight and if you still haven't learnt it, you will wake up early tomorrow and continue studying". They believe that with the right effort, everyone can have a good performance at school". In short, a strong cultural ethic of work translates into greater motivation, zeal and perseverance, an genuine emotional incentive (GOLEMAN).

6. Families and educational institutions

Schools should help parents to fulfil their educational tasks at home in a better way, and also help them to get involved in the functioning of schools, because their efficiency depends on the collaboration of the families.

The "Harvard Family Research Project" defines two different modes of collaboration, I believe should be underlined. The involvement of parents as "consumers" of education, who are concerned with the education their children receive, and their participation as "citizens" who want to contribute to improve education in general. While the former seek individual success —of their children or their school—, the latter wants to improve schools, increasing the commitment of parents, the school's atmosphere, equity, and the quality of the teaching. I have previously referred to this distinction, when speaking about direct and indirect parents' education. The former is directed towards their sons directly, the latter is directed towards the educational surroundings of their children, particularly the school.

These movements are known as "Community organizing". The "National Center for Community Education", the "National Coalition for Parent Involvement in Education" or

the "National Center for Schools & Communities" or the "Family Involvement Networks of Educator", sponsored by the Harvard Family Research Project, promote citizen and family involvement. Through the *Universidad de Padres* I intend to encourage this collaboration between parents. For example, I believe it is very important for parents of classmates to know each other, and foster a relationship between them, because they can help each other to solve their children's educational problems. Also, the group of friends is so important for the child's future, that parents must try to get to know it and establish a relationship with it.

Harvard's programme also tries to change the way schools see parents. Instead of considering them a problem, it views the community as a resource, a pool of knowledge that can be useful to students and teachers. Based on the study of 200 gruoups pertaining to these communities, the "Cross City Campaign for Urban School Reform" identified the following characteristics pertaining to these groups:

1.- They work in order to change public schools, making them fairer and more efficient for all students.

2.- They gather many members in order to make collective decisions and to carry out their projects.

3.- They build relationships and a collective responsibility identifying shared concerns among neighbours and creating alliances and coalitions between neighbours and institutions.

4.- They choose leaders to carry out the projects which have been democratically selected.

5.- They use strategies of education for adults, civic participation, public actions, and negotiations to give power to residents of lower income zones, which will continue to be proactive in problem-solving.

The main function of these organizations is to increase civic capital. This term is used to designate the relationships of confidence and reciprocity within communities, taking part in supportive activities, the basic consensus in terms of ethics values. Through conversations among small groups, parents share their stories. This way, empathy increases and the parents are encouraged to help each other. Also, bridges between parents, schools, collective institutions and public administrations are promoted. It's strange that in such a participative society such as that of the United States, one of the urgent goals these organizations aim to achieve is overcoming the resistance of schools, which are reluctant to

admit this citizen participation and activity. They promote a new involvement of the parents, whose presence in schools increases. "They improve the communication with the teachers, they get to understand what works inside the classrooms, and they become an effective aid for the learning of their children at home. Parents play the role of tutors in class and in programmes outside the school timetables, directing parents' workshops and contributing to the safety of the school"(LOPEZ).

7. ¿What happens when parents do not cooperate?
Of all that has been said, we can draw a good consequence, a bad one, and one that is even worse. The good one is that parents can improve education decisively and, therefore, the future of their children. The bad one is that when families do not play that role, the child's education suffers greatly. The worst consequence is that they can have a negative influence. In this case, the social and educational systems must try and make up for the family's shortcomings. In fact, the programmes that have been designed to improve the performance of children in risky situations —the american Head Start— have been succesful when they have devoted their efforts to interventions in families and not only in schools. The educational aid given to mothers is one of the factors that bear a greater influence on the childrens' progress. Given the difficulty of the issue, it seems convenient to train specialized teachers in these methods of educational urgencies, in order to bring into contact schools with dysfunctional, neglectful or problematic families.

8.The role played by teachers in encouraging communication with families
Let's return to the normal families, which may want to cooperate with schools but do not know how to do it. It seems obvious that the new educational tasks demand a new kind of teacher. For several years I have collaborated in a project for the initial training of teachers of secondary school, in the *Instituto de Ciencias de la Educación de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid*, and I have noticed the lack of interest of academic authorities in this issue. I will now outline briefly the teaching model we consider is needed in the Universidad de Padres:

1.- The teacher must conceive education as an ethical project, understood as the best solutions that intelligence has produced to solve the problems that affect personal happiness and the dignity of coexistence.

2.- The teacher must be an expert in education and must know that his role is to educate through maths, literature, art, gymnastics. We don't need any more methods to explain the quadratic equation, but we do need somebody to explain how to educate through the quadratic equation.

3.- The teacher must educate for action and coexistence.

4.- The teacher must be an expert in solving conflicts. Conflicts cannot be expelled from the school. We are living in a problematic society and what we must do is try to solve conflicts, explaining why they must be solved. And which are the best solutions.

5.- The new teachers must be good propagandists of education. We must explain what we are doing to the people. Opening the doors of schools, attracting society towards schools. In short, we need a good educational marketing.

6.- The new teacher must be an expert in collaborating with the rest of teachers. The era of the isolated teacher is now over, if it ever existed. It is the school that educates, the entire system educates.

7.- The new teacher must know how to cooperate with families and establish ties between family and school.

This is the issue that is more directly related with our topic. I have reviewed the standards for the selection of the teaching staff that have been published by several educational or psychological organizations in the United States (CASPE). I have extracted some of their recommendations:

"Teachers must establish positive and productive relationships with families. And maintain an open, friendly and cooperative relationship with the families of each child, encouraging them to get involved in the educational programmes, and promoting the relationships of the child with his family" (Council for Professional Recognition, www.cdacouncil.org)

"Given that the children live in a familiar and collective surrounding and given that the research indicates that the efficiency of children's education depends on the cooperation of parents and communities, the experts in infant education need to be aware of this fact in order to fulfil their task" (National Association for the Education of Young Children –NAEYC, www.naeyc.org

"School psychologists need to know the family systems, including their abilities and influence on the school development, learning and behaviour, and also the methods to get the families to engage in education" (National Association of School Psychologist, NASP, www.nasponline.org

"Teachers work with and through the parents to support learning and the development of the children. Good teachers work to establish good relationships with families, in order to participate in the education of their children" (National Board for Professional Teaching Standards-NNBPTS,

www.nbpts.org

I want to emphasize the opinion of the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (www.standards.netm.org), which in chapter 8 of its *Principles and Standards for School Mathematics* states that maths teachers must be capable both of giving knowledge to the students and "promoting the relationships with families".

9. The situation in Spain

The parents' participation in schools is done, fundamentally, by engaging with the tutors, attending School Councils, Parents Associations and schools for parents or similar events. The relationship with the teachers is usually not very smooth, among other things because the visiting hours are scarce, and, normally, are scheduled in the morning, making it difficult for parents to attend. They are also usually caused by the appearance of some sort of problem, and very rarely by the desire of the parents to participate in improving education. The relationship In Spain between family and school is not as close as in other countries of Europe. For instance, in Spain the number of meetings held with parents during the course is 2'6, in Germany it is 6'10 and in Austria it is 4. In these countries, it

is not something rare for parents to enter the classroom, spending some time there while the usual activities occur. The presence of parents in the classrooms of infant education is practically non-existing in our country (PALACIOS).

The scarce culture of family-school relationships does not help the parents (particularly those who are more distanced from the ways and customs of the school) to transform their ideas regarding their children, their abilities, the way to stimulate them and improve their education and breeding conditions, and it does not contribute to change the vision they have of themselves or their capacity to have an inluence on the development of the child. "In the best of worlds, the shift from traditional ideas to modern ideas could be encouraged by the presence of parents in the classrooms, by observing the way in which the teacher engages with the children, explaining things, proposing challenges, etc. But in the reality of our surroundings, it seems that this is too far from what both parents and teachers are willing to do. On the other hand, intensifying the family-school relationships In the form of more meetings, more contacts, more information and exchange, seems to pertain to the domain of that which is feasible. We believe these exchanges are the ideal context to improve the rapprochement between family culture and school culture in the case of those boys and girls who have greater chances of failing when facing the schools requirements, who happen to be the children whose ideas and family practices are more distanced from that of schools (PALACIOS).

The schools for parents have the aim of helping them to fulfil their parental functions in a more effective and safe way. Fernando de la Fuente defines them as "One of the most interesting strategies to create a field of educational dialogue on the goals and means of education: why we educate, how we educate. It is part of the department of communication or conversation, that does not try to achieve any kind of short-term operative decision, but only seeks reflection, dialogue, consensus"(DE LA FUENTE)

V. Fresnillo Poza and other authors, from the Social Services of Madrid's Municipality, point out the following current indicators of the need to have Schools for Parents:

- The confusion on the values that should be predominant. Some describe our western society as hedonist, competitive, consumer, individualist… however, many earnestly recognise values like

solidarity, ecologism, cooperation, tolerance…
- The lack of time to be shared with children, that transforms schools in many cases into a second home.
- The growing influence of the media, which on occasions interfere with what parents want to pass on to their children.
- The generational differences and the consequent communication problems between parents and children.
- The lack of dedication or knowledge to improve as human beings and thus offer our children a better model of behaviour" (FRESNILLO)

The negative aspect of the running of these schools is the scarce number of fathers/mothers who chose to attend, for in 70 % of the ones that have been studied there are 20 people, in many cases the attendance is lower than 10. They allege problems at work and lack of time to justify their absence, that is why it is important to figure out how to inspire the parents to participate. I have tried to alleviate some of the greater difficulties taking advantage of new technologies of communication. The University of Parents, which is having great reception, gives classes through Internet.

The absence of participation is also perceived when studying the School Councils of institutions, and the Associations of Mothers and Fathers. School Councils raise special problems with regard to the management of schools, which are being debated again on the occasion of the new Law of Education (LOE), and which surpass the scope of this work. Regarding the Associations of Parents of Students, the report published by CEAPA (Confederación Española de Asociaciones de Padres de Alumnos) reveals the low index of participation. The attendance at the meetings organized by the Association of Parents is 18% of fathers, and the participation in the organization of the APS is 4 %.

10. A shared pedagogy
When we consider education to be something more than the simple learning of concepts, when we refer to the fundamental resources of character, the habits of affection and volition, the ability to manage one's own behaviour, moral education, we clearly see that the school and family must cooperate. And they must do it in a systematic way. That is why I want to

propose the elaboration of a "shared pedagogy". I believe the "formally educational" space, that is, that which has the goal of educating consciously, has two centers: school and home. They both form a common space, that should have the same rules and aims. Expressed this way, it seems obvious and, however, it raises problems of enormous complexity. In order to understand it, it is enough to remember the debate on the "education of citizenship" that has taken place in Spain recently. Families have the recognized right to choose the moral education their children will receive. There is an alternative that stems from this right: (1) the school follows the wishes of the parents and becomes confessional in some cases, (2) the school sets the rules of parents in the public space, respecting their right in the private educational space. Both solutions prevent the consolidation of that "common educational space" I believe is necessary.

Difficulty forces me to reverse the argument. The "common educational space" is not at located at the beginning, but at the end. Such a space does not exist, but it would be good if it did exist. That is why, we must make an effort to show that it is feasible and necessary. The controversy about moral education dissolves when we translate education into education of values in terms of the shaping of character. Moral education becomes an "education of virtues", and thus a magnificent tradition that incorporates greek wisdom, christian theology, oriental philosophies, or the research of positive psychology. The consensus on the basic virtues is consistent. Who can deny the value of courage, justice, restraint, responsibility, or good judgement? Virtues, which are operative habits, strengths, fundamental resources, do not prescribe, they discover, invent, recognize, justify. This is not about imposing moral prescriptions, but about teaching children to think, feel and act in a good way.

"Shared pedagogy" must ensure that parents and teachers have common information. That is why, I propose that parents should receive a "Book of parents", which explains what his son or daughter will study in that course, the educational goals, the resources of character that shall be worked on, and how they can cooperate from their homes. In primary school they shall be able to help the children in the learning of contents, that is, in the training. As they make progress, it may become harder for parents to fulfil this task. However, they shall always be able to supervise their childrens' work, praising their improvements, and showing interest for

what they do at school. However, the help for the shaping of character continues to be necessary until the end of the educational process. I believe this shared pedagogy could render surprising results.

11. Conclusions

Some useful conclusions can be drawn from this quick revision. Educational problems are complex, but we have many tools in our hands to solve them. That is why it is important, after having explained our situation, our goals, our needs, to make a call to action. We are living in an accelerated society, based on knowledge, that will probably experience very deep changes, that could be good or bad. Our children are going to encounter a ferociously competitive world, where they are going to have to learn and retrain themselves continuously if they want to maintain their quality of life, where many different cultures shall coexist, and where human relationships will probably become more and more fragile. It is going to be a world full of possibilities, but a very difficult one indeed. That is why we must urgently provide them with an "educational capital" that enables them to survive.

We cannot continue being locked up in a circle of excuses, in which parents accuse the school of inefficiency, the school complains about parents sending their children without having attained a minimum level of socialisation, in the end they all agree to blame television, with the tv channel managers saying they are guided by the taste of the audience and that if schools succeded in placing refined spectators in front of the tv screen, their programmes would be refined; lastly, the complaints are directed towards the government, that usually changes the legislation, and then the process begins all over again. In order to break this hellish circle, each of them must act according to their own scope of possibilities. I believe it is important to raise the level of the educational debate, and I believe we must incite families to recover their educational role. Their pressure on public administrations can be effective, if a basic consensus has been previously reached among the civil society on educational issues. There shall be no government agreement on education if a civic agreement has not been previously reached. This document tries to contribute to the fulfillment of that educational consensus in civil society.

5
The Place of Religious Schools
in Democratic Societies

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This article has two tasks. The first is to show that liberal, religiously pluralistic democracies do not have an obligation to support full time religious schools. Here I argue against the view that state support for *full* time religious schools is justified as an inherent human right. I also argue against the view that state support for parents who send their children to religious schools is justified on the grounds of fair competition and efficiency. I then develop a limited justification for support for such schools where the requirements of liberal, religiously pluralistic democracies must be met in a transparent way. The second task is to argue that the liberal state does have an obligation to allow free standing, full time religious schools to function, and that it bears a heavy burden of proof should it wish to shut down such a school.

This article proceeds in the following way. I begin with the UN Declaration of Human Rights' and ask what is the nature of a parent's right to educate her child. I show that the Declaration of Human Rights Articles on education, when taken together, require an interpretation if they are to be compatible with the ideals of liberal democracies. I then propose an interpretation that is consistent with the needs of liberal, religiously pluralistic societies. Given this interpretation I show why it is important to favor public education over religious and private education.

After this I turn to the economic arguments and show that they depend on incorrectly reducing education to a commodity and in doing so they confuse two different kinds of burden's of proof—one belonging to the state to show that a religious schools should be denied standing. Here I also show the considerations that need to be addressed for the state to meet that burden. The other burden belongs to religious schools to show that they merit public support. I conclude the paper by assessing other reasons for state support for religious schools showing that some support is acceptable under certain conditions, depending on local considerations.

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1. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights

The Declaration on Human Rights says the following about religion and education:

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

It also says in Article 26

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

And then it adds, also in Article 26:

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires an interpretation. Does Article 18 and 26 # 2 apply only to state based education, leaving parents a completely free hand? Does Article 26 # 3 allow parents then to opt out of such education for their children? Or, as I argue here is the right of parents to educate their own children constrained by Article 18 and by 26 #2? If we read 26 # 3 as a separate right granted to parents, then we allow them to control their children's education without consideration of the information needed to make an intelligent choice about the merits of other religions and without the experience that would help to develop tolerance and friendship across religions.

The alternative interpretation, one which makes the most sense for religiously pluralistic liberal democracies is that a parent's rights to educate her children is limited by the right of the child to information and skills that would enable her to develop an informed conscience, to assess the merits of different religions and to change her religious beliefs. It is also limited by the need to promote tolerance and civic friendship across religious groups. Thus while a parent has a right to educate her own child and to advance her own ideas and beliefs her right is constrained by the need to promote the

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interest in freedom of thought, conscience and religion and to advance understanding, tolerance and civic friendship.

2. The Public School Ideal

These constraints are essentially the same as the principles comprising the public school ideal in liberal, democratic, religiously pluralistic societies. (Liberal, democratic, religiously pluralistic societies are those that take the individual as the unit of moral and educational development, hold that each individual is of equal moral worth and maintains a climate where individuals can hold different religious and non religious beliefs.) The constraints include promoting autonomy, equity and fraternity. These three interests are critical for the continuation of liberal democratic societies across generations. Public schools have an essential role in their reproduction and they define their distinguishing mission. Although other schools, private and religious, may choose to advance these ideals, only public schools are expected to make them a primary and transparently part of its educational mission. Private schools may choose to neglect equity by providing already advantaged students an additional advantage while religious schools may choose to neglect autonomy by promoting one spiritual view as absolute.

Briefly, autonomy includes freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It is the interest the child has to develop the skills and attitudes required for an open future, and for the development of a mature conscience. It entails an obligation on the part of public schools to develop the reflective capacity to understand and to revise one's own inherited conception of the good. Parents do not have this obligation. Rather, they may provide a single, unified conception of the good and they have an unfettered but not exclusive right to pass on to their children their own beliefs and attitudes.

Equity entails respect for the equal rights and freedoms of others. It is the idea that all people are worthy of equal respect and opportunity. Public schools are required to protect this right and to assure that all children enjoy equal consideration, respect and opportunity. Parents do not have this obligation, and actually have a moral obligation to favor their own children in many ways.

Fraternity involves understanding, tolerance and friendship among all groups. It is the understandings and fellow

feeling needed to maintain a reasonable level of social cohesion within a pluralistic society, and serves to advance social cohesion across group differences. It is reflected in the public schools' obligation to promote an identity that transcends loyalty to a particular racial, cultural or religious community and to attach it as well to the practices, attitudes and skills of liberal democracies. Parents are obliged to be neither liberal nor democratic

3. Two kinds of Fraternity
All societies require social cohesion and so fraternity is not, by itself, specific to liberal democracies. For this reason we need to distinguish two different levels of fraternity—a thin level that is appropriate for liberal democracies and a thick level, which is not. Thin fraternity promotes the *understanding* across group differences required to support the advancement of autonomy and equity. In contrast to a thick fraternal interest it does not promote national unity over everything else nor does it insists that all group differences be absorbed into one national purpose and melded together. Rather it simply advances the mutual confidence that members of one group can count on members of another group to extend the ideals of democracy, including autonomy and equity to all, and to possess the attitude and skills required to sustain democratic practices.

Fraternity is a derivative interest under this interpretation. It is requires to maintain stability across group differences by educating citizens of the necessity of protecting autonomy and equity across racial, gender, religious lines and across lines of sexual preference. When teachers and students are drawn from diverse social and religious groups, as public schools often do, one condition for the development of fraternity is provided—the opportunity to shape concrete friendships and mentoring relations across group boundaries.

Parents need not advance this goal and may be legitimately content "sticking to their own kind."

4. Tensions between Family Values and Liberal Democratic Values
Some families promote undemocratic values such as gender inequality, racial intolerance, religious bigotry and homophobia and prefer schools that do not contradict these values, and that might even support them. Given the many other important functions that families serve and given the special

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relationship between a parent and a child, liberal states are reluctant to interfere at the family level with the transmission process. This makes it especially important for students from these families to be exposed to schooling that is discontinuous with the values transmitted by their families.

Moreover, even in families where bigotry and intolerance are absent, values appropriate for family life can be in tension with the values required by a democratic society. For example, parents are expected to favor their own children, and to distribute affection and goods among their children according to need not to according to merit. A parent who thought first of the merits of other people's children instead of the needs of her own could well be seen as irresponsible. Parents who neglect the needs of their own children in order to serve the needs of children they have never met are not morally praiseworthy. For example, parents who discourage their child from applying to one college because she feels there are more meritorious students who deserve to be considered will not be praised for fairness.

However, schools must teach children the skills and attitudes required for a life in civil society and these include the concern for impartiality and fairness. Students must learn to consider strangers as equals in many situations and to accept the fact that rewards will be distributed according to standards of performance and excellence and not just according to need. In the public sphere one of the formative idea of democracy, equality of opportunity, requires that people be rewarded according to merit and not by virtue of affection or special status. Thus public schools are properly expected to educate children beyond the values imbedded in family life and to help them develop the values required by civil society and democratic politics. To the extent that public schools are properly expected to teach students to put aside personal affection or religious affiliation and to judge fellow students on the basis of performance and merit, public schools are in tension with values that are perfectly appropriate within the family. While there is often a meritorious principle at work in religious schools, it is limited because it applies only to children who already share the same religion. It is one thing to select the best Catholic student in a Catholic school to captain the football team, or play the leading role in the class play. It is quite another to select the best student, regardless of religion, as must be done in a public school.

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5. Tensions between Religious Values and Liberal Democratic Values

A deep tension also can exist within liberal democracies between the need to reward merit and the need to respect different religious beliefs. On the one hand the maintenance of liberal forms of government requires that citizens hold, understand, and appreciate intersubjectively the values critical to democratic life, values such as equality, and impartiality. To hold these values intersubjectively simply means that each citizen not only holds these values herself but knows she can depend on other citizens to hold them as well. As we saw, this is a basic condition of fraternity. On the other hand democratic values also include the freedom to worship, as one will and to pass on one's beliefs to one's children, even when those beliefs are not consistent with the needed democratic intersubjective values. Religious schools can, for example, legitimately favor teachers and students who hold the same beliefs.

To advantage publicly controlled and publicly accountable schools is to acknowledge that social cohesion in a democracy requires nurturing certain intersubjective understandings while also allowing for the importance of respecting the integrity of religion. To advantage public schools means that parents are enabled, through say tax benefits, smaller classes and the like, but that they are not coerced to send their children to schools that transparently support the public schools ideal.

6. Education is Not a Commodity

Recently the public school ideal has been challenged by arguments that schools are pretty much like any other commodities, and that parents should be able to use state support to choose the one that best suits their own ideas of education. This challenge adds fuel to the idea that parents have unconstrained rights to control their children's education. Given this view of education, when the state uses its resources to advantage public schools it is exercising a morally illegitimate monopoly. If education is viewed as but another market then it makes sense to provide parents with the means to select private and religious schools for their children.

To understand state schools in terms of a commodity neglects the special obligation of education to promote autonomy, equity and fraternity serving to weaken the public school ideal by obscuring the critical distinction between a

parental right to educate children in any school of their choosing on the one hand and a state granted preference on the other. To bring the public school ideal back into focus means that if the state is to support homogenous schools it should do so only where schools do not violate the concern for autonomy, equity and fraternity. For example, equity and autonomy might be served best for some oppressed groups by providing voluntary separate schools where cultural identity can be maintained and individual self-esteem nurtured.

While democratic governments often accommodate religious schools, the idea that education is a commodity minimizes the importance of the public school ideal. The justification for public schools is to promote liberal democracy and pluralism. To see such schools in terms of an illegitimate monopoly belittles this ideal. Given a pure market ideology, parents are entitled to standardized information, largely about the academic performance of students from different schools on state administered standardized tests and about student and parent satisfaction with different schools. This allows for comparative shopping, and some religious and private schools do well on these measures. However, the basic norms of democracy--the sanctity of the individual, the primacy of rights, equality before the law, advancement by merit, to mention but a few, the basic rhetorical building blocks of the democratic nation state are left to independent religious and private schools to advance or not, at their will.

The market analogy breaks down in two ways. First, the public funding of an individual parental preference is different than a traditional market relationship. In the latter the buyer provides her own money to purchase a commodity in order to satisfy a self-determined need. The buyer thus defines the need as her own and also determines whether the product has satisfied it. In the former the public provides the parent with the funds to purchase a "product" (education) that directly impact the interest of the child. In the economic exchange there are two primary parties—the buyer and the seller. In the "educational" exchange there are four parties, the public, the parent, the school and the child. Moreover, the economic exchange assumes that the seller has the capacity to define her own needs, has the information required to determine which of a number of competing products will best satisfy them, and is able later to determine whether her choice was a good one in terms of whether it met her expectations.

A truly *educational* exchange cannot make these assumptions. The parent may determine the product but it is, in the case of choice schemes, the public that pays the bill and it is the child who ultimately will experience the goodness or badness of the choice. In this exchange the public has certain interests that have to do with such things as the coherence, stability and justness of the society, and the child has certain interests in a future that is reasonably autonomous and reasonably self determined. This means that the child has an interest in becoming the kind of person who can reflect on and evaluate different conceptions of the good life, including those shaped and passed down by her parents and their religious community.

However, these interests are not yet actualized for young children, and since the development of reflective choice may mean that a child develops a critical distance from the values of the parent, many parents are not happy with schools that promote autonomy. To view schools as simply commodities then may result in the market anomaly that the buyer (the parent) chooses a product that is inadequate for the consumer (the child), and does so using money that belongs to another party (the tax payer) whose interests may not be addressed.

The second way in which the market analogy fails is in classifying education as a commodity. Society wisely protects some things from being defined exclusively as commodities. These include one's body parts, one's children, and one's sexual favors. These are rightfully excluded from inclusion in many markets. In other cases commoditization is limited. Professionals can sell their services but are prohibited from selling certain things that arise as consequences of those services. Psychoanalysts, and attorneys cannot sell the information their clients provide them even should the client agree to the sale. Elizabeth Anderson makes a similar point regarding the state.

If the state should promote citizen's freedom and autonomy, it may not regard itself as a customer with respect to all the projects it funds. Its proper aim in funding projects is not to serve the political interests of the state, the self-interest of its officials, or even the tastes of the majority, but to expand the range of significant opportunities open to its citizens by supporting institutions that enable them to govern themselves by the norms internal to the modes appropriate to different kinds of goods.

Markets are appropriate only in so far as they support goods that can advance purposes that are internal to the activity at hand. Education has two internal goods that limit its commoditization.

On the individual level the internal educational value is the development of a capacity for reflective evaluation relevant to making good choices and living a flourishing life. As mentioned, this is the good of autonomy, and it is intimately tied to the second internal value of education.

On the societal level the internal educational value is the good of equity or the need to recognize and acknowledge the right of others to develop a capacity for reflective evaluation and flourishing. These two values, autonomy and equity are the two goods that must circumscribe all claims to educational choice. They are what is required if a choice is to be considered an *educational* choice rather than say, a vocational one or a religious one. All liberal democracies are responsible to further these aims through education.

7. Religious Schools Need Not be Democratic

Although some, perhaps many, religious schools may promote democratic values promoting democracy is not what makes them a religious school. Religious schools normally require a certain distance from the state in order to advance their own beliefs and practices without undue interference. Thus, while state supported public schools are directly accountable to public bodies, religious schools maintain a certain distance from these bodies in order to successfully advance their own unique beliefs and practices. In addition, many religions advance the belief that their own congregants have a special place in the scheme of things, and these religions may not see equity or fraternity as a primary aim of education for their children. These religions will often promote a separate identity that excludes members of other religions and will view them as less worthy.

Further, gender equity is a problem for some religions that believe women should be submissive to men. Other religions view autonomy as overly individualistic and selfish and do not rank it high on the scale of values. In sum: religious schools may legitimately view their primary role as reproducing congregants rather than reflective citizens. The latter may happen and it may happen deliberately but this is not a condition of a religious education. Ironically, to the extent that

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public education succeeds in creating and maintaining a robust democratic culture whose influence extends beyond the school, then the public can have more confidence that democratic culture will influence religious school students as well.

8. Different Burdens of Proof

The argument above should not be taken as an argument against recognizing the legitimacy of full time religious schools. Nor should it even be taken as a categorical argument against state financial support for such schools. Rather it is an argument about the rational for such support, rejecting both the argument that parents have an unconstrained right to educate their children as they wish and rejecting as well the efficiency argument that views education as simply another market and schooling as simply another commodity.

Legitimacy and support are somewhat separate issues because they involve different burdens of proof. The very idea of religious diversity, which is critical to the liberal state, places a strong burden of proof on the state to show that a particular religious school is not legitimate. After all, religion is one of the generators of the plurality that the liberal state is assigned to protect. This gives parents a presumptive right to educate their children in their own religion, and few would question that parents have a right to reproduce their own religious beliefs and practices in their children.

Moreover, autonomy and reflection do not function in a vacuum. They depend upon the development of an initial set of skills and on an inherited and specific conception of the good. We are autonomous when we have the capacity to reflect upon and change our own conception of the good or to make an adjustment in our way of life. Yet that conception of the good comes from some place—usually our parents and their extended communities, and the revision thus operates upon an already given, concrete form of life.

However, the fact that financial support for a religious school takes resources away from public schools means that such support potentially subtracts from the resources required to reproduce liberal values. This places a different burden on religious schools when it comes to the question of public support and some countries may simply decide, quite legitimately, to not support religious schools for a variety of historical, political or social reasons. Hence, even in those countries that do provide public funds for religious schools

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support for any given school should require a strong justification based on liberal ideals.

Given that such support cannot be claimed as a *right* and given that education is not just another *commodity* to be bought and sold on a market it is important that the justification for supporting any specific religious schools meet certain general criterion. First, the rationale should be durable, extending beyond any immediate but temporary advantage for religious schools; second, it should be acceptable to people beyond a particular faith community; third, it should be factually and normatively accurate; and finally it should not be incompatible with the needs of liberal democratic societies.

As an example, some have recently made the empirical claim that children in Catholic schools perform better than children in public schools on standardized tests. By itself this argument may be a good argument for a parent to send her child to a Catholic school but alone it is not sufficient to justify state support because it does not meet the durability standard. Performance changes over time and a school that has high scores one year may not have them another. Hence, it is not a sufficient reason to take away public support from state schools to support Catholic ones or to discriminate against non-Catholic religious schools whose students are not up to par with public school students. Indeed, it may well be seen as a reason to provide greater support for public education in order to help raise test performance over time.

Another influential argument that meets the durability standard but fails the accuracy one holds that it is as unfair to favor non-religion as it is to favor religion, and when it comes to issues of belief, we are all congregants-- creationist and evolutionist alike. According to this view, publicly funded schools that teach certain doctrines of science, such as evolution, as if they were the truth are being unfairly favored over privately funded religious schools. This is the force of the charge that public schools are the "Churches of Secular Humanism", and that to force religious parents to support them without providing a publicly funded religious alternative is a form of tyranny. If it were accurate, the argument would provide an acceptable reason for state support for religious schools. However, this argument rests on confusion between the non-religious and the anti-religious.

The charge of public school tyranny is inadequate at least two counts. First, public schools are (or should be)

accountable to all citizens, and their programs are (or should be) open to inspection, challenge, and debate through the political process. In the end a particular parent may well object to the conduct of the schools, but there are avenues for collective citizen change. Second, public schools do not teach the doctrines of Secular Humanism. They teach, or should teach, biology, chemistry, etc. Secular Humanists believe that these subjects leave little, if any room, for the supernatural. Others, however, believe the complexity and order revealed by such subjects is a sign of divine intervention. The fact that public schools may be silent about such issues is neither an endorsement of a secular humanistic nor of a theistic understanding of nature. It is teaching students what scientists understand about their natural world and how they go about gaining such an understanding—through the methods of science.

To defend the public school against a blanket charge of tyranny should not be confused with the acts of individual teachers or administrators, which may in fact be inadequate, incompetent, unprofessional or tyrannical. If a teacher belittles a child's belief, whether that belief be based in religion or not, is a form of professional tyranny and should be seen as unprofessional. Yet public school teachers can use their positions to inappropriately advance a religious tradition, such as when Christian teachers join with Christian students to meet before school to pray on school grounds, signaling a commitment that non Christians often find offensive and unwelcoming.

In a liberal society the public has a stake in advancing an education in which students learn the basic liberal democratic norms, including the norms that call for respecting people who differ from themselves. Parents with strong religious commitments may or may not share such an interest, and the basic principles of liberal society require that their own beliefs and attitudes must be respected. It does not, however, require that public support be provided to help them pass illiberal beliefs and attitudes on to their children, and it does not require that parents be given the exclusive right to educate their own children into these beliefs. The question of whether to *allow* full time self-supporting schools that promote illiberal values is not just a matter of freedom of conscience. It is also a question of the obligation of the state to protect the autonomy rights of children and the equity rights of society.

Certainly whereas freedom of conscience applies to the development and expression of one's own beliefs, it does not

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apply, except indirectly, to the transmission of those beliefs to one's children in publicly supported institutions. Children have a right to grow up with a reasonable possibility that they will have opportunities to develop beliefs that are different from their parents and the liberal state does not compel students to attend school—-private or public-- so as to reproduce the views of their parents.

The question of support for more tolerant and open-minded religious schools is complicated by a number of factors. Among these is a preference on the part of most religious schools to hire teachers who belong to the faith. This means that public funds are expended on selected hiring practices. This preference is perfectly understandable given the desire to maintain the specific denominational flavor of the school. However, it presents serious problems when public funds are concerned. It should provide considerable hesitation to those who are considering whether or not to extend public funding to religious schools and it should also lead to considerable hesitation on the part of religious educators who are thinking of requesting such funding. Were religious schools to be publicly funded, pressure to require open hiring on the basis of academic qualifications would likely materialize. Without public monitoring it would be impossible to determine whether a school was or was not promoting liberal values in a consistent and effective way.

Since state support for a religious education is not an unconstrained right, liberal states may choose to fund some religious schools, based on a commitment to liberal values, but it need not support any or all religious schools. Schools that meet the standards of justification should be able to show that they are not contradicting the ideals of liberalism, even if the religion is uncomfortable with certain tenets. As an example, Catholic students could be informed of the Church's rejection of homosexuality, even while the school teaches students to not degrade homosexuals or to discrimination against them in the economic and political sphere, regardless of where the Church thinks they are destined to go in an afterlife. Illiberal religious schools, schools that reject the principles of autonomy and equity, and that intend to monopolize thought, can be discriminated against and states can refuse financial support. Hence, ever though parental rights and market efficiency are not ultimate reasons to support religious schools, support is permissible when certain conditions of liberalism are met.

The larger question is not that of support but whether full time illiberal, schools, religious or not, should be allowed to operate within a liberal state? Since parents do not have a right to deny their children an autonomy developing education, they do not have a right to send their children exclusively to an autonomy retarding school. Yet the liberal state must allow parents a lot of lead way, and this places a large burden of proof on the liberal state.

The principles of liberalism restrain governments from intruding into a family's private space, even when there is conclusive evidence that parents are teaching illiberal ideas. However, a school, whether religious or not, has a different status than a family. It is a transitional body that serves to help the child make the adjustments requires for engaging in civil and political society. Given its transitional function the state has stronger authority to monitor children's development within a school setting than it does within a family one and this entails that it has a legitimate role in intruding in the transmission of illiberal values within a school setting.

The question then of whether illiberal schools should be allowed to operate will then depend on the character of the school's "illiberalism". If a school simply promotes religious ideals over democratic ones, then the costs to pluralism would be too high for the state to interfere with its operation and the school should be allowed to continue. As I mentioned earlier, religion is one of the engines of the plurality that the liberal state must protect. If this engine is to be maintained within a robust liberalism, schools that advance a preferred system of beliefs must be distinguished from those that teach intolerance for any way of life other than their own. The former must be allowed, the latter should not be.

Because liberalism entails a commitment to the coexistence of many different comprehensive doctrines and ways of life, the liberal state must exercise caution before it interferes with a parent's educational preferences. When considering the legitimacy of full time religious schools a certain amount of chauvinism is to be expected and, as long as the schools are not receiving public funding, should be tolerated. According to some Christians, Jews and Moslems do not get into heaven; according to a fundamentalist teacher, Unitarians allow Hitler into their heaven; according to some Moslem teachers, Christianity is polytheistic; According to some Jews, Jews have a God-given right to Israel. While these claims may seem odd to those who do not share the belief system,

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they do not, by themselves, constitute a threat to democratic pluralism. While there are reasons to object to such teachings, they are part of the signature curriculum of some religious institutions, and may even serve to ease the ideological pressure on public schools.

Strict regulation of these institutions, regulations that go beyond minimum safety and academic standards, is problematic because state regulation of religious teachings is a serious problem for liberal democracies. Here some burden of proof is placed on the state when it comes to monitoring religious schools beyond some safety and academic minimum, and private religious schools have often been allowed to operate outside of the social consensus. This burden, however, is on the side of tolerating, not supporting such schools.

Moreover, intensity of commitment should not be confused with indoctrination. One important test is whether students are provided with the perspective required to decide whether to exit a tradition and the skills requires to do so should they so choose These skills involve both the academic and vocational education needed to take up work in the larger society and the capacity to consider the worth of different traditional practices. Policy makers need thus to distinguish between schools that reflect parent's intensity of commitment, from schools that use psychological manipulation, limited skill training or intimidation to inhibit future adults from leaving a religious tradition.

However, should such schools function to deny a minimal level of autonomy, to advance significant intolerance and hate or to retard the development of a reasonable capacity to exit a given tradition or to reject a given system of beliefs, the presumptive right given to parents is not be sufficient to prevent the closing of the school. A less drastic measure would be to allow the school to remain open during the afternoon or weekend as a supplement to acceptable public schools that the child would be required to attend. As Brighouse, a supporter of choice, notes: "Parents have a fundamental right to have intimate relationships with their children, which are conditional on the protection of certain of the children's interests. Failure to protect those interests amounts to forfeiture of the right, in the same way that failure to obey the laws amounts to a forfeiting of one's right to freedom of association."

One problematic argument ties religious education to a concern for the rights of endangered minorities to maintain their own culture through education. However, the state does not fail to give respect if it refuses to support a religious school, as it might if it failed to provide minority and endangered cultures with extra support. It fails to give respect to a religion if it does not assure a safe climate in which congregants can practice and express their beliefs and, involve their children in them. This conception of respect allows beliefs of many kinds to flourish without requiring those who do not believe in a certain way to support those beliefs. Respecting religious traditions does not, however, commit the state to paying the salary of its ministers or teachers.

9. Conditions for States Support for Religious Schools.
While a parent's right to educate her child in her own religion does not obligate the state to financially support that right, many liberal democratic countries do provide support in one form of another to children attending religious schools. In these situations support is provided by citizens as well as congregants, by non-believers as well as believers and it is important that the conditions for support not be inconsistent with basic liberal ideals. Some of these conditions will be specific to the schools while others will be relevant to the social climate in which the schools is imbedded. The basic idea is that the school should not be inconsistent with the ideal of autonomy, equity and fraternity, and that it should not serve to delegitimize the liberal polity. Four of these conditions are as follows: A. Growth in autonomy and the primacy of the educational mission. B. Political equality. C. The welcoming of diverse groups into the society. D. System legitimacy and coherence. I treat these below.

10. Autonomy and Growth and the Primacy of The Educational Mission
To repeat: autonomy refers to the developing capacity of a child to choose a life in accordance with her own critically developed conception of the good. Autonomy requires the ability to reflect upon one's own socialization process, and to eventually take greater control over that process. Growth refers to the capacity of a child to incorporate new information and influences into that life as her interaction with her physical and social environment becomes more deliberate and goal directed. Growth requires adult guidance, but the aim for

liberal society is to develop independence of purpose and control. Parental control then is control for the sake of developing independence.

A parent, for the first time, guides her toddlers' hands on the computer mouse. The toddle has no idea of the parent's intent, but enjoys the physical contact and lets her hand be guided. After some months the parent can feel her intention being taken over by the child. The parent's hand plays a smaller and smaller role in controlling the mouse and the child's hand takes over more and more of the work. Soon the child goes to the computer by herself, opens up the game alone. Then, after some time has passed, she selects her own games. Later, she uses the computer to communicate with others, and even forgets the original game and the pleasure gained by contact with her parent's hand on hers as they worked to guide the mouse. In this way she becomes free from her earlier dependence on her parent's hand and intentions.

Educating children in a way that intentionally maintains the initial dependency and reproduces uncritically the parents' goals in the child is a type of tyranny. It is not necessarily that the child is forced to do something against her will. It is rather that the child is being denied the opportunity to develop a will of her own. The citizenry of liberal democracies have a stake in discouraging this kind of education because it has a stake in reproducing the subjective conditions that are essential to its own reproduction as a liberal society.

It is a judgment call whether parents should be allowed to choose schools for their children that foster dependency and retard the development of an independent judgment. The judgment requires weighing the consequences of disrupting the parent child/relationship against the likelihood that the child will fail to develop the skills and dispositions required for life as an autonomous citizen. The presumptive right is on the side of parental authority. However, as noted earlier, a parent's right to educate children, is not an absolute one and can be impeded when it seriously harms the child, and harm includes retarding a capacity to develop independent judgment and the use of manipulation to develop of an overly dependent, servile person.

Yet it is well to keep in mind that the standards for determining manipulation are not easily or precisely set. It is often in the interest of children, even those whose parents are not particularly wise in the way of understanding their own

manipulative motivation or their child's best interest, that caution be exercised in asserting state control over a parent's authority to educate her child in a specific schools. The tragedy of the education of Native American children in state run boarding schools in the United States and of Aboriginals in Australia should be sufficient evidence that the government is not necessarily wiser that a parent, even an unwise one. However, those were cases in which the primacy of the educational mission was subordinated to a larger social goal of total assimilation and children were removed from the nurturing home environment and placed in the total institutional environment provided by the state.

However, while it is a judgment call whether parents should be allowed to choose schools for their children that foster dependency and retard the development of an independent judgment, it is not a judgment call whether liberal states should support such schools. A condition for supporting religious schools in liberal democratic society is that they not subvert the subjective conditions necessary for reproducing liberal democratic citizens and that they thus provide the educational requirements for children to grow into reflective, autonomous citizens. One of these conditions is that at age appropriate times children are allowed to gain intellectual and emotional distance over the form of life with which they are most familiar, and to understand that there are many reasonable other forms of life. Religious schools that refuse to hire people from other religions regardless of merit or subject matter, or that block other reasonable viewpoints from being considered are schools where the religious mission supersedes the democratic one. Public support for such schools is appropriate to withhold even where other religious schools receive it.

11. Political Equality

One of the features of many religious schools is that they provide students with a disposition to favor those who share their devotional orientation over those who do not. The fundamentalist message that atheists and members of other religious faiths will go to hell; the Moslem view that Mohammed was the last and the greatest prophet with a more complete version of God's message than Moses or Jesus; the Jewish belief that Jews are God's chosen people, are all, in one way or another, exclusionary beliefs. The exclusionary effect may be even more penetrating when delivered to young children who

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have not yet had much contact with members of other faiths, and who do not yet comprehend the metaphorical functions of language. Because members of the citizenry belong to many different faiths as well as to no faith, they have an interest in mitigating the effect of these exclusionary messages and enhancing, the cooperative possibilities of people from different groups in the larger society.

Both religious and non-religious schools can do this. For example, regardless of the religious message, schools can advance a message of political equality where students learn to separate their self-defined religious standing from their political standing and where they learn that their political voice, even when informed by their faith, should count no more than that of any other citizen.

One might teach this in a number of ways in a religious context. In some religions it might be seen as the manifestation of the respect that arises from the moral worth of each individual. In others, it might be understood as one of the implications of self- fallibility arising from original sin. In advancing this distinction, religious educators would need to encourage students to become critically reflective of the doctrinal errors made by past leaders of the faith. For example, Southern Baptist schools might have units on their Church's erroneous defense of slavery and the belated retraction. Mormons, following lessons about their own persecution could explore the church's failing in refusing black people membership. Catholic Schools could study the behavior of the Church during the inquisition, and the crusades. And Jewish schools could encourage students to reflect upon the relationship between Jews and Palestinians and the issue of social justice. Islamic schools could explore the issue of Islam and free speech.

In all religious schools the distinction between the disposition to favor believers like ones self could be mitigated by appeals to humility and the ever present possibility that anyone, their own religious leaders included, can be wrong about God's will. Such programs within religious schools could go some way in opening space for the later development of civic friendship. However, without such mitigating messages there is little to advance the idea of civic friendship across congregations.

Religious schools could acknowledge the humanity of everyone, believers and non-believers alike, and the obligation

each of us has to enable others to participate in the determination of our collective and individual futures. Loving ones' neighbor as ones' self allows self and neighbor to participate together without fear or hatred in mapping our joint futures in a liberal democratic society. As one Talmudic scholar put it:

The sanctity of life is not a function of national origin, religious affiliation, or social status. In the sight of God, the humblest citizen is the equal of the person who occupies the highest office. . . . 'Heaven and earth I call to witness, whether it be an Israelite or pagan, man or woman, slave or maidservant, according to the work of every human being doth the Holy Spirit rest upon him'.

12. Welcoming Factor
Liberal democratic societies require informed and knowledgeable people able to participate in political discussions, to listen to the point of others, to defend and amend their own point of view when reason and wider considerations suggest they do so. Liberal democratic societies also need citizens able to participate in the economy, to be capable of taking advantage of the opportunities it offers, and of defining new opportunities and setting new economic priorities.

Religious schools may provide these services equally as well as, and sometimes better than, do public schools. However, there is more to education than the services a school provides for its own students. Citizens in liberal democratic societies need to have the psychological, as well as the political freedom to move from one part of their country to another, and such mobility requires that education be seen as available for their children.

Availability requires not just that a school exist in the new location but that the school is one that a child could attend without discrimination and with a reasonable expectation that she will be accepted. Given a highly mobile population, citizens in liberal societies have to assure that all areas of the country have schools that are able to provide a hospitable atmosphere for children from different backgrounds.

This requirement provides a special problem in some societies. One way in which religion is used (or interpreted as being used) is as a welcoming signal for believers in a faith and a hostile signal for non-members. Thus the presence of a publicly supported religious school of only one or two

denominations can serve as a signal to those from other denominations, that they would have a difficult time in this place.

In societies with highly dense populations, or in those with very limited possibilities for mobility, this may not pose a large problem. Hence, The Netherlands, a small and densely populated nation can provide many different kinds of religious schools within a small area. If a student feels unwelcome in one, she may choose to attend another. How well such an approach works depends on the reasonableness of the population and its ability to develop avenues of cooperation across religious faiths.

Larger countries with areas where the population is sparse may have more difficulty with this kind of arrangement. People in liberal societies need to be free to move wherever their situation requires or wherever they might like, and when doing so they need to have assurance that their children have available to them schools that do not discriminate because of race, creed or color or religion. Moreover, they need to be assured that the available schools will not assault their children's religious or non-religious identity by requiring that they remold their lives to conform to a certain image of goodness. Gay students cannot expect to hear that we love the sinner, but hate the sin. Jewish and Moslem students must be allowed to worship without having Jesus thrust upon them in the classroom, Catholic students should not have to listen to teachings that reject Jesus' divine status or that holds that a belief in Jesus violates the First Commandment and non believing children should not have to be proselytized or treated as outsiders.

When a community has only a few public schools, it is important that they signal a welcome to anyone who might have a reason to move into the community, and this is unlikely when all schools carry a strong sectarian message. The fact that such schools may not engender significant protest is not a sufficient reason to support them since possible protestors may have understood their presence as a message of unwelcome. This may be difficult for some countries that have been dominated by a single religious tradition. Nevertheless, full membership requires that people from many different faiths and non-faiths feel that the entire country, and not just parts of it belong to them.

13. Legitimacy and Accountability and Coherence

One of the critical issues in public support for religious schools involves the need for the development of fraternity across religious and non-religious groups as a way to generate adequate social cohesion. Historically this has been one of the critical reasons that some nations have given priority to one or another religion. They wanted to provide the emerging citizen with the outcome and the loyalties of the settled ones and it was assumed that connecting public schools to a single religious agenda was an effective means of doing this.

As global populations become increasingly mobile and as religious affiliations within any one nation widens, as questions are raised about the hegemony of the dominant group, the link between national solidarity and religious commitment cannot be taken for-granted, and is sometimes a disruptive factor across religious and ethnic groups. Reducing the tie between national loyalty and a single religious affiliation may promote commonality more than linking the two.

Loyalty can be developed in children to the principle that the liberal state enables everyone to worship as they wish and that they can be assured that another form of belief will never be privileged over their own. This means that any support will be conditional on the promotion of the surplus loyalty required for liberal, multi- religious societies to continue to function. Under some circumstances this might best be accomplished by providing support to religious schools. In others it might be accomplished by withholding support for them.

However, surplus loyalty from each individual religion to the state alone provides a strong hierarchical structure but a weak horizontal one, and is unstable across groups. Coherence requires connections across religious differences as well as from members of each religion to the state. Public schools provide this support when they develop religiously diverse classrooms and provide the conditions for the formation of friendships across religious (and non religious) boundaries. Religious schools might be able to provide this support in different ways, say by developing formal contact with schools of different denominations and by encouraging students to participate in interreligious and civic events. The more these developments are encourages, the greater the case for public support and funding.

14. Public Accountability and Transparency

If religious schools are to be supported by public funds, however, then they should be accountable to a public body, and the problem is then to find ways to accomplish this without sacrificing the uniqueness of different religious orientations. There are at least three ways in which this might be accomplished. 1. Utilize standardized tests in key subjects to assure that students meet minimal standards but avoid direct community monitoring of instruction. 2. Provide funds to support and monitor that part of education that is secular while requiring the religious congregation to support, free of government monitoring, that part that is devotional and sectarian. 3. Require participating schools to include members of the general public on their governing board. Boards can then set standards and decide how to monitor schools.

While they are not the panacea that policy makers seem to think they are, to the extent that standardized tests provide some guidance in evaluating the success of a school in preparing students for the world, they do have a certain limited usefulness. Nevertheless their usefulness should be qualified in specific situations regarding religious schools. For example, imagine a school that held that standardized tests fostered unhealthy competition and pitted student against student in a way that was disruptive to the entire religious community. If such a school wishes to remain self-supporting and to also opt out of state assessment, then the state has a burden to show why it should not do so or to provide less competitive means for assessing student achievement. If, however, the school wishes to be supported by public funds it would need to develop, for state approval, alternative methods of evaluation. For example, the school might open itself to community members, videotape classroom instruction and develop non-intrusive methods for evaluating student performance. While standardized tests have become more common as states exert greater control over schools, they tell us only a very little about the climate of the school, its merits or demerits and they cannot reveal much of anything about autonomy and growth, or equity and respect across group differences.

The second possibility--supporting only that part of education within a religious school that has a secular purpose--presents similar problems. For many devotional schools it is not possible to separate the devotional from the secular

because the entire climate of the school is intended to encourage commitment to a certain faith. Hence when children read math books, they read them in a classroom that has a large cross on the wall or in front of a teacher wearing a yarmulke, or with the boys separated from the girls according to certain orthodox traditions. Lessons in English may concentrate on religious virtues, and social studies may emphasize the importance of a certain religious heroes while much of the taken-for-granted discourse of the school assumes a certain religious orientation as the following examples from a Catholic school in Ireland indicate.

I sent my four year old to the local school for one year. Unfortunately, the responsibility lay with me to remove the child from the school during the daily 'religion' class. [which she did not want him to attend and from which the law allows removal] This would have meant someone going to school at noon hour every day to take him out. . . . And when it came to issues such as trips to Church, which occurred outside of regular religion class, I was not informed.

Religious schools carry with them certain expectations. They form the premises from which other discussions flow. For example:

A priest came into my . . . son's class and stated, 'I presume everybody is going to be confirmed". At this point some pupils jokingly pointed to my son saying that he wasn't religious. The priest asked him why he was not being confirmed. My son said that he didn't do religion. "Why not?" asked the priest. "that's none of your business and I don't wish to answer any more questions." There was a long and stony silence.

The difficult task then is to provide a system of support and accountability in which the inner workings of the school can maintain its religious character in a way that does not subtly discriminate against those who may, for whatever reason, wish to attend the school, but do not share its religious orientation.

The third possibility would require schools receiving state funds to include members appointed by the larger national community on their boards who could represent the interest of the larger public and would serve to mediate between the religious and the democratic requirements. The external members of the board might be responsible for overseeing only academic courses while the courses in religion would be the exclusive domain of the denominational members

of the board. There are dangers here as well since a great deal would depend upon the quality and orientation of members of the board, and their ability to define the line between religious and academic in a clear way. In addition to the fact that religious classes would remain opaque, problems could develop if external conflicts filter in to the school or if internal ones spill out into the larger community. Yet this approach provides the greatest possibility for transparency while allowing the religious program to flourish.

15. Transparency

I have discussed some of the conditions that might make state support for religious schools acceptable. Each of these possibilities requires however that some aspect of religious education be allowed to remain opaque and hidden from public view. Lack of transparency is one reason to provide a bias in favor of non-religious public schools. For example, liberal democratic states need to weigh any tax break for religious school parents carefully against the potential harm that it might cause public education.

My argument for favoring public schools does not assume that simply because a schools is state supported and state accountable it is serving democracy. Too often this is not the case. It only assumes that the core values of autonomy, equity and fraternity are essential components in the evaluation of such schools and that they are obliged to make their performance transparent to the public at large. When a public school falls considerably short of the ideal it opens up its performance to deliberation and debate. The transparency of public schools allows for public sanction when they fall short on promoting basic democratic ideals, and the rhetoric can provide the norms for re-evaluating performance.

The lack of public transparency in many religious schools retards their case for public support. Autonomy is threatened when science is distorted to fit religious doctrine. Equity is weakened when a school diminishes the status of women or homosexuals, and fraternity is fractured when students are taught that their own religion is the only true religion and all others are pretenders.

Because schools are complex institutions, transparency is required on a number of different levels. The most obvious and the easiest to provide is the content of instruction. Here transparency requires only an examination of the texts used in

the class and an examination in order to determine how well the students have absorbed its factual content. Many conservative theorists believe that transparency has been accomplished once a schools test scores have been made public. However, autonomy and equity are traits of character more than they are content of mind, transmitted as much pedagogy as through content.

While the transparency of content requires only inspection of written text books and the report of student scores on standardized tests, there are three other aspects of education that are critical in understanding the significance a school places in the development of autonomy, equity and fraternity. These three are: the pedagogy of the teacher, the climate of the classroom and the culture of the school.

16. Transparency and Pedagogy

Pedagogy is the means by which the content of instruction is delivered. The "same" fact can be told or discovered. A multiplication formula 10 x 10=100 can so that every time a student hears it, he responds in a parrot like way "100" or it can also be explained so that when the student hears for the first time 10x11 he is able to go on because now he knows what it means to multiply. Pedagogy is important not just in terms of the sufficient delivery of content. It is also important because the nature of the content itself changes depending on the pedagogy. This is because besides delivering a direct content—say, 10x10=100 pedagogy also delivers and indirect content about the nature of learning and knowledge. Although practice has an important role to play in education, teachers who use drill alone requiring students to simply memorize responses are indirectly communicating to students that knowledge is a closed system and that learning is a matter of meaningless role. In contrast, teachers who foster inquiry and experimentation communicate that knowledge is open ended and that learning involves initiative, conjecture and careful observation. Hence the transparency of the pedagogy requires contact with the teacher and the classroom. Certainly it helps when the text discusses autonomy and equity but if students do not have opportunities to make informed choices, if they are constantly drilled and tested for the one "right answer" to the exclusion of more active forms of inquiry, then the school is not teaching students to be autonomous.

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17. Transparency and Classroom Climate

In addition to the content and pedagogy each classroom has a certain kind of climate that colors the transmission process in certain ways. A classroom climate involves the background conditions in which instruction is imbedded and that shape the students sense of significance and identity. When a teacher lines up the boys on one side of the room and the girls on another for a spelling competition, instruction is now delivered in a gendered climate, and students learn that their identity as a boy or as a girl is significant as a factor in academic performance A climate can be competitive or cooperative, it can be patient or impatient, partial or impartial, among other features. It is marked by features such as the way students of different skill levels are grouped—homogeneously or heterogeneously, by how much time the teacher spends with different kinds of students, by whether she encourages shy students to talk, whether boys are favored over girls. Which students are allowed to roam, to interrupt and which are not. It can be set by the informal acts of students and teachers as when a fundamentalist teacher in a Christian school brought in a cartoon depicting a Unitarian Heaven with Hitler and Darwin gaining entrance. Each of these factors influences the kind of values that are transmitted and determines who receives them and how. Like pedagogy, the school climate is not transparent from afar, but requires classroom observation to discern.

18. Transparency and School Culture

In addition to content, pedagogy and classroom climate, schools have distinguishing cultures where taken-for-granted and self-sustaining patterns of meanings and personal interaction pervade the environment inside and outside the classroom. The elements of a culture sometimes can be clearly observed in the policy and official acts of a school. A Catholic school fires a pregnant teacher because her partner is a woman and the school has a policy against lesbian relations. However, can be quite subtle, communicated in the acts that are ignored. For example, in jest one boy calls another a faggot, while a gay student happening to hear the teasing turns away in shame and a nearby teacher smiles in silence as he passes by. Even more than the content and pedagogy of instruction or the climate of one classroom, the culture may be the most opaque and difficult to address from within. Yet because every student and every teacher experiences the culture, it is the

most pervasive conveyor of values, and will have the most long lasting influence on the extent to which autonomy, equity and fraternity effectively transmitted within the school. Because culture is so much a taken-for-granted aspect of a school, with internal sanctions unavailable to discipline violators, external

Full transparency requires that all four of these aspects of schooling be available for public scrutiny in ways that go beyond a cursory examination of text books and a reporting of text scores.

19. State Involvement In Religious Education

Democratic states might may waive full transparency requirements and risk the operation of illiberal, but non-supported schools, as the price liberalism needs to pay for pluralism. Yet this price cannot be too high, and at the very least the state must require that students have academic exposure to the basic ideas of science and to the basic principles of democracy. In the name of pluralism the state may allow a school to refrain from endorsing these ideas, but students must be familiar with them and the role they play in the society. For non-supported schools content transparency in academic subjects may be sufficient for state approval.

In this case the state would set minimum academic standards for religious schools in class size, safety and basic subjects such as math and reading. In higher grades it would require that students understand the basic constitution, Founding documents or laws of the society and that students would also understand the consequences of not following them. State control would be triggered only when there is evidence that the basic rights of children are being violated, or when there is reason to believe that the education is not adequately preparing children to lead some kind of reasonable, even if unreflective, form of life.

There would be no mandate that schools teach students how to think for themselves in any way that would lead them to question the values of the community. Nor would they be required to hear that other groups are equal to their own. It would, however, require that they learn to respect the basic political rights of others and to obey the law. The advantage of this approach is that it actually serves to maximize pluralism, although it does so by waiving the need to transmit some values critical to democracy.

These exemptions would hopefully be few and to keep them at a minimum requires that religiously diverse, publicly

accountable state schools be advantaged as a condition for maintaining an encompassing democratic climate. For example, much like childless people who are expected to help finance a public educational system, parents who sent their children to exclusive religious schools should be expected to pay public school taxes at the same time that they shoulder the burden of school tuition for their own children. Whatever the appropriate method, the state has a strong obligation to maintain the public schools ideal and this means that religious and private schools have a burden to show why exemptions are warranted.

20. Summary of Argument:
Markets, Education and Religious Schools
This is a good time to summarize the argument before concluding. The ideas that schools are not simply another commodity and that the view that parents have an equal right to state support for the *full* time schooling of their choosing is misguided. First, education is not, counter to the arguments of some economists, a commodity to be bought and sold without respecting the specific goods of education. These are autonomy and equity.

Second, the right to educate one's own child does not entitle parents to be the *exclusive* educators of their children, and the state has an obligation to advance values critical to the development of liberal, religiously pluralistic democracies. Given this obligation the state also has an important stake in the education of the child and can and should legitimately favor public education over private and religious education. This does not mean that the liberal state can or should deny parents who wish to do so the opportunity to educate their children in religious schools. Indeed, the right of parents to educate their own children gives them a presumptive right to educate them in full time religious schools.

It does mean, however, that the liberal state can provide incentives for parents to choose public schools over religious ones, and that under certain limited conditions it can restrict the activities of full time religious schools. Hence the market rational is insufficient to establish a parental entitlement to state support for a religious education.

A parent's preference for a religious education for her child is circumscribed by both the autonomy interest of the child and the equity interest of the liberal democratic state. While the state has an obligation to treat all religions with

equal respect, it has another obligation to discriminate in favor of schools that have a transparent interest in promoting the autonomy, equity, and fraternity.

Because of their legal commitment to transparency, public schools are the model for favored status, but they need not be the only schools that advance these ideals. If a state provides support for religious schools, it cannot discriminate in favor of one kind of religious school over another just on denominational factors. Christian schools cannot be favored over Moslem schools or Jewish ones. However, if it does decide to support religious schools the state must discriminate in favor of those that promote in a transparent way autonomy, equity and fraternity and against those that do not.

One implication of this view is that the closer education veers to the part time involvement of parent's or their educational designates, the more it approaches the status of an unconstrained right. The more it veers toward full time schooling, the more that right is appropriately limited by the states obligation to protect autonomy, equity and fraternity interests and the more public funds are diverted to religious schools, the stronger the state's obligation to monitor the school for promoting autonomy, equity and fraternity.

Educational practices in liberal democracies must also be evaluated by whether they are appropriate and effective way to reproduce the inter-subjective understandings and the institutional practices that are needed to sustain a liberal, democratic society where a plurality of different conceptions of the good will be allowed to flourish. Educators representing the interests of such a society must be concerned not only with the future autonomy of one child, but with producing the kind of social understanding in which future adults have developed the political skills required to maintain autonomy at acceptable levels for all.

Many religious schools share the concerns to develop autonomous individuals and to maintain the political structures through which autonomy is nurtured. When these schools fail to develop reasonably autonomous adults, they have, like non-religious public schools, failed on their own terms. Moreover, there are public schools that fail to promote autonomy in an adequate way or to nurture a concern for the kinds of political and cultural institutions through which autonomy may flourish. In these cases as well they have failed on their own terms.

Some Church schools do not see their mission as the preparation of democratic citizens, and they would not shy

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away from being called non-democratic. However, for public schools such a label, if it meant that they were failing to provide adequate education in democratic living, is a damning criticism. To be called a public school entails the idea that this is a place where one should learn the skills and attitudes required for living together in a democracy. A public school must aim to reproduce a public. This is not an idea that is entailed by the label "religious school," as such, although individual religious schools do adopt it as an important aim for them.

A bias in favor of public education does not mean that all education should be public and secular. It does mean, however, that the liberal state has educational interests to advance, and that and because of the transparency of public education, those interests are easier to monitor in public schools than they are in private or religious ones. The fact that public support for religious schools is not a right that goes along with the right to educate, does not mean that it cannot be justified on other grounds or that some states may choose to grant parents opportunities to provide a religious education for their children. What is does mean is that these opportunities, whether state supported or not, needs to be justified with reference to the long-range interests of a liberal, religiously pluralistic democracies.

21. Possible Resolution
Part of the problem arises because of the way in which we continue to conceptualize public and private as two completely separate spaces with a strong boundary between them. Thus on one side are public schools, supported by public funds, with administrators accountable to an elected body and funding dependent on the will of the electorate. On the other side of the boundary are private schools, many of which are religious, in which the state has only a minimal supervisory role. Here safety and minimum academic requirements must be met, but beyond that these schools are allowed to go their own way. The requirement of liberalism itself to maximize the sphere of tolerance entails minimizing state intervention in religious education.

Where states hold it desirable to promote pluralism by providing support to full-time religious school, participating schools would submit to heavier state supervision. For example, states could develop public bodies to monitor subject

matter and conduct on-site inspection to assure that the values or autonomy, equity and fraternity are reflected at all levels of the school experience. Participating schools might be provided the opportunity to appoint, perhaps on a rotating basis, a minority of the supervising body while the rest would be appointed by elected representatives of the citizenry at large. Schools that chose to participate would then be granted a certain degree of state support and it would be understood that the schools are allowed to express their religious identity and promote a denominational culture but in non-discriminatory ways. The body might want to provide certain incentives for maintaining a religiously plural teaching staff, but where religious schools are supported participating schools should be allowed to hire people in relevant subjects, including history, who will advance a given religious orientation. However, to maintain public support schools would be required to encourage applications from and to admit students from other religious and non-religious orientations, to provide a welcoming atmosphere and to hire teachers in non-religious courses on the basis of their subject matter competence, allowing that they are not hostile towards the religious orientation of the group. Religious instruction and devotional activities would be supported by the denomination itself.

Schools that did not wish to participate in such a program would be subject to minimum certification requirements, would receive no state support. They would be allowed to maintain independent boards as long as students showed evidence of sufficient factual knowledge and skills to make informed judgments about their lives. The difference between the supported and the non-supported schools would be largely a difference in the burden of proof. To maintain their support religious schools would be expected to demonstrate that they serve to advance democracy and autonomy and monitoring procedures would be in place to assure that they did so. In order to close down a non-supported school the state would have the burden to show that it actively promotes anti democratic ideas and practices.

22. Conclusion
A parent's preference for a religious education for her child is limited by both the autonomy interest of the child and the equity interest of the liberal democratic state. While the state has an obligation to treat all religions with equal respect, it has another obligation to discriminate in favor of schools that have

a transparent interest in promoting autonomy, equity and fraternity. Because of their inherent transparency, public schools are the model for favored status, but they need not be the only schools that advance these ideals. The right to educate one's own children in a liberal society is best seen as a right honored by the state and granted to the parent under certain constraints of autonomy, equity and fraternity and not as a right that the parent holds in any absolute or inviolate way. The state is not allowed to discriminate for one religion over another in terms of worship, but it must discriminate in favor of public schools and it can discriminate in favor of those religious *schools* that promote, in a transparent way, autonomy, equity and fraternity over those religious schools that do not.

6
The religious labyrinth

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1.Denying the evidence

The global labyrinth, which is so difficult to define, in which human beings are now located, appears as the result of many partial and specific labyrinths which are easy to define. Studied from points of view which —as occurs in all issues— are not only different but are clearly opposite and are the cause of personal and collective conflicts that stem from interests which are considered to be legitimate. An explanation of the ultimate intentions that lie behind many of them should be demanded, in order to accept them as such. Such demands do not exist, and therefore, there are no explanations either. The result has disastrous consequences which increase and strengthen the global labyrinth, although in many cases they favour concrete and identified beneficiaries.

In spite of this process, positive and negative moments, and long neutral periods, the evolution towards higher levels of civilization is a reality.

I believe it is interesting to understand the process of creation of each labyrinth, not in order to take stock of the situation, but with the aim of proposing a project to liberate all the labyrinths in which we are trapped, similarly to the proposals that other authors have created, indicating the path towards education as an essential factor of liberation from the labyrinth.

The very much challenged reality of the evolutionary process discovered by Darwin, has been held back by the conservative intellectuals, and only one and a half centuries after the "Origin of Species" book was published, has a movement of clear acceptance and revision of its theory has come into being. Not only has it been reviewed by progressive intellectuals. But also in an important way by the human masses that trail these intellectuals' footsteps. The poor arguments that have been used against evolutionary reality, have consolidated due to the lack of an empirical basis, or at least a rational basis in this evolutionary process. And since the

people who deny it are usually conservative, mental laziness have led them to ignore the other reality: that creationist ideas which form the foundations of their arguments, apart from not having a rational basis, have been denied by empirical knowledge, which has been proved undoubtedly certain by the sciences of astronomy, paleoanthropology, and analytics, even after another science, biology, has established the incessant change not only of human morphology, but also of its essential systems: the central nervous system, the genetical system, and in general that which governs human vital development. When will our cranium-brain stop growing?

The knowledge which has emerged thanks to fossils, the growth of the cranium as a consequence of the growth of the brains for instance, is crucial for the shift in human focus from belief —less than ideology— to the reality of the evolutionary process which wasn't designed, but discovered by Darwin.

What are now religious beliefs, particularly those which have evolved around the Bible and other similar texts —which have been proved to be irreal by the palaeontological knowledge which denies any possibility of adapting the religious beliefs to undeniable realities—, were inspirations of people who suffered intellectual impatience. Today we can guarantee the existence of evolution, even if the anthropological and palaeoanthropological sciences are still incapable of expaining the evolutionary process of life in all its extent from its origins. These sciences indicate the path for the investigation. But palaeoanthropologists also have a certain tendency to fictionalize. We should welcome this tendency if it only provokes humans to pay attention to the rationality of science and the irrationality of religions. The main indicator of fictionalization in the Bible lies in the dating of biblical events. The palaeoanthropological account is evidently not very explicit —and although it is excessive and makes mistakes where it becomes excessive—, but it is credible with regard to the dating of realities established through the analysis of fossils which absolutely deny biblical accounts. Analytics has been decisive in order to dismantle the "novels" created by monotheistic religions, and all of them in general, except those oriental religions which do not explain the origins of everything, nor do they determine the future, limiting their scope to attempting to establish a favourable present for human beings.

In any case, the decisive denial of religious beliefs is not caused only by scientific discoveries that have occurred

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constantly with an increased rythm since the mid-nineteenth century. It is caused, without the existence of any counter-proposal, simply by its internal contradictions. The fabricated ones, the existing ones, and those of all religions, even within the monotheistic abrahamic religions. And among all the contradictions the shift through the inheritance of syncretisms throughout the milleniums, reaching the old religion of good and bad of oriental origin. Although this is not an issue that can be included in the present essay because of its size which would demand a specific book, one only needs to contemplate the repetition of ideas from one religion to the next through the inherited shift of syncretisms throughout milleniums that have made evident the fact that there has been no direct communication between an alleged God and Abraham, Moses, Christ or Mohammed.

Just as there is a fantasizing tendency towards science at the present time, before, a long time ago, there used to be a fantasizing tendency with regard to divinity. The results are negative in both cases. Science and fiction, God and fiction, do not contribute with evolutionary factors or with a stimulus for research and they should not exist or ever have existed. This is the eternal burden of conservatism so as not to create expectations in both cases avoiding feelings of frustration at an advanced age, above all among the clergy, when they discover by themselves that they have been unjustifiably manipulated, in spite of the fraud that has been carried out with noble intentions. Besides gays and pedophiles, who use their ministry as a means of recruiting sexual partners. For many priests the confessional booth is the authentic incarnation of Tantalus' punishment. Whether it is with the good intention of the person that is confessing or whether there is a malicious and provoking intention behind.

A more extensive argument, which is scientifically provable in order to avoid creating false expectations: religions since Abraham are termed monotheistic, all of which are scattered and opposed in a fratricidal way. Contrary to what is desirable, because it is a movement that tends to channel peace and coexistence among human beings, due to the lack of philosophy and an excess of inventiveness in order to become intelligible, in an approach that is divergent to rationality, religions since Abraham have taken the shape of complete fables, distancing themselves from rationality. Understandable

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in its origins four thousand years ago. But no longer understandable in the twenty-first century when rationalism updates the evolution in order to adapt to the changes that constantly take place in real life, especially in the Western world. This does not happen in the Oriental world, where religion posesses more philosophy than fantasy, and where some movements undoubtedly emerge which without breaking away from current beliefs, can introduce essential changes for the development of rationality in the world. Because, what is religion? The theological definitions of religion are inevitably in all western ones contrary to rationality, the greatest human faculty to evolve positively. The sacred, mystery, miracles, are concepts that are opposed to rationality. And they are basic concepts for the creation of FAITH needed to identify the subject —human being—, and the object —eternal happiness after death. The western religious divinity opposed to Tao (Path-Way-Orientation, a concept which is present in all religions), which has similar meanings, but deeply opposed in content: Tao refers to specific vital aspects. Not phenomenical, as are the miraculous concepts that "explain" that which is inexplicable. The "paths" of FAITH we have seen in the latest religious phases in the West, have not improved the understanding for the newly initiated, the great majority of human beings in the present time. It has not improved either for the much varied oriental "Taos". The difference lies in the impossibility to make progress on the phenomenical path of the religions that have stemmed from a great number of western syncretisms, originating from the concepts of good and bad in the Ancient East. And that is why, given that the chances to make progress through the taoistic path are scarce, and by the development that has trailed on the christian FAITH, the japanese having discovered the dominating effect of the religious means over the masses when they began their movements of de-massification and returned to individualization, in relative modern times that coincide with the actions of Javier in the East, a timid christianity has been established. No Dö, the version of TAO in Japan, has been and probably will never be a vehicle to make progress anthropologically speaking. But it could become a positive factor if it deepens its central idea and at the same time recovers the rationalism of its roots, diamonds of family feelings.

We shall give priority to the three religions that are monotheistic —a quality which is not exclusively theirs, that is

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why it would be better to refer to them as abrahamic—, although it is clear that with this classification, there is no simplification of the religious branches. In the synopsis at the end of the chapter we shall try to show the intellectual waste of theology. We shall review the complexity of a hundred religions, a small part of the existing religions. But next we shall focus on the three abrahamic religions, especially the one founded by Abraham, the first core of the impressive abrahamic triple jewish-christian-islamic compound.

2. Judaism

Abraham initiated the jewish movement during the first exodus of the eternal and paradigmatic jewish exodus in the world, in this case from Ur to Canaan. In this first exodus they inevitably left some roots in Canaan that acted positively in their next exile when they returned having been deported from what in a certain sense was their country, Babylon, where they experienced the advantages of many coexistences they have been involved in throughout their eternally exiled history. The extraordinary agreement between God and Abraham, was the beginning of the regulating religion placed above the beliefs of other impatient intellectuals like Abraham himself. Never spontaneously. On the contrary, always laboriously but constantly. Four milleniums have gone by and abrahamic religions have nearly monopolised the esoteric world of free beliefs.

But there are not only three religions that govern this multi-religious world. Apart from those that call themselves oriental religions, within each one of the three abrahamic religions, there exists a great number generated by schisms in each one of them.

On the other hand, 1.300-1.500 million muslims whose faith if it could be measured would be greater than the added faith of the two thousand million christians that in their majority live in the West, those who have been baptised as christians would account for a minimum percentage, between ten and fifteen percent, if baptism took place at an adult age.

Given that the demonstration of Abraham's relationship with God, and of having direct communication with a clear indication of the route that should be followed between their city of residence, Ur, and the country they were heading for, Canaan, became embedded in the minds of his followers, their

rebel tribes insisting on believing that the trip could not be that long and grueling, and having realized that the path followed according to divine indications, through Abraham, was right, the tribal riots ceased and they settled in the land that God had granted them as the chosen people. That is how the feeling of hebrew superiority compared to the rest of human beings was created. And a new religion was born, a new religion with a single god who was an ally of the jewish people. For more than half a millenium this religion had no name or rules. Moses in a second exile from Egypt repeated the same strategy to convince his tribes. He showed them the road between Egypt and Canaan, telling them it was winding to wander about the desert for forty years, with an added miracle by the supreme ally, God, whose intervention was not, in this case, just an indication of the path to be followed. He gave Moses the first five books of the Bible —the Pentateuch— and also inspired them to write the more than forty books that comprise the Bible's Old Testament, which they obey, rejecting the Bible's New Testament that was established by the christian schism nearly two thousand years later. Christian orthodoxy represents no more and no less than, without invalidating the Old Testament and its forty five books, an addition of twenty seven books of the New Testament which were not accepted by judaism because they considered them the work of schismatics who were convinced of the fact that Christ was the announced Messiah, son of God, and God himself.

In spite of constituting a religion, and a church, the initiator of abrahanism, was always been a minority religion, and it currently only has between thirteen and fifteen million followers divided in independent branches. As in the rest of religions, divided also by many dissidences, the most important being karaite judaism, secular judaism, conservative judaism, secular humanistic judaism, hasidic judaism, mitnagdim judaism, orthodox judaism, and ultraorthodox judaism, with an average of two million believers each.

3. Karaite Judaism
Movemenet created by Anan Ben David, that reached its maximum level of diffusion in the X century. Against clerical judaism, it preaches the free interpretation of the wide basis of the Bible in the three abrahamic religions: judaism, christianism, and islam. The main difference in the rabbinic

judaic movements lies in the karaite idea that it is unacceptable to follow religious rules —more than six hundred written by human beings—, secularly surpassed over time. The laws written by Moses as God's agent, under his order and inspiration, do not have rational verosimilitude. ¿Should the means used by humans to find new realities in the Second and Third Millenium be mandatory? It's a different situation, human beings did not used to have, generally, a sense of rationality or an understanding of reality. This issue may seem trivial, but it entails a constant feature discussed by different judaic branches. Its anti-rabbinism symbolised an act that goes way beyond the sparing of religious costs and obligations which are practically unbearable in modern life. This approach justifies the karaite schism. What cannot be justified is the fact that each branch, although sharing common reasons that explain the distancing, karaites have their own movement, what could lead us to perceive that personal prominence and profit motives are the reason behind the proliferation of branches within the judaic religion —and all religions in general—, that hardly reaches fourteen million followers, because of all the main established schisms.

4. Conservative judaism

Conservative judaism is one of the three judaisms, together with reform judaism and orthodox judaism, that represent the branches of wider support among jews. In spite of its name, it was recently created between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and poses no obstacle for the development of science and rationalism. An existing contradiction in nearly all judaic movements, which provokes the social schizophrenia in their ways. In the secular West thie problem has been overcome. It has also been overcome in Islam: they are all ultra orthodox, wherever the contradiction does not exist. As occurs with other branches of judaism, it does not conceive the Torah —Pentateuch— as a dictate of God to Moses, but accepts divine inspiration; it accepts in opposition and contradiction that the biblical contents must be reviewed in order to adapt to the evolutionary level —avoiding the use of this term— produced by the present times, and they do not have a clearly defined, only a slight, inclination towards this fact which was established by Darwin.

5. Secular humanistic judaism

In order to understand the humanistic jewish branch, we must first consider the definition of the jewish creed, and it would be interesting to accept the Sherwin Wine's idea, who was an atheist and a rationalist, ex-rabbi and the creator of a new secular and atheist movement. With it, the contradictions between beliefs and knowledge, which the majority of jews deeply appreciate, become even more complex. Gathering an important number of jews like Kaplan for inspiration; the support of Dan Friedman and Julian Huxley; inspired by Theodor Herzl and Golda Mayer, and two universities and cultural institutions like the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, where the students of secular humanistuc judaism receive shelter, without which this rationalist action would have become ineffective. This happens because the idea of continuing to exist within the rabbinic judaism, with the intention of destroying it and transforming it into a rational society, using the personal values of the non-believers, ends up becoming an intricacy that clouds concepts instead of clarifying them. Collecting the jewish people's values of creativity through reason and science is a good idea, but as long as it is outside religion and within the framework of the rationalist existing movements in the world. Being aware of the abrahamic con, reacting against it. But it must be done outside religion. In one world, lassoing not only Israel, but the entire world, because at the end of the day it is the world —and within it Israel— that needs to be rationalised with its govewrnmental institutions. Without mixing religious distorting issues.

6. Haredi judaism = Ultra orthodox

The ultraorthodox are no different theologically from the majority of the remaining of branches. But in everyday life, many are parallel to the islamic fundamentalists. Religion and the Talmud are the guide of their real life. With much more balance than the mohammedan fundamentalism. The divorce between orthodox and ultras did not occur only because of theological arguments, this indeed played a role, but also because of the debate on the way the Torah and the Bible should be understood. The schism occurs mainly because of social issues; regional policies —ethnic in a certain way, although its groups all over the world, through mimesis have assimilated features from the native inhabitants where they have established new roots—; reactions against modernity and

zionism, and in family life; and the eternal issue of who and how should power be exerted. They are extreme rabbinians. The rabbi must always be the guide that enables haredis to correctly interpret the Bible and the rules (over six hundred) of the Torah —Pentateuch—. For it is not only salvation that depends on this but also peace with themselves in their life on earth.

7. Reform Judaism

All branches of judaism insist repetitively in having religion adapt to each time, especially the reform movement. If studying the six hundred rules of the Talmud became a generalised practice —which are impossible to fulfil nowadays— the Biblewould cease to be a vital guide for jews. That is why they all want, apart from the ultra-orthodox, to be modern, but as these do, they all want to save that which is essential from judaism. An evident contradiction which is impossible to resolve. Everyday life makes people forget the rules but the traditional verbal expression persists. The only path that could lead to overcoming this situation is secularism, and to use all reform action towards defending the right to be as the jews are, through the differentiation occurred between jews and gentiles caused by the diaspora. The ethnicity is practically the same as that of jews and islamic palestinians, but in the beginning they were different peoples already, and day after day they have become even more different. A territorial and water problem is behind it all. Israeli politics are also framed by the demographic problem, because of the great prolific power of palestinian muslims. But the territorial problem created by the Roman Empire which in the height of its expansion hardly gathered a hundred million human beings — today only the twenty seven capitals of the EU surpass that figure— proving Malthus' ideas. What will happen to a world, whether it has rules or not, in which the number of humans grows in spite of the restraint imposed by contraception in the West? Islamists and israelis —and 2.000 million christians in the world of course— proliferating in a diversified way have created the world labyrinth of greater size. The mixing of ethnic themes, and the differentiation among peoples, possessing or lacking technology, science and oil, all of them camouflaged by a religious facade creates a dangerous situation. Israel possesses atomic weapons. Iran seeks them. And the EU sleeps as the just ones do, which is not as the

strong ones sleep. No Bush or Obama can solve this conflict, succeeding to open the created labyrinth. The responsiblity lies on the shoulders of all the timid ones and easy-going rulers of the West.

8. Secular judaism

Judaic branches in general, except for the conservative and ultra-orthodox ones, have been impregnated with the rationallist and scientific spirit that has produced an ethnic group, which was originally a second cousin of the palestinian ethnic group. But the coexistence in the West with a great variety of ethnic groups, and an even greater diversity of peoples that have adapted and coexisted —but have not assimilated— have created a multifaceted ethnic group. Fortunately when there is authentic faith in the religious aspect —a very small minority—, there is nothing to discuss. Because each position does not seek the truth, it possesses it. But in the aspects of everyday life, rationalist, family, scientific life, in order to engage in discussion, an acceptable position which deviates from those which are discussed is frequently sought, but it is a somewhat more real, truthful position. The characteristic of the renovated jewish ethnic group, takes shape and develops between two extremes: religious basis with a great impregnation since before the time of their exodus, and reason driven by science and applied by technology, which has existed in the peoples of the world with which they have coexisted.

Although the contradictions between the Torah and the Pentateuch, and the christian Old and New Testaments are weak, the jews had the need to maintain religion as a means to ensure the cohesion of their people within the spreading process of the changes produced according to a human mode which is different to the place where it has been developed. The environment has produced a great amount of jews who in spite of not being believers they declare and recognize they are jewish. Making sure they are discreet with regard to their agnosticism or atheism. Though this is not the case of renown scientists who during interviews or in their writings they declare they are non-believing jews, generating believing and atheist jews. What is it that identifies them? Their sense of belonging to a same people or their personal nature, which when facing the dilemma of being regarded as racists, the idea according to which jews in general suffer schizophrenia grows. This occurs, in spite of the fact that jews are the ones who

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need the disappearance of racism in all its versions more desperately. The religious anthropological research shows that jews happen to be the ones who are less influenced by religion.

9. Orthodox Judaism

This branch is common to all judaisms since they have all evolved under the same name, and it continues to be one of the main branches. They say: God exists; his laws are eternal and are not subject to changes; God rewards goodness and punishes badness; God gave his commandments to Moses in Mount Sinai; the prophets receive divine communications. Any movement of unification —which is hardly possible—, revolves around orthodoxy, but without the shadow of reform in this branch that could mean the beginning of a judaic religious unity.

These main branches of the judaic religion do not exhaust the scattered outlook of this religion, which is camouflaged by the fact that being clearly produced by theological issues, the common interest dominates in them all, a common interest that has nothing to do with theological issues, on the contrary, they are completely earthly issues.

The great Judea is a concept that is caressed by all branches. The pragmatism of some and the stubbornness of others, do not produce violent conflicts as has been the case in christianism and islam, which has generated the impression of apparent unity, appreciated by all. Reality goes way beyond this fictional unity that has been created. There is simply a political unity, and the theological diffusion is something to be avoided by all leaders —in general— for if not all of them, a great majority of them do not have any belief whatsoever, they leave these issues to the common people, and even for the latter these are clearly declining. The rivalry between the extremes may be real (not just apparent) because of the distortion that has been created by the coexistence of judaic minorities in places where they have sought shelter during the diaspora. In the former USSR, for instance, where atheism was widely accepted. Thus, we are talking about issues that have nothing to do with politics, religious or earthly issues. Because of it all, the great contradictions we have underscored do not cause any problem whatsoever at a political level, and are only confined to the individuality of the true believers. For the rest, and especially among rulers, there is no contradiction. What is important and prevails is the common interest to widen the

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NATIONAL HOME to its maximum limits. The return of the diaspora would be much bigger than the one that has existed until now, with a long-dreamed Great Israel seemingly against an important part of the rest of the world.

What is debatable is that because of the holocaust they have the right to generate another exodus: that of palestinians. Especially if we consider demographic growth of the latter.

The labyrinth is built. There is no way to exit it other than ensuring that each people has their own portion of land. Jews have, on a global world scale, the means to buy deserts, cultivate them and develop them. Palestinians are framed with the islamic countries in general, with a common problem, taken to the limit by the palestinians wandering around the refugee camps and proliferating more and more, feeling resentful and having reasons to do so: current palestinians cannot face the debt they have contracted with jews because of their forced exodus provoked by Hadrian. Besides the holocaust, there are all the humiliations suffered by jews all along their constant diaspora.

10. Secularism
The latest judaic branch we shall take into consideration is secularism. It is the one that can create a framework that dissolves this apparent jewish schizophrenia. Kaplan posed the issue in reasonable terms which uncover the paradox of most of the inhabitants of the West declaring themselves to be believers. But they do not practice any religion. Due to their schizophrenic behaviour originating only from words, jews practice religion but are generally non-believers.

Jews have transformed their exodus in their way of life, not because of vocation but because of political requirements and wars of different types. When for the first time since the middle of the twentieth century they can achieve relative peace with the world, a new schizophrenia emerges: whether to live in diaspora or in the yearned ancient home. The diaspora pronounced by Hadrian initiated the constant diaspora that has taken place since then. The one generated by the Catholic Monarchs deprived Spain of having a bigger and better development, similar to the one enjoyed by Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and the rest of Central Europe, England and the United Stated of America. In each of these countries they have lived in voluntary ghettos, but when they have been

non-voluntary, in the West of Europe and the US, they have enjoyed a nearly normal life without any particular distinction and reaching powerful positions. However, although the relationship between jews is not really friendly, it does not provoke violent conflicts. With more or less realism, there is no hope in the current world for the arrival of a real Messiah (not an unauthentic one like Jesus Christ) —according to the judaic version— which being very badly defined by the apostles provoked the schism of the jews, the islamic one, and it christianism itself with its protestantisms. But all jews would cherish the materialization of the visions of rabbi Abraham Kook: a great Israel illuminating the world and guided by judaism. Everything the Kooks achieved, father and son, has been assembled by the son Zvi Yehuda Kook: poisoning the palestinian issue with movements like that of Gush Emunim, which he created, and that has only generated problems besides messianic dreams, for the possibility of widening the zionist guide —from its derisory population—, lies in the acceptance of a palestinian state, and learning to coexist with their arab cousins, who have not mixed for generations. And unlike the West, in learning to create a growth of population in harmony with palestinians —funding them— so that no palestininan woman fathers more than two children. A fact that should worry jews. Apart from the fear of a positive palestinian demography, they must consider the fear of the negative ashkenazi demography, which in few years, has decreased its population from 92% to a scarce 80%. And the rest of jews will surely not be the ones to come up with solutions to the palestinian-israeli demographic problems.

In all historical times, the struggle for survival has taken place between two parallel lanes: enjoying power and enjoying sex. The only interference in these two independent supports has been prostitution. But the connections between these two supports have other implications, like private property, finances, money, work, production, productivity in the economic aspect. And in the sexual aspect, marriage, celibacy, polygamy, demography, and social classes, sanctioned by laws dictated by persons or institutions which with varying forms of power obtained through violence, and which have established themselves with differences on planet Earth, a general labyrinthine order we are currently living in. Not because of the difference between the portions of land (the basis and

support of the general order), but to exert power without any programme or project, only through the instinct to possess economic and sexual power at a personal level.

Hundreds of millions of years have apparently been needed in order to create this world order. Not a convergent one, but one that accepts the divergence produced by the personal fights, and the variety of collective groups, we have reached a disorder that affects a greater quantity of poor people and a minority of rich people (economically or culturally). Majorities, according to the so-called democratic system, always end up prevailing. And political leaders contribute to it with their hunt for votes. Through demography, the world suffers the stress between these poor majorities and the powerful and rich minorities. The knowledgeable are on both groups. And it seems as if they have all understood that a clash is not convenient. Thus a historical unassessed debt has been produced, and it is unforgivable. The longer it takes to pay back the poor, as is currently demanded by the Third World, greater will be the demands for the interests. With different concepts, this situation already existed four thousand years ago. Abraham, who was highly imaginative, declared he had dealt with God. The Pope and all the bishops have said they believed him for two milleniums, living their life with the promise of paradise (where no fight is required in order to survive) and have produced the great atheist movement. If a descendent of Abraham, having checked out his DNA, was experiencing a complicated situation of poverty or opulence and had to resort to the use of his imagination in order to solve a particular situation, whether a cleric or a parishioner who was faithful to his ancestor, would he imagine an omnipotent God creator of this labyrinth where humanity has taken shelter due to the bad distribution of pleasure and pain among the poor and ignorant, and the rich and cultured? You don't need to be Einstein or Goethe to describe the process of creation of human beings, not through the power of God, but by the nature and flair of the Earth. Abraham's heir would imagine molecules moved from interstellar molecular spaces to an adequate climate like that of the Earth, which in a continuous metamorphosis of subatomic elements, in each atom and each molecule would produce cells. And from these would stem organs, systems and species. The mental and metamorphic process finishes with the cell that instead of being created as its discoverer Robert Hocke (1665) and his successors had assumed, through the effect of an essential substance, and not

through their partition according to Virchov's dicovery in 1855. In the times of Abraham and Moses, the concepts of atom, molecule and cell did not exist, and neither did the idea of the metamorphic process exist, that still produces silk in spite of the continuous fibre. For present day haredis, science is worthless. It is logical for them to continue believing in Torah and essential substances created by God.

11. Christianity and Islam

From the history of judaism re-digested by christianity and islam, stems the abrahamic complex of the three monotheistic religions. All three of them together gather approximately half of the current population. Christians and muslims follow the path of judaism: the same contradictions we have pointed out; the added complexity due to the imagination of the apostles regarding death, resurrections and endless miracles, produced since biblical times all the way to present day times, and above all by the interests created during the long space of time when religions imposed their domination on the rulers of the world. The other half of the population, follows two hundred religions which are hardly standardized and have no messianic, though in some cases miraculous, bibles. The great cores follow the wake of philosphers who have no intentions of deity, or at least with a dimmed deity caused by their incapability to produce miracles. During the remote times of the past, all kings, besides ruling had to cultivate their orchard in order to survive, a concept of democratic divinity, which is not weird for this practice occurred in the East, where religion only had one goal: the distinction between good and evil applied to men, because women were considered to be a part of evil.

Officially christianity was founded by Jesus Christ. In reality it was a making of the apostles, when they created the Catholic Church. One cannot deny the existence of Christ. Neither can we accept it as has been presented by christian churches.

Within the judaic religion, there are schisms and basic disagreements between the different branches and tendencies, because of the convenience they all have to present themselves as a solid whole due to issues that go beyond religion, —which strangely enough are transferred into reality to a certain extent avoiding all kind of violence between them, which lends it a touch of modernity. In christianity the theological differences have provoked fratricidal fights, not

only with opposite religions, but also with the many christian churches, especially with those who have proposed changes in the biblical writings. Judaism's vocation of wanting to adapt to changes provoked by science —though failing to achieve it—, in christianity these changes or the intention of making them have always been considered as a reason for schism. The causes are the same in both religions: the nature of Christ, God, Man or both; the family of Christ, particularly the issue of his brothers who threaten the virginity of Mary; the existence of the Holy Spirit, and therefore the possibility or impossibility of fertilizing Mary; the resurrection of Christ after dying in the crucifixion; and the existence or inexistence of catholic saints. Also the debates on the infallibility of the Pope, and the administrative and financial order of the Catholic Church. This church, the most widespread in the world, has always been considered from the very beginning as a product of the twelve apostles, confirmed in the first Council, under the guidelines of the Emperor Constantine I, with Mary being advocated as the mother of God, of everything created and as a perpetual virgin. Lastly, as the latest branch of the abrahamic religions, Islam is more closely related to judaism than to christianity. Doing without saints and miracles gives it a more modern touch when compared to christianity. What they cannot avoid is the schisms. With the aggravating factor of violence which is as virulent as it is in the case of christianity. And we also have the parallel divisions we have highlighted in judaism. The schismatic churches of catholicism; primitive christianity; coptic orthodox church; ehtiopian orthodox church; greek orthodox church; anabaptist churches, quakers, waldensians, pietists, unitarians, universalists, jansenist, millenarianists, seventh-day adventists, mormons in three different branches; the nestorianist church; and the churches that have stemmed from protestantism, anglican, calvinist, baptist, integral chiristian, presbyterianist, lutheranist, methodist, pentecostalist, and Jehova's witness. And then there are Islam's: shia, ismailism, druze, bahá'i faith, and sufism which stemmed from the schisms that were born because of theological causes, but mainly in order to defend earthly rights. A hundred religions, alfabetically arranged, can be seen in page 176, grouped according to colours in the first column are the following:

Light blue: the three abrahamic religions.
Navy blue: all the religions derived from the former.

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Yellow: Various religions
Grey: Oriental religions
Green: Tribal religions, they display religious diffusion.

A reference to the chart is useful in order to summarize it in this chapter on the issue of bad education, though accepting that given the circumstances that surround the general process, unbalanced and disastrous, indicates the work of human beings themselves, not the product of a demonic or kindhearted being, whatever its name is, God, Devil or Holy Trinity.

The causes are:

First:
It begins with the fact that the controversial Jesus Christ, from the denial of his existence to the affirmation of his divinity within the Trinity, was confronted in Primitive Christianity by a great quantity of "protestants" organized in parallel churches to the catholic one, which disagreed, as protestants now disagree, on the facts that were presented as being real, as opposed to being symbolical, on issues as the following:
God exists and is the creator, but not the one who maintains the Universe. Deism (see page 178, line n° 17 in the chart). Jesus Christ, life and virtual death. Docetism (see page 178, line n° 18 in the chart). Jesus Christ God is denied, without denying his human and real existence; they fight against Paul whom they consider a renegade; (see Ebionites, page 178 line 19 in the chart); the first primitive "protestants" (see gnosticism, page 183 line 51 in the chart); dispute between Christologists and anti-christologists, who also question the eternal virginity of Mary (see Jesus' Brothers, page 179 line 20 in the chart)

Second:
Although all religions claim their exclusive oneness, it seems evident that the biggest syncretism developed throughout known history, going beyond the content of an episode within a single religion, branch, or another religion globally or partially. The mesopotomian religion considered King Sargon as the first boy-God found inside a basket floating in the river; Moses was a replica, not as a God, but as a prophet. Abraham convinced his countrymen of having communication with God, for them to accept his route in their escape from Hur (Mesopotamia); Moses

repeated the episode in his escape from Egypt to Canaan. Hiding of Imams in Islam. The first Husayn with various repetitions, on most occasions because of succesion issues; the position of the imam was and still is highly profitable economically...

Third:
The causes behind schisms generate the idea of corruption. They are generally justified through the so called theological dissections. They are always trivial. Political parties, new "churches" have improved the system. Each branch that beaks away from the core is pitilessly crushed together with each of the instigators, especially in totalitarian countries. (See Macedonism, page 179 line 21 in the chart). Jesus is not the Prophet, John the Baptist is the Prophet (see Mandaeism, page 184 line 57 in the chart). Marcion initiated the New Testament, determining the evolution of Catholicism. (See Marcianism, page 179 line 22 in the chart). Generally, not only in abrahamic religions, schisms are provoked by the immediacy of a religion's creation, when the incidents are closely known. Thus the biggest debates on the brothers of Jesus Christ, took place before the IV century, and although they were not very enlightening given the deathly silence that was imposed by the christian religions on the issue, the eternal virginity of Mary was justified in many different ways. That the brothers, recognized by the Apostles in the gospels, were really cousins. That Jesus in his sermons never recognized them: his brothers were all his followers...

Issues like these would demand long discussions, but the most definitive argument is knowing that the creationist view has a thick curtain of smoke that dissolves itself with one single observation: if only one of the proposed gods, one of the non-demonic ones, was true, being merciful and really omnipotent, would he really have allowed the evolution of the humans over the last ten milleniums —and in a certain way since the very beginning— in the sense of some having grown in their conscience and spontaneously, and others through paths of inmense pain and sacrifice, or not growing at all? Would he reward some, the conscious, and punish the rest for not having known him? This would not be a divine and merciful behaviour, it would be the conduct of a demonic kinglet. On the other hand, this true God would be obliged to supress all other gods, and to make himself known all over the world without exceptions, to save those who are not well taught in theology

of making the mistake of chosing the wrong God, or believing in that which has been taught to them by their tribe.

The culture we have created after hundreds of millions of years without the existence of education, besides our ancestors with their conduct and way of life, is what has allowed religions and churches to persevere, and their members to maintain the prerrogatives while waiting for the promise of heaven, and the threat of the purgatory or hell.

All kinds of beliefs exist as a substitute for ideas of empirical basis. They may become this type of empirically tested ideas. But until that happens, beliefs do not contribute to a good evolution, they distort realities. The right to give religious classes should not exist. It distorts the students' evolving direction.

Let's welcome globalization, a phenomenon which has managed to ignite a process that will be hard to overcome. What some clairvoyant humans had foreseen; Malthus for instance, and also others more recently like Derrida: the solution only lies in establishing an adequate population for the abilities and capacities of the Earth. Without any poor to maintain, and with a majority of rich people, maybe everyone. Not in order to become happier, a term which is completely relative. But to avoid greater disasters like the latest economic crisis, because if this one is not correctly solved, others will emerge with apocalyptic wars, degeneration of the species along the path of gratuitious pleasure, and through time the definitive degradation of the Earth. Malthus warned us. We absolutely agree with his predictions, as Darwin agreed, which makes it necessary to act in order to avoid them. What makes it possible is the complete globalization of things, especially of people and their education.

Editorial Note

Biblioteca Divulgare

There is a certain coincidence in the chapters of the first part of this book in the "diagnosis" of the problems of education in the current world. However, the "treatments", that is, the proposals of collective action which have been suggested by the different authors are not all oriented in the same direction. A more legitimate action of the public powers regarding the ethical and behaviour guidelines of the different actors which have a role in education, including schools, families and the new media agents, would be more consistent with an analysis and a diagnosis of the recent social changes. The current problems render any attempt to reverse the situation and recover the educational authority of the family within the framework of the traditional model as something deceptive, to a great extent.

All the authors observe that with economic development, families' demand for education and its quality increases. From a global perspective, economic development favours the diffusion of education. Some of the contributions to this book, for instance, highlight the incorporation of women to the working environment and social life as a positive aspect, underscoring the fact that within families with educated mothers the activities and teachings given to children before they enter school education become more important. And that the development of abilities from an early age will improve their performance later on in life.

However, changes in the family structure entail break-ups in lifestyles that render the old traditional educational models obsolete. The entry of women in the labour market itself and the mass spreading of non-reproductive sexual behaviours through the use of contraceptives, have generated a decrease in the number of marriages and a delay in the age during which they occur in the developed countries; an increase in the number of divorces; a decrease of the birth-rate; and a proliferation of single parent families, which is analyzed in the second part of this book.

These changes in the family structures have generated, in spite of the economic and cultural progress which entails the development and the incorporation of women into the labour market, a "crisis of the educational function of the family", "a relaxation of family responsibilities" and a "loss of

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families' educational authority", in words of the authors of the first part of this book.

Thus, new questions about the responsibility of education in the current world arise, which are answered in different and often incompatible ways. On the one hand, a group of proposals emerges on the assumption that, given the crisis of the traditional model of education within the heart of the family, we need to design new ways to "educate parents". But family units are incapable of rebuilding new educational practices autonomously, that is why a greater cooperation between families, schools and the action of the new educating agents is needed, including those who can benefit more from new information and communication technologies.

However, these proposals cannot prevent us from noticing that, as a long-term historical trend, the global reconstruction of the family traditional model as a core to which the task of teachers in the training of children must be added is not feasible. The training within the family must be a complement to the training received at school. The experience gathered by the countries of the North and Center of Europe seems to predict the path that will be followed by a great part of the world which still is under less advanced levels of economic and cultural development. The growing diffusion of single parent families indicates that reversing into a previous stage is not an option. Families change and their educational action must improve by adapting to these changes.

The crucial observation from which one can draw implications of collective action is that in some of the countries in which the traditional family is a minority the educational experiences have rendered better results. As an example, Finland, a country in which the dissolution of family structures is nearly extreme, repeatedly heads the list of more than 60 countries in the evaluation of performance at school of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In general, scandinavian countries witness the greater dissolution of family structures and, at the same time, are widely considered as models of reference by the educational authorites of many other countries.

Family collaboration in education is very important, but the majority of fathers and mothers lack the tools to carry it out succesfully. The support they can give to teachers is limited, since even the latter need new tools in order to face the challenges of the current world. The best contribution that

can be made by parents in their time living together is an example of their behaviour regarding interpersonal relationships.

Experiences such as the spreading of centers for infants' shelter, which have proliferated in scandinavian countries, indicates the path that should be followed. As other contributions have underscored, the challenges of present-day society requires the training of "new teachers". Public institutions must train staff, providing teachers with the educational abilities needed to give a response to the de-structuring, negligence or problems which affect families. The emphasis placed on public measures of this type provides a greater coherence between the "diagnosis" and the "treatment" of the educational labyrinth in the current society. According to the views that have been exposed, it is fairly easy to deduce that fathers and mothers must not become an extension of the teaching community.

The support given to the educational task carried out by teachers is relative, since even the latter need to undergo some sort of retraining in order to channel their own educational mission, which as potential parents themselves should be relatively easy for them to take on. However, parents cannot take on the role of teaching assistants in all the subjects given by teachers throughout the course of each student's life in each career. Let's say that their intervention in the training of the students' soul can only affect the sensory part, primarily, leaving the task of the intellectual development up to the teachers.

For a long period of time, human beings explained their origins through the action of an omnipotent God who had created the universe. Today, however, the idea of the creation of human beings in God's own image and likeness is incompatible with the knowledge on biological and cultural evolution of the world and human species. Evolutionism has seriously and conclusively challenged creationism in its different versions. This questioning has strong implications in two fundamental fields which had been traditionally dominated by a religious vision of the world and that have been analyzed in the sections which make up this first part of the book: the role played by churches in education and the training of rulers.

The prospect of religion hindering education and demography, and politicians exerting privileged power, almost

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exclusive in the ruling of the world, is nowadays unacceptable. They have become obsolete, as religious ones have. They both respond to coordinates which were established milleniums ago. They have been incapable of doing nothing other but establishing labyrinths. The religious ones have created near-childish ideas. The political ones have created corrupt habits.

The socialization of religion —the only way to ensure its survival— is a hard task. Its hierarchical structure avoids the appearance of a superman with the ability to open up the labyrinth where it has run aground. If such a superman does not enter the scene, the end of religion will surely come about.

Education had been traditionally monopolized by churches. It could be that there was no alternative. But in the current world, exiting the religious labyrinth requires the socialization of religion. In contrast with the socialization of economy, which destroys the entrepreneurial spirit, as was tested and failed in the Soviet Union, the socialization of education within democratic societies can favour the initiative and creativity of individuals. To put it in words of one of the contributions which have been presented in the previous pages, "the right to educate one's own children should be considered as a public right that is granted to the parents under certain conditions and not in an absolute way". Thus, the parents' preferences regarding education must be limited both by the autonomous interest of the child and society's interests in achieving a civilizing progress. A democratic government is not only obliged to develop a public system of education, but also to discrimnate favouring schools that have an explicit interest in promoting values such as autonomy, equality and fraternity.

On the other hand, exiting the labyrinth of bad government requires new criteria in the training of rulers and new intitutional forms within the political system. For many centuries, rulers claimed a legitimacy of divine origin and were obeyed and venerated as if they were superior beings endowed with charismatic virtues. Nowadays, no ruler can hope to obtain such a superority. The shortcomings and perversities of the greater part of democratic systems in the world are caused, on the other han, by the lack of control citizens have over rulers. This allows professional politicians to pursue their own interest and favours the spread of corruption. In order to reach an efficient democracy, the political training of citizens must begin at school. At a higher

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level, besides providing an explanation of the existing political processes, political science studies should design the essential transformation of certain thousand-year-old practices that still survive in the current political systems.

However, it is not enough to improve the professional and cultural training of politicians, since no individual human mind, no matter how powerful it may be, can face today all the world's problems. The design of the political institutions is fundamental. The great states of the modern age tried to impose a single size for all issues and intended to blend the population within excluding borders. The result was a permanent conflict between States and the subsequent wars for sovereignty. On the other hand, through the division of powers into different institutional levels, each one should try to tackle the issues that can be solved efficiently from within the territorial field each of them possess. Each public institution has its own scale of efficiency, which must determine the scope of authority of the corresponding institution (whether it is education, culture, civil engineering, security, justice, the management of natural resources, the preservation of the environment or international relations).

The Helvetic Confederation, which is above all a tool used to preserve the popular self-government of the municipalities and districts, it is a basic reference for the design of the government on multiple levels. The local, regional, national, state and continental governments must form a harmonious group, precisely because each level must have exclusive authority over its corresponding field. The United States, and also the European Union which is still under construction, are examples of big federations of peoples that can be organized in the world. The United Nations Organization should also undergo a reform in order to become a truly global government. The ruling of the world with many institutional levels requires new ways of collective representation in wide assemblies that allow all interests, values and preferences to have a voice, and new forms of organization in the departments or ministries of limited scope for making decisions and carrying them out effectively. An independent system of arbitration or justice should guarantee the smooth running of the institutional body.

In short: the educational labyrinths, which entail social labyrinths, require an adaptation of the government to the evolutionary stage of the existing human societies. The

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communication systems have been incapable of avoiding the creation of isolated spaces which ignore each other mutually, and at the same time, the existing mobility of people provokes drifts from one spaces to others, generating an intellectual void in the less developed spaces given the exile of the best, and confusion in the developed spaces, which fail to produce cultural alliances, creating instead stresses and an obstacle to general evolution.

Education must be carried out through specific means for each cultural level reached in the different world territories. A second colonization is imposed. It is exclusively directed towards the education of the ex-colonies. And this demands a new scaled government in the spaces of the First and Second World. With the affirmation of individual and collective autonomies, substituting religious and political myths for rational education.

SUGGESTION (1)

It could be that the ideas given in this essay by the authors, which are efficient in the field of education, among other values, are mainly important because they have been assembled together, in such a way that it allows the reader to draw specific and useful definitions to consider education globally in order to find the way out of the worst labyrinth of all those which make the positive evolution of mankind difficult: the labyrinth of education.

- *All belief, at its best, is a hypothesis, therefore, all gods are hypothetical.*
- *Education cannot continue to be based on a hypothetical development. Its raison d'etre is to establish realities, empirical knowledge. A rule to act since the moment each human being is born.*
- *The freedom of worship cannot be mistaken for the right to educate hypothetically. That is why there is no space for beliefs at school or in families. The universal astronomical meditations, and the basic vital ones, should only be developed during a second learning process. Without combatting any belief whatsoever. Ignoring them all, apart from those which are the object of individual or collective meditation. And clearly defining that which is a reality or hypothesis.*

- *Religious beliefs, without an exception, fail to reach the category of a hypothesis. They are ideas which have been imagined by primitive human beings.*
- *The only academic qualifications should be derived from having passed global level standardized tests, carried out in institutions which are independent from educational centres, allowing access to students who possess attendance and average grading certificates in courses, issued by any public, private or charter school.*
- *Creation of School Councils within each country, grouped on a world level in order to establish a unified administration with powers to define patterns in the study programmes and issue degrees, the only valid qualifications in order to practice professionally a speciality.*
- *From secondary school onwards, subjects of elementary astrology and biology should be introduced, basic learning that enables pupils to gain knowledge on the Universe and the creation of life.*

7 - List of 100 religious

Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
1	Judaism	15,000	Abrahamic	Mesopotamia	The oldest Abrahamic Religion. Incomparably small in comparison to the Christian and Islamic religions. Survives through the ethnic-political-economic support of world of the Jews throughout the world.
2	Christian	2,000,000	Abrahamic	12 Apostole 1st Century	Under the banner of Christ, man, great communicator, the Apostles led the schism with Judaism, without abjuring the Bible (Pentateuch, Torah) and Abramanism. Subsequent schisms have led to over thirty branches of religions: early Christian, Catholic, Eastern religions, Nonconformists, Jansenism; Millennialists, Mormonism, Nestorianism, Protestantism, Jehovah's Witnesses. The number of adherents is not real, expressing the number of baptized new-borns.
3	Islam	1.500,000	Abrahamic	Mohammed	Abrahamic Religion, sincretism of Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan. It has Sunni-Shiite-Sufi-Kharigite and Kalam branches. Among the four they give rise to more than twenty religions that make up Islam. It occupies the 4th place in the U.S. in the number of fervent followers.

	Derivatives of Judaism Derived from Abrahamic religions. Those inserted in sections 4)-- 5)-- 6)-- 7)-- 8)-- 9)--10)--11)				
4	Makoya	60	Judaism	1948 Japan	Transplant to the Orient of Judaism. Created in 1948 by businessman Abraham Ikura. No temples, prayer at home. Their belief is patterned after traditional Judaism.
	Derivatives of Christianity				
5	Adoptionism	-----------	Primitive Christian	First Century	Jesus is not son of God, only a messenger sent to redeem the Jewish people raising it above their opponents.
6	Seventh Day Adventist	15.400	Protestant	23-5-1863	Neither religion or not antireligion. Belief in something unknown and unknowable.
7	Agnosticism	-----------	Protestant	-----------	Protestant, on the rise due to effects of moderate educational work.
8	Anabaptism	2,000	Protestant	7th Century	Unhappy with baptism. Faith through prayer. Anti-violence.
9	Anglicanism	70,000	Protestant	Henry VIII	A Christian schism not motivated by theological reasons, but by the opposition of Henry VIII and the Roman papacy for personal, marital and sexual reasons. Since its inception on Anglicanism is nostalgic for the Roman Catholicism, the reason for their current ecumenism with Rome, which serves no manifest desire expressed in various ways by the Anglican Church.
10	Arrianism	-----------	Protestant	Arrian	Differs from Catholicism as Christ is considered a mere prophet. Today it would be a Protestant religion.

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Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
11	Baptist	105,000	Protestant	John Smyth	No baptism of children. Clergy: pastor and deacon. Faith in Jesus Christ, separation of church and state, each local church is autonomous, each believer is a priest.
12	Calvinism	-----------	Protestant	Calvin	Rejection of papal authority. "Five Points" is their Bible.
13	Catholic	600,000	Abrahamic	12 Apostles	Result of schism of Judaism. Own schisms, Abrahamic religion, Mosaic and contradictorily faithful to the Old and New Testament. Repressive. Now condescending.
14	Catholic Maronite	3.500	Catholic	Saint Marón	Based on the Catholic church. Differences in rituals.
15	Early Cristianism	-----------	Catholic	-----------	Religion of the first Christians up until 4th century.
16	Quakerism	300	Protestant	G. Fox	Abrahamic religion. Many different beliefs.
17	Deism	-----------	Primitive Christian	-----------	An attempt like so many that failed to rationalize religion. God exists, and is the creator but not maintainer of the universe.
18	Docetism	-----------	Primitive Christian	First Century	First Protestants. Jesus' virtual life and death.
19	Ebionism	-----------	Primitive Christian	Middle East	Other Protestants, deny Christ, God and doubt their real existence. Contrary to S. Paul considered apostate. Disappeared in 4th and 5th centuries.

20	Brothers of Jesus	----------	Primitive Christian	First Century	Not religion. Only dispute between Christologists and anti-Christologists who deny the divinity of Christ and the virginity of Mary, to attribute the maternity to several brothers of Christ not begotten by Holy Spirit.
21	Macedonism	----------	Primitive Christian	First CenturyV	One of the primitive schisms. Deny divinity of Holy Ghost.
22	Marcionism	----------	Prim.Crist.	Marción	Instigated New Testament. Set stage for Catholicism.
23	Millenarism	----------	Protestant		The return of Jesus during millennium.
24	Monophisism	----------	Catholic	Fifth Century	They deny the divine-human duality of Jesus Christ. Human nature is absorbed by the divine. The presence in the Council of Nicaea led to the introduction of orthodox religions.
25	Mormons	14,000	Christian	Jose Smith 1830	A schism whose real motivation apparently is to practice polygamy while keeping the acceptance of the Christian religion.
26	Nestoria-nism	----------	Catholic	Nestorio	Like many religions, this one proposed reforms that do not come together until the 15th century with Luther. Symptomatic that the calls for reform are continuous in the centuries following the death of Christ. From 1st to 5th century.

Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
27	Coptic Orthodox	45,000	Catholic	Marcos I	A stabilizing religion in the 1st century founded to support the Christianism against the multiple opposition groups existing in the period immediately after the death of Jesus Christ.
28	Ethiopian Orthodox	45,000	Catholic Ethiopia	Phillip the Evangelist	African version of European Orthodox.
29	Greek Orthodox	9,000	Catholic	Saint Paul	Greek Orthodoxy has 15 independent churches, this is the third in number of adherents. All have a common theological background and its independence was motivated by its geographical situation and the policies of the respective states. Abrahamic.
30	Pentacostalism	600,000	Catholic	Fundamenta-lism	Religion in active struggle against the degeneration of customs. Jesus heals, saves and baptizes with the Holy Spirit.
31	Protestantism				See line 42 Lutheranism.
32	Teosofia	-----------	Christian		Disguised atheism. Gods and religions are human attempts to get closer to the divine. Sincretism in philosophy and belief.
33	Jehovah's Witnesses	7.100	Christian	Century XIX USA	Powerful organization made possible by the activism of its adherents. Current in about 150 countries with over 400 languages.

34	Universalism	----------	Christian		Preaches universal salvation, without purgatory or hell. There are many paths to salvation.
35	Valdense	----------	Christian	First Century 12th Century	Questions of whether its origin is in the 12th Century or religiously unstable 4th Century. Persecuted by the Catholic Church, they invite the belief that there was internal sincretism over eight centuries. In the 12th their leader is Valdés, Frenchman from Lyon.
36	Bahaismo	6,000	Islam	El Bab y Baha'u'lláh	Two prophets one after the other. Authentic rationalist innovators. Established in 250 countries and 2000 ethnic groups, in 1850 El Bab was executed. His "Bible" the "Baiame" was published in 800 languages.
37	Shi'ite	225,000	Islam	Husain	Important branch born of schism. There are no prophets. The infallible imams give the framework, and must be descendants of Mohammed.
38	Drusa	1,000	Islam	Middle East	Islamic sect not appreciated by the Arabs who deny their belonging to this ethnic group.
39	Ismailism	15,000	Islam Shi'ite	Year 765 Ja'far as-Sadiq	Supreme example of ramification. From Ja'far his youngest son at-Kazim. Creating second branch elder brother Ismail hidden as Husain. And repeating the scene continuing with youngest son of Al-Mustansir in 1094; the youngest son al-Mustaali, the eldest son creating another branch. In three centuries four religions proliferated by family inheritance. Now they have the Agha Khan as spiritual leader.

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Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
40	Jaryism	-----------	Islam		The third branch of Islam. Democratic succession differences.
41	Orisha	1,000	Islam	En Ile Ife	Religious movements with mythological background like Batuque, Candumbla and Santeria, from tribal beliefs.
42	Sufism	-----------	Islam	Second of the Héjira	Pure esotericism, life standards: first "Courtesy forever." A definition of Mustafa al-'Alawi: Sufism can not be defined in words, it is an absolute certainty.
43	Sunni	-----------	Islam	Year 610	The most important branch of Islam, created out of disputes between the descendants of Muhammed. A nebula ascended to the caliphate after the death of Muhammed in 632, created the two branches, Shi'ites and Sunni (first Caliph post-Mohammed: Muawiya). Fights with under the fiction of succession conceals the real reasons, to enjoy rich personal, economic and social profits.
	Various				
44	Atheism	1.100,000	-----------	-----------	The atheist is a non-believer in the gods imagined by humans. If there were a true creator this would be accepted. Can we expect one to appear?

45	Asatru	----------	Neopagan	Rudd Mills E.Christens.	Pagan religion. Gods: Odin, Frey, Thor. Reminiscent north-European paganism officially recognized in Iceland and accepted in other Scandinavian countries.
46	Ascetism	----------	Various	Spontaneous	Mystical access practiced in many religions as Buddhism (its rationale); Christianism, Islamism, etc.
47	Catarista	----------	Various	Midi francés	Social Background. Eradicated by the French state. Religious-social duality.
48	Scientology	500	Simisma 1953	R.Hubbard	Futuristic blend of science and religion.
49	Dioniso	----------	Various	----------	Greek mythology. God of wine.
50	Discordianism	----------	Various	G.Hill	An attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of religion.
51	Gnosticism	----------	Primitive Christian	4th Century	More Protestants than Christianism. In its current version does not differ in the non-religious philosophical background.
52	Jedi	800	Joke	George Lucas	Religion is not recognized by any government. 700,000 adherents in Australia and 100,000 in the UK. Inspired by Star Wars.
53	Orthodox Kemetism	----------	Paganism	Ancient Egypt	Tribal religious sincretism to neopaganism in an American version in 1980 by Tamara L. Hekatawy L. Siuda.
54	Book of Urantia	----------	----------	1950	No history. Written by celestial beings.

Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
55	Makuya	60	Various	1948 Japan	Replica of Makoye. Widens Zionist base with a kind of Protestantism within Judaism, with Christian touches.
56	Malteísmo	----------	Various	----------	They believe in God. A mean and cruel God suited to the disappointed or pessimistic.
57	Mandeism	44	Gnostic	Manes	Jesus is not even a prophet. The real central figure is John the Baptist.
58	Masoneria	10,000	Various	Hiram Abif	Rather anti-religion. A sociological elitist attempt at rationalization. Without their esoteric symbolism they could become a political party.
59	Methodist	75,000	Various	18th Century	More than a church it is a Protestant creed parallel to various religions introduced in low-level social strata. Predominates in the former colonies of the United Kingdom.

60	Mythologies	----------	Various		Established in Latin America, and remains in Africa. All religions eventually become mythologies. Of those who have undergone this process we highlight the old ones, many resistant ones in Africa. Without change in the process, we include living African mythologies, and nearly extinct Amerindian ones; Chibcha, Chimu, Inca, Maya, Moche, Nazca, Olmec and Toltec, and the more elaborate Celtic, Egyptian, Germanic, Greek, Norse, Roman and Basque. The greatest miracle of the three Abrahamic religions, is to slow down the process towards becoming myth for four millennia.
61	Mitraism	----------	Paganism	First Century	Outlawed by Theodosius in 391 on seeing the attraction his soldiers felt for this religion. A kind of paganism.
62	Neodruidism	1,000	Paganism	John Holand	Natural, very ecological. Seeks to reposition Druism.
63	Nueva Era	----------	Various	Sponta-neously	Scattered and conflicting astrological beliefs based on the position of the sun in relation to the signs of the zodiac.
64	Orphism	----------	Various	Guia Orfeo	Rejection of mythological Greek religions.
65	Pantheism	----------	Various	Spontaneous	Everything is God. God is everything. An alleged atheism that considers this god in plants and all living things.
66	Patafarism	----------	Various	B.Henderson	A substitute against organized religion, against the theory of intelligent design.

Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
67	Pietism	----------	Various	F. Jakob	Personal religion without church or liturgy, inspired Methodism the church of the brethren.
68	Raelianos	55	Various	Rael	UFO sciente fiction.
69	Rastafari	700	Various	Haile Selassie	The latest God. A New Trinity with Anglo names that accompany Rastafari alias H. Selassie.
70	Risshokosel Kosei-Kai	26,000	Various	Nikkyo Niwano	The most secular Buddhism has several hundreds of centers in Japan. Their secularism is manifested in the attention to personal affairs and groups.
71	Santeria	----------	Various	Spontaneous	Christian-tribal sincretism, religion transferred to North and South America by black slaves.
72	Santo Daime	10	Various	Maestro Irineo	Repeating the tribal-Catholic. South America is where it has mostly come together. Sincretism joins tribal-Catholicism, the third group: The one of the Amerindians.
73	Satanism	?	Various	Anton Szanoor	Luciferism, another joke?
74	Vedism	----------	Various	Vedic Period	Four Vedic writings are preserved. Rig Veda hymns Rik = thousand hyms. Sama Veda = songbook collection. Jayur Veda = laculatorias collection. Atharva Veda = text to read at sacrifices.

75	Wicca	----------	Pagan	Gerald Gardner 1953	Sincretism of Neodrudism, Asatru, Thelema Neopaganism and Stregueria.
76	Zoroastrism	2,000	Various	Zoroastro	Zoroaster, a sort of precursor to the Abrahamic prophets, Ahura Mazda plays the role of Jehovah, the Trinity and Allah. The Avesta is the Zoroastrian bible.
	Oriental				
77	Ayyavazhit	----------	Hinduism	Ayya Vaikundar	Established in southern India with high growth in the Tamil region.
78	Buddhism	376,000	Oriental	El Buddha	The Buddhist idea (to wake up) in essence is to overcome suffering, contradiction with the idea of interference of pleasure and pain. Not a deist religion. It's a personal philosophy that supports infinite ways to wake a supposed reality.
79	Tibetan Buddha	20,000	Oriental	Padmasam Bhava	The variants of Buddhism are many with Hindu background. Each Buddhist can create a personal Buddhist belief. By symbiosis Japanese, Mahayana, Nicheren; nicheren shu; nicheren Shoshu, Soka-akkai; risshokosekai; shingon; bikaya, Tibetan, Theravada buddhisms have been created. The variants are symbolic. The back-drop remains.
80	Cao-Dai	8,000	Oriental	Vietnam	Proselytizing. Copy-cat of other religions.
81	Confucianism	350,000	Oriental	Confucius	Philosophy tinged with esotericism.

Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
82	Hinduism	800000 in India	Creates off-shoots	India	Set of dispersed beliefs in India, no religion and little philosophy. It has no clergy. Each Indic country establishes their own rituals. Each person can also do it. Is maintained by the Islamic campaign. Rooted in rural areas. On the decline in urban areas.
83	Jainism	4,000	Hinduism	Mahāvīra.	Denies the veracity of the Vedas and Brahmins. The third branch of Islam.
84	Mahayana	-----------	Buddhism	First Century	Cousin of Zen.
85	Nichiren Shu	-----------	Oriental	Nichiren Buddha	The origin of Buddhism is the Buddha. As in all religions variants arise and both Nichiren, Shoshu y Shu, are variants which have crossed Japan's borders. In Japan there are more than 5,000 temples.
86	Rosacrucian	30,000	Oriental	Cristian Rosen Kreuz	Fraternity within the Masonic movement. They pursue a dynamic and creative cultural agenda that seeks happiness.
87	Sahaja Yoga	-----------	Oriental	Mataji Nirmala	The twice-born. Biological, and when meditation awakens feelings and ideas.
88	Sijism	23,000	Hinduism	Guru Nanak	Of the 23 million adherents, 19 million reside in India, almost entirely in Punjab where they are majority, and are called Sikhs. Born when Hindus and Muslims became entangled in religious wars.

89	Shintoism	4,000	Oriental	Japan	Has various sects. Worship of ancestral spirits, the oldest belief system in Japan.
90	Taoism	----------	Oriental	Lao Tse Fifth Century A.C.	Philosophy of good and evil. Yearning for long life. Religion native to China derived from sincretism of tradition and Buddhism.
91	Therevada	----------	Oriental		One of the 20 versions of traditional Buddhism and the oldest. Its Bible is the Pali canon transcript of all the sermons of Buddha after his personal Nirvana.
92	Vajrayna	----------	Oriental		Comes directly from Tibetan Buddhism and the Singlón of Japan Singlón. Differs little from the other two schools Theravada, Mahayana: trio of leaders.
93	Vishnuism	----------	Hinduism		Belief system which worships the god VISHNU
94	Zen	----------	Oriental	India	The large following in the East and the world responds to its richness and capacity for adaptation and transformation.
	Tribal				
95	Ashanti	7,000	Tribal	Ancestral	More than a religion, it is the rest of the United States unified by the Akan language disperse colonization. Their god is Nyame.
96	Candomble	4,000	Tribal	Brazil	It began among slaves and has transcended to other countries.
97	Iroque	----------	Tribal	Canada	Religion established in several Indian villages at the south of Lake Ontario.

Number Alph. Order	Name	N° Adherents Thousands	Typology Branch of	Founded	Observations
98	Maria Lionza	-----------	Tribal	Spiritism	Paradigm of the merging of tribal and Catholic beliefs in Central and South America. The original name is Yara Guichia, changed by the Catholic clergy.
99	Mexica	-----------	Tribal		Religion of the early Mexicans.
100	Voodoo	-----------	Tribal	Black American Slaves	The African American slavism created this religion, now a tourist spectacle, especially in Brazil where it is regularly included on tourist routes.

PART TWO
THE ETHNIC AND SOCIOPOLITICAL LABYRINTH

8
Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous Peoples

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Linguistic and cultural diversity is the rule rather than the exception in human societies across the globe. Most States are not uniform in terms of national origin, ethnicity, religion or language of their inhabitants. They generally comprise one or more groups whose ethnicity, language, culture or religion distinguish them from the majority population. Yet there is no easy way to define a minority beyond the numerical aspect which is not a sufficient criterion, however – not to mention that it is also a controversial one. Indeed, there has been debate over the question whether there ought to be a minimum number of people for one to speak about a minority as a constituted group. Some threatened groups, for instance indigenous peoples in the tropical forests of Amazonia, central Africa or Malaysia, may number only a few hundred, but they, no less than others, have the right to exist and survive as distinct entities, and to resist against State-sponsored policies geared towards cultural assimilation.

It is when numerical inferiority goes hand in hand with non-dominance or discrimination in a given State that one speaks about a minority issue. This means, of course, that dominant minorities – such as the white minority in South Africa during apartheid – do not lie within the scope of this chapter. By and large, the minorities issue is linked to two broad trends : the globalisation of environmental, resource, climate and human rights concerns, going hand in hand with an internationalisation of human, minority and indigenous rights ; and conversely, an upsurge of at times excessive or confrontational identity claims leading to State repression and often violent conflict. Concern with the minorities issue lies at the crossroads of these opposite trends. The main challenge – at least from an international law perspective – is to find a balance between respect for cultural difference and the preservation of the territorial and political integrity of States. In this connection, education may be less contentious than, say, autonomy regimes for minorities or indigenous peoples. For these are likely to shake the foundations of existing States,

and to raise considerable legal and political controversy. In the context of the promotion and protection of minority and indigenous rights, education rather involves cultural rights which everyone seems to agree upon, at least in principle. Yet there is nothing self-evident either about culture or, for that matter, about cultural rights. Definitions of culture in the context of international law and politics remain rather vague. Some clarification is therefore needed to gain a better idea of how to determine the scope of education for minorities and indigenous peoples – two categories of non-state groups that are both similar and different, as we shall see. On the basis of existing legal standards, this chapter will also offer some thoughts about the challenges of recognising cultural rights and cultural diversity, as opposed to measures geared towards the prevention of discrimination. Education plays indeed a twofold – and sometimes contradictory – role. At first glance, it represents a means to integrate persons belonging to disadvantaged groups into mainstream society by putting them on an equal footing with the majority. Yet, to fulfil its function in combating discrimination, education may actually result in cultural assimilation that is generally viewed negatively by members of minorities or indigenous peoples. Conversely, education may also play an important role in preserving cultural identities, as is illustrated by the existing programmes of bilingual and bicultural education for indigenous communities in the Amazon. The twofold potential of education for different categories of non-State communities lies at the core of this chapter which uses teachings from anthropology – my discipline of specialisation – in order to make its point.

1. About Culture

Anthropologists have contributed to a number of topical debates about respect for cultural diversity and the cultural rights of individuals as well as collective entities. These issues have come to the fore in different guises all over the world: in the pluralist democracies of the West having their established multiculturalism policies, in post-1989 Eastern Europe where several countries grapple with minority rights issues, and in the so-called developing world where one encounters a host of ethnic and indigenous problems of varying gravity.

Human beings have the inherent capacity to be culturally creative, and anthropology is basically about the dialectics

between the unity of the human species and the cultural diversity of human societies worldwide. Moreover, there is general agreement nowadways that cultural diversity and the general principle of cultural pluralism deserve protection and promotion.

What complicates matters is that the world is not laid out as a tapistry of cultures, made up of discrete, clearly defined entities occupying specific territories. In other terms, there is no « natural » association between place, people and culture, between cultural identity and territorial inscription. Rather, under the impact of mass migration and transnational culture flows, cultural diversity is being gradually deterritorialised. In fact, groups and people migrate, seek refuge, intermarry, exchange, have preconceived ideas about each other, seek to distinguish themselves from others, sometimes relegating others (foreigners, strangers) to the status of non-persons. Here we have potentially both the best (e.g. cultural exchange, intercultural dialogue) and the worst (such as xenophobia, racism and discrimination) of cultural relations.

It is in this context that identity claims and claims for cultural rights have come increasingly to the fore, leading to an array of laws, policies, and administrative measures to « manage » cultural diversity. However, positing the principle of cultural diversity as inherently human and also as a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence both within and among States does not imply that the idea or concept of culture is uncontroversial. For instance, culture may be invoked to bolster – or, for that matter, contest – rights claims made in view of achieving the recognition of cultural rights, thus lending itself to being instrumentalised for diverse and sometimes reprehensible purposes.

By and large, the promotion of cultural diversity and the respect for cultural rights or cultural pluralism occurs within the liberal paradigm based on the principles of individual autonomy and freedom of choice inspired by John Rawl's social justice model. This view considers the individual as the ultimate bearer of rights and unit of moral worth. Cultural pluralism appears here as unproblematic harmony achieved via the balancing of individual choices. For instance, the liberal theory of justice underpinning « multicultural citizenship » as advocated by the Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka

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is grounded in the assumption that the interests of each member of the political community matter equally in the market place and in the political process of majority government. However, still according to this view, under conditions of cultural pluralism, where the cultural community and the political community are not coextensive, the question is whether the request for special rights by cultural groups is grounded in unequal circumstances or rather in differential choice. If unequal circumstances exist, appropriate measures – such as affirmative action – are needed to rectify inequalities experienced collectively. This presupposes for the recognition of collective rights to protect cultural membership as a context of individual choice. The result is a consociational rather than a universal mode of incorporating the individual into the liberal State, by virtue of which the nature of each person's rights varies according to the particular community he or she belongs to.

The crucial point of this perspective is that such measures are considered to be of a temporary nature : cultural rights are only recognised to ensure that persons belonging to disadvantaged cultural groups are treated without discrimination in relation to members of the majority. Such accommodation of cultural rights within the liberal framework entails the risk of reducing culture to an epiphenomon.

At the other extreme, one finds what has been termed « cultural absolutism » which assumes that because of their respective cultural membership people are so fundamentally different from each other that they are incapable of understanding each other or even coexisting. Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* illustrates this view. In this manner, any influence the individual may have on shaping his or her culture through contact with others and, by the same token, any possibility of intercultural communication is being denied or considered insignificant. A further problem of cultural absolutism is that it may look at colonialism as a problem of culture shock or regard apartheid as an expression of a particular culture, without considering other determining factors such as economic inequalities, power relations, vested interests or political ideology. It should be added that cultural absolutism has also been invoked to contest the validity of the idea of human rights as an allegedly « Western construct ».

The idea of culture is therefore inherently ambivalent and calls for careful handling. This ambivalence partly derives

from the fact that culture is part of everyone's daily experience and vocabulary. On the one hand, there exists a spontaneous, commonsense, even intuitive approach to culture : as human beings we are all cultural beings ; we all belong to a given culture understood as a people or a community with distinctive characteristics in terms of language, worldview, political system, economic organisation, religion, and so forth ; we all have to deal with issues of both individual and collective identity ; we all tend to invoke culture when it is a matter of explaining ourselves and our actions to others, of reasoning out differences, of pointing out affinities or, conversely, lack of mutual understanding. On the other hand, for the anthropologist, « culture » is a construct, a concept, an analytical tool abstracted from observed social practices and based on a set of methodological and theoretical premises. Viewed from this angle, « culture » has given rise to numerous definitions and considerable theoretical controversy whose treatment would exceed the scope of this chapter. The point to be underscored here is the difference, if not the tension that exists between the commonsense approach to culture that all of us engage in as cultural subjects, and the anthropological perspective to culture – the activities of the international community being rather inspired by the former, which is not without raising problems.

2. The Problem

In July 2009, experts from Minority Rights Group International (MRG) and UNICEF gathered in New York to present the 2009 report on *The State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* whose focus lies specifically on education.[34] MRG is a London-based NGO that also publishes the *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* compiled for the first time in 1990. After a 1997 update, the directory was transformed into a data base and posted online to be used free of charge.[35] It provides information about numerous minorities and indigenous

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[34] Minority Rights Group International, 2009, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*, London, 248 p. http://www.minorityrights.org/7948/state-of-the-worlds-minorities/state-of-the-worlds-minorities-and-indigenous-peoples-2009.html. This is the fourth report of this kind. All reports are accessible online.
[35] Minority Rights Group International, 2009, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples*, at http://www.minorityrights.org/6065/the-directory/the-directory.html

peoples worldwide in over 200 countries, as well as a number of useful links (e.g. to find out which relevant legal instruments a given State has ratified, or to identify NGOs working to protect and promote minority and indigenous rights).

The 2009 MRG report finds that of the over 100 million children currently out of school, a vast proportion – 50% on the average, reaching 80% in some cases – belong to a minority or an indigenous community. This is not due to a lack of international standards providing for a right of education or, more generally, for the preservation of cultural diversity worldwide. Nor can it be attributed to controversy over the importance of education. Indeed, the achievement of universal primary education is the second of the United Nations Millenium Goals. The right to education was recently endorsed as an inalienable human right by the newly established UN Forum on Minority Issues. Also, the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples addressed specifically the question of the implementation of the right of education for indigenous peoples at its second session in August 2009. Finally and most importantly, a number of international and regional instruments provide for the cultural and eduational rights of minorities and indigenous peoples. Rather, the main problem is implementation. As in many cases, beyond the enunciation of lofty principles of human rights, the community of States often seems reluctant to implementation such rights, if necessary through the adoption of special measures so that members of minorities and indigenous groups can effectively bridge the gap that separates them from the majority population, or, conversely, preserve their own identities and cultures if they so wish.

Anti-discrimination measures and the promotion of cultural diversity are not easily reconciled although they exist as parallel activities, such as in education-related programmes for minorities and indigenous peoples.

UNESCO for instance, a specialised agency of the United Nations established in 1946, has adopted standard-setting instruments such as the Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), followed by initiatives such as the Dakar Framework of Action adopted by the World Education Forum held in Dakar (Senegal) in 2000. The Dakar Framework of Action formulated a series of recommendations which include access to free and compulsory primary education of good quality for all children by 2015, especially children belonging to ethnic

minorities ; as well as bilingual education for such children. At the same time, documentation illustrating UNESCO's promotion of cultural diversity clearly shows the difficulty of striking a balance between anti-discrimination measures and the need to protect and foster cultural diversity worldwide.[36] The latter include precisely recognition of culturally-specific forms of transmitting knowledge that are threatened, however, under the impact of globalisation, especially in the case of indigenous peoples whose territories and ways of life are consistently being encroached upon.

This difficulty of finding a balance is mirrored by the rather divergent views that persons belonging to minorities or indigenous communities may have with regard to education as a tool of social and economic integration, depending on whether education is viewed as an invidual or a collective right. Before addressing this problem more in detail, it is necessary to gain a better idea of the similarities and differences between minorities and indigenous peoples.

3. Minorities or Indigenous Peoples ?

While there exists no formal legal definition of the term « minority » at the international level, several attempts to define minorities have been made over the last decades, notably by two special rapporteurs of the United Nations, F. Capotorti and J. Deschênes. Their respective definitions actually share most elements : both mention numerical inferiority and non-dominance ; both refer to a set of ethnic or national, linguistic and religious characteristics that distinguish minorities from the rest of the population of a State ; both evoke a sense of group solidarity for the preservation of culture and language ; to which must be added one element especially put forward by Deschênes, that is, the collective will of minorities to survive as distinct groups while seeking to obtain equal treatment *de facto* and *de jure* in relation to the majority population.

The last three of these elements – minorities as sociocultural groups with specific characteristics in terms of language and religion ; group solidarity ; and identity claims paired with claims for non-discrimination – bring together all the challenges we are dealing with here. As we have already

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[36] See for instance the UNESCO World Report *Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue* at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001852/185202E.pdf.

seen, culture is a concept to be handled with care. Group solidarity is not something easily identified : an oblique approach is needed to abstract it from observable human practices. Finally, identity claims and claims for non-discrimination are somewhat contradictory since the latter are rooted in individual human rights while the former refer, in one way or the other, to collective rights or even group rights. All these challenges have been addressed – if not necessarily resolved – in the specialised literature as well as in international policy debates.

When viewed broadly, the term « minority » applies to a large variety of groups. This appears clearly from its many qualifiers : « national minority », « ethnic minority », « linguistic minority », « religious minority », « cultural minority », « indigenous minority »…. In this connection, two points need to be underscored. Firstly, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between national and ethnic minorities, and I will not endeavour to do so here. National minorities are generally the focus in the European context : for instance, Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits discrimination, mentions the term « national minority » but does not define it. In international parlance one rather finds the expression « ethnic minorities », as in Art. 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), or a combination (« ethnic or national »), as in the United Nations Minorities Declaration (both the ICCPR and the Minorities Declaration are dealt with more in detail below). There is general agreement that when qualifying minorities as « national or ethnic », reference is made to both historical and cultural aspects. One can hardly imagine a national minority that is not also an ethnic or a linguistic one. A classic case of a national minority involves a people that forms the majority in one State but constitutes a minority in another, often straddling a national border. Situations like this exist both in Europe (Danish minority in Germany, Slovak minority in Hungary, etc.) and in Africa or Asia where the national borders drawn in a more or less arbitrary fashion after decolonisation have resulted in dividing peoples that subsequently became ethnic or national minorities in some of the States in which they now live. Another example are the Kurds who may be regarded as an ethnic or national minority in the different States they inhabit (Turkey, Iran, Irak, Syria…). From a historical viewpoint, however, one could also say that the

Kurds are a people against which circumstances conspired after World War I, preventing them from gaining statehood. This points to an important element in the discussion of minorities and minority rights : the term « minority » is not only geographically and historically charged ; it is also a relational concept, and it is context-bound. Minorities do not exist as such, they exist in relation to other collective entities and, moreover, in constellations of specific power relations.

Secondly, the multiplication of qualifiers alluded to above, while an indication of the considerable geographic and historical diversity of minorities, illustrates the difficulty (all at once legal, conceptual and political) of pinpointing the specific characteristics of minorities in comparison with other non-State groups claiming special rights, such as migrant workers, not to mention « new minorities » resulting from immigration. These groups used to be explicitly excluded from prevalent definitions of « minority ». This should not imply, however, that non-State groups in general cannot claim special rights. Moreover, one notes an evolution in thinking over the last decade at least, with the result that immigrant groups in particular tend to be viewed nowadays as minorities, especially in Western countries. Some degree of terminological and conceptual confusion persists nonetheless in the face of growing complexity.

The relatively recent broadening of the purview of the Minority Rights Group to include indigenous peoples is an illustration of this tendency – however uneasy the distinction between minorities and indigenous peoples may be. For both often experience similar living conditions and voice comparable grievances, whereas their claims, as well as their legal situation, may differ considerably. MRG reports and directories focus on settled communities rather than new migrant communities, although it is difficult to draw a firm line between these two categories, especially in Western Europe with its large immigrant communities from countries such as Turkey. Conversely, in North America and other former European settler States, a much clearer distinction seems to prevail between immigrant groups and indigenous peoples. Such a distinction is mirrored – and has partly been fostered by – the double-track approach of the United Nations system, with two declaration of rights, and two working groups that functioned for a number of years until the recent reform of the

UN human rights system in 2007, as we shall see in the following section.

Contrary to the term « minority », the expression « indigenous people » (or population) has been officially defined in a UN study dating back to the 1980s. This so-called working definition involves four elements which must exist in conjunction for one to speak of an indigenous people as a specific category. By and large, then, indigenous peoples are non-dominant in economic, political and socio-cultural – albeit not necessarily numerical – terms;[37] they are the descendants of the original inhabitants of a given territory; they have been victims of genocide, conquest and colonisation; and they seek to maintain their cultural specificity. In the same vein, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169 (1989) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) – the only binding legal instrument dealing with indigenous peoples[38] – defines indigenous peoples in Art. 1.b as those « peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions ».

Such a definition applies in particular to the original peoples of the so-called New World, including Amerindians, Inuit, Maori of Aotearoa/New Zealand, and Australian Aborigines; as well as a number of northern peoples, such as the Sámi of Fennoscandia, the Ainu of Japan, and the (numerically) small peoples of Russia. The interesting aspect here is a fundamental difference between the former and the latter group. The former comprises the original inhabitants of European settler colonies and refers to what has been called the blue-water doctrine. According to this doctrine, indigenous peoples are overseas peoples which came in contact with, and eventually were dominated by, European powers during the era of European expansion abroad since the « age of discoveries », and which now form culturally separate as well as non-dominant groups in the States of the former « New World » that gained their independence through excluding the original

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[37] The majority of the inhabitants of Guatemala and Bolivia for instance are indigenous.
[38] That is, binding on States that have ratified this convention ; according to the ILO website, twenty have done so to date (2008).

inhabitants. Canada, Australia, the United States and New Zealand are examples of this process. Conversely, Samé, Ainu or small peoples of Russia are not overseas peoples in relation to the dominant majority and, from this viewpoint, rather seem to resemble minorities. Yet they are all considered to be indigenous, at least at the international level.

One must also not neglect the growing tendency of subsuming under the qualifier « indigenous » certain socio-economic lifestyles based on hunting and gathering, trapping, swidden agriculture, or transhumance. These are located located in so-called frontier zones such as the tropical or boreal rain forests and thus at the margins of modern industrialised society with its sophisticated technology and consumption patterns. Using such culture-based criteria, certain communities in Africa and Asia have been described as « indigenous », notably pastoral and forest-dwelling peoples. In other terms, the argument centred on lifestyles is generally linked to the situation of indigenous peoples rather than to that of minorities. Not surprisingly, the Tuaregs claim « indigenousness », as do the forest-dwelling peoples of Central Africa and other populations maintaining traditional – non-urban and non-industrial – ways of life, like the Adivasis of the Indian subcontinent.

The question of the similarities and differences between minorities and indigenous peoples thus remains open for debate. Some have even questioned the usefulness of posing the problem as one of fundamentally different categories. Be that as it may, what should be retained as this stage is that, globally, the situation of indigenous peoples is highly complex and may lead to confusion, both when compared with minorities and when considering the category on its own. In some cases in Africa and Asia for instance, the relevance of the criterion of prior existence in a given territory has been questioned, whether in connection with ethnic strife and resource conflicts (e.g. the Ogonis in Nigeria) or as a result of the emergence of separatist movements that are the product of neo-colonialism (e.g. the Nagas in India). Moreover, a cultural (rather than political and historical) understanding of indigenousness is equally subject to debate.[39]

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[39] It is worth recalling here that the ILO Convention No 169 uses the expression « tribal peoples » to refer to such cases ; « tribal peoples» are defined as groups in independent countries that distinguish themselves from other sectors of society by

The purpose here is not to arrive at iron-cast definitions but rather to determine to what extent the differences and similarities mentioned may give rise to diverging legal standards and what this means with regard to cultural rights and education. Even a cursory glance at the *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* mentioned earlier shows the extreme diversity of the hundreds of communities that fall potentially within the purview of this chapter, as well as the danger of marginalisation and cultural assimilation these face on a daily basis. While the situation of non-dominance and potential discrimination of minorities and indigenous peoples clearly motivates international action in their favour, it is extremely difficult to offer in a few paragraphs a meaningful and encompassing description of their conditions and predicament, beyond mentioning in passing some individual cases. A pragmatic approach is thus more useful. Instead of compiling ever incomplete lists of minority and indigenous communities worldwide, including hard-to-get statistics (more often that not, official figures or censuses do not disaggregate data relating to minorities and indigenous peoples, mainly for political reasons), it is more worthwhile to look at existing legal standards and gauge their chances of implementation.

4. The Legal Framework

As mentioned before, the United Nations has adopted a double-track approach distinguishing between minority and indigenous rights as a supplement to general human rights. This led to a specific institutional set-up within the human rights system, including the establishment of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (1982-2007), and of the Working Group on Minorities (1995-2007). In the wake of the recent reform of the UN human rights system, the former was replaced by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (composed of five indigenous experts), the latter by the Forum on Minority Issues and an Independent Expert on Minorities.

The now discontinued UN Working Groups on Minorities and Indigenous Populations offered spaces for dialogue and allowed for the active participation of indigenous and minority representatives, governments, international agencies, NGOs, and academics. They were established for different reasons : in the case of indigenous peoples, to draft special legal standards,

their living conditions, traditional lifestyle, and, if applicable, by the fact of coming under special legislation.

which led to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter Indigenous Peoples Declaration) eventually adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, fifteen years after the adoption of UN Declaration on the Rights of National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (hereafter Minorities Declaration) of 1992. The implementation of the Minorities Declaration was entrusted to the Working Group on Minorities, while the implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples forms the mandate of the Expert Mechanism mentioned above. The purpose of this section then is to explain briefly three different categories of rights – human rights, minority rights, and indigenous rights – before considering their significance for culture and education.

From the outset, one may say that the two pillars on which minority rights rest are individual human rights and the principle of non-discrimination. The general human rights are set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and subsequently elaborated in other legal instruments. They can be claimed by everyone, including members of minorities and indigenous communities. General human rights are based on two fundamental principles stipulated in the Universal Declaration. One is freedom and equality in dignity and rights for all (Art. 1). The other is non-discrimination (a principle also contained in the United Nations Charter). Thus, by virtue of Art. 2 of the Universal Declaration, all human beings are entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration « without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status ».

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not mention minorities. During the drafting process by the now defunct Commission on Human Rights, some States like Poland, the USSR and Denmark sought to have specific rights for minorities included. When the Declaration was in the process of being adopted, the USSR maintained that the future instrument should spell out the right of speaking one's mother tongue and preserving one's cultural identity. But no debate took place. Only the United States intervened to assert that the Universal Declaration was not meant to serve the purpose of enunciating collective rights. In this manner, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents the apogee of individual rights, while the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples were still to be

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the object of further elaboration.

The principle of non-discrimination is also set out in a series of multilateral treaties, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which defines « racial discrimination » as « any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life ». The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which monitors the implementation of the Convention has consistently considered discrimination against minorities and indigenous peoples in its examination of the periodic reports submitted to it by States.

The ICERD is one of six major, legally binding international human rights treaties within the UN human rights system that are relevant, each in its own way, to the situation of minorities or indigenous peoples. For each of these treaties, a committee has been established to monitor the way in which States are fulfilling their obligations under the respective treaty. It should be recalled, however, that members of minorities or indigenous communities are entitled to all human rights.

In the field of human rights, the principle of non-discrimination has thus been instituted as a rule of international law both by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It belongs to the hard core of international human rights standards : rather than being simply a violation of a specific human right, non-respect for the principle of non-discrimination amounts to a violation of the founding principle of human rights.

Two multilateral treaties adress non-discrimination and equality of treatment in a more detailed fashion. These are the so-called Covenants of 1966, that is, the International Convenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC). Providing both for a catalogue of human rights that States are called upon to respect and promote, they can be considered as the foundation of the international human rights protection. In the context of this chapter, one of the Covenants deserves particular mention, for it includes a provision

referring specifically to minority rights : « In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language » (Art. 27).

Art. 27 of the ICCPR introduces a crucial nuance by referring specifically to « persons belonging to minorities » rather than minorities, while underscoring the collective dimension in stipulating that the rights of such persons are to be exercised « in community with the other members of their group ». It is this manner that minority rights acquire a cultural dimension as well as a focus on identity. Moreover, the wording « shall not be denied » implies that States must refrain from adopting, say, assimilationist measures or activities endangering the exercise of cultural rights by members of minorities.

The Human Rights Committee, which monitors the implementation of the ICCPR, has observed that States may be required to adopt « positive measures of protection » to protect rights from being violated not only by governments but also by other persons. Similarly, the ICERD cited above allows States to adopt special measures of affirmative action or « positive discrimination » with the purpose of correcting historical injustices.

Moreover, while the introductory sentence of Art. 27 seems to exclude newly arrived immigrants, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted the article broadly to include all those living within a State's jurisdiction, including migrant workers and visitors. Indeed, if foreigners are to be viewed as a persons belong to a minority under Art. 27 of the ICCPR, one may not refuse to grant them the right to practice their own culture, language and religion in community with other members of their group. Consensus prevailed for some time that only citizens of the State in which they live can be regarded as national or ethnic minorities. But one nevertheless wonders how, in the absence of a generally agreed upon international definition of the term « minority », one is supposed to determine unequivocally whether non-citizens may or may not be recognised as members of a minority.

Another relevant multilateral treaty illustrative, at the same time, of the double-track approach menioned above is

the widely ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, which extends to children (that is, persons under the age of 18) most of the rights guaranteed to all human beings under other international human rights instruments. Several articles of the Convention are of interest here, for instance Art. 2 which stipulates that the rights set out in the Convention must be guaranteed without discrimination on the basis of colour, language, religion, or national or ethnic origin. Art. 28 provides for the child's right to education, including access to primary education. Art. 29 reflects the fundamental purpose of education, providing *inter alia* that a child's education ought to be aimed at developing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as his or her own cultural identity, language, and values. Finally, Art. 30 extends to children the provisions of Art. 27 of the ICCPR quoted above, regarding the right to enjoy one's culture, to practice one's religion, and to use one's own language. It should be noted that it does so by differentiating explicitly between indigenous children and children belonging to minorities.

The Minorities Declaration adopted in 1992 confirms the principle of non-discrimination, notably in Art. 3 modeled on Art. 27 of the ICCPR quoted earlier. At another level, however, it affirms in Art. 1 – and it is the first international instrument to do so – that the existence and identity of minorities must be protected and promoted by States. In this manner, States are called upon to take appropriate legislative and other measures. Also, Art. 2.2 and 2.3 address the right of persons belonging to minorities to participate fully in cultural, social, economic and public life, and to take part in decisions affecting them. However, contrary to the principle of non-discrimination, the recognition of special rights to minorities remains controversial despite the fact that such recognition may turn out to be necessary in order to put minorities on an equal footing with the majority.

In obliging States to protect the identity of minorities, the Minorities Declaration reaches beyond the implementation of the principle of non-discrimination. This clearly appears from Art. 4 which provides for special measures to allow persons belonging to minorities to live and develop their cultural identity, to practice their religion, to learn and practice their language, to get to know their history and traditions. But this provision also contains an important limitation which one finds in many human rights instruments :

that the practices to be protected must not be contrary to national law or international norms, and especially not put into jeopardy the territorial and political integrity of States.

It is useful to have a closer look at Art. 4.2 which provides that States « shall take appropriate measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics... ». This is easily done, for it is simply a matter for States to leave it up to minorities « to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs... ». One is then struck by a change in the following paragraphs of the article. When it is a matter of States making special efforts by creating appropriate structures or providing financial means, there is a switch from the affirmative to the conditional : « should take appropriate measures » to create conditions for persons belonging to minorities to learn and practice their mother tongue (Art. 4.3) ; and « should take, where appropriate, » measures in the field of education with the purpose of ensuring knowledge transmission with regard minority cultures and history (Art. 4.4).

It is worth recalling in this connection the temporary character of special measures alluded to earlier. For example, Art. 2.2 of the ICERD calls upon States to ensure the protection of particular ethnic groups or of individuals belonging to these, so that they may enjoy fully their human rights and fundamental freedoms, but only as long as such measures are needed, that is, until all forms of discrimination have been dislodged. In this manner, one recognises a given group as such, but only with the purpose of legislating it out of existence, in a manner of speaking.

In reality, States often hesitate to accord special rights to non-State groups. One may also wonder what exactly such special measures may consist of in international law, since they have never been properly elaborated. For instance, the various types of special measures set out in the Minorities Declaration are not conceived of in an identical manner : measures in the areas of politics, culture, economics, language and religion are mentioned, but these areas do not carry the same weight. Furthermore, the commitments asked of States may vary. Thus « culture » remained relatively uncontroversial during the drafting process, while economics and politics fostered considerable debate since the stake are higher with regard to

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resources and the distribution of power.

It may be preferable to leave it up to minorities to take initiatives in the defence of their own interests. However, unless rights are accorded to minorities as such, specific provisions of the Minorities Declaration can hardly constrain States to adopt special measures. Unless minorities have a right of veto or other rights of effective participation, States will always be inclined to weigh the « legitimate interests » of minorities against their own interests, and they may well sacrifice minority – or, for that matter, indigenous – interests to those of majorities.

Minorities tend to be denied special rights by virtue of the argument that such rights would contradict the individual nature of human rights. But the manner in which minorities are conceived of in international legal instruments like the ones referred to briefly in this chapter reflect mainly technical and political considerations. The drafters of the Minorities Declaration simply stayed within the limits within which minimal agreement between States Members of the United Nations was possible. However, there is a growing sense that the effective enjoyment of human rights presupposes that a given collective be in a position to avail itself of rights. Nothing precludes such a broadening of the human rights concept whose limits and culture-specific connotations have been amply debated.

The situation of indigenous peoples gives a different spin to such a broadening of the human rights concept because it involves so-called group rights. Indeed, the constellation of interests mentioned in relation to minorities also governs the situation of indigenous peoples, especially with regard to their lands, territories and resources. Here resides a crucial difference between indigenous peoples and minorities. No rights to land and natural resources are set out in the Minorities Declaration. But such rights are important elements both of ILO Convention 169 (Art. 13-19) and the Indigenous Peoples Declaration (e.g. Art. 26 and 29). Recalling the definition given above, « indigenousness » is indeed inextricably linked to the historical relationship that the original peoples of former European settler colonies have with the lands which they continue to claim or occupy.

It has been pointed out repeatedly by indigenous representatives that conventional human rights standards have failed to solve the predicament of their people. Rather, the

situation of indigenous peoples is more directly linked to the tension that exists between rights deriving from the principle of non-discrimination and special rights claimed collectively by virtue of a common identity, a common history, or even the quest for restorative justice. In this manner, recognition of indigenousness also puts a new spin on the classic debate over the possible reconciliation of the idea of the individual as the ultimate bearer of rights as opposed to the idea that collective entities other than States can also be viewed as rights bearers. This has consequences with regard to the (international) legal personality minorities or indigenous peoples could claim.

When international legal instruments provide for special measures for minorities or indigenous peoples, they conceive of these as State obligations, for the collective entities concerned cannot usually avail themselves of any standing in international law that would allow them to impose the implementation of such obligations. The interesting point here is that the situation is not the same for indigenous peoples and minorities. The former were actually often recognised – or at least dealt with – as international entities at a certain point in history, for example on the basis of the hundreds of treaties that European powers concluded with them between the sixteenth and the nineteenth century. Conversely, in the case of minorities, the question would rather be whether some form of legal personality should be sought and, if so, according to which criteria. Possible avenues (e.g. plebiscites) have not yet been integrated into positive international law. This is not by accident. The main objective of international law is to safeguard the stability of States and inter-State relations. Given that States tend to regard minorities as a potential threat to their territorial and political integrity, they are concerned more with exercising control over the minorities living within their borders than with tackling the issue of rights that would allow these minorities to ensure their survival as distinct groups. However, as the situation in Eastern Europe has shown, it is the repression rather than the encouragement of minority aspirations that may well represent a major factor of destabilisation.

Indigenous peoples often assert that provisions concerning the rights of « persons belonging to minorities » do not apply to them. When looking broadly at the diversity of situations indigenous peoples may find themselves in, one notes

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a twofold problem. Some indigenous people may live *de facto* a minority situation, notably when they have been geographically dispersed or dispossessed of their landbase. Others still occupy vast tracts of land on which they subsist without – as yet – major interference from dominant society. Nonetheless, such cases become more and more rare under the impact of globalisation and growing competition for natural resources. In manner of speaking, then, the elaboration of standards applicable to indigenous peoples have pushed the envelope with regard to special rights as opposed to rights of non-discrimination. Two international instruments are relevant here, namely ILO Convention No 169 quoted above, and the Indigenous Peoples Declaration of 2007 which contains more far-reaching rights. Both recognise the foundation of individual human rights. Art. 1 of the Declaration states that indigenous peoples have the right to full and effective enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms recognised in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law. A corresponding provision is contained in ILO Convention No 169 (Art. 3).

As to the specific rights of indigenous peoples contained in both texts, these differ significantly from those stipulated in the Minorities Declaration. The Minorities Declaration aims at « ensuring a space for pluralism in togetherness », as A. Eide, the former chairman of the Working Group on Minorities, has put it. Standards concerning indigenous peoples are intended to allow for a certain degree of autonomy. By and large, whereas the Minorities Declaration emphasises effective participation in the wider society, some provisions regarding the rights of indigenous peoples emphasise the latters' capacity to make their own decisions. Minority rights are formulated as the rights of individuals to preserve and develop their separate collective identity while integrating mainstream society in one way or the other ; in this manner, persons belonging to minorities often have so-called multiple identities. This means staying within the scope of individual human rights while conceiving of the possibility that these may only acquire their full meaning if they are exercised collectively. On this basis, then, collective rights can be defined as individual rights exercised in community with others – relevant examples being linguistic and religious rights.

Conversely, indigenous rights tend to consolidate and strengthen the autonomous development of indigenous communities, in the assumption that indigenous persons prefer to maintain a predominantly indigenous way of life and are less inclined to participate in mainstream society. An important factor here is that the debate over indigenous rights has brought a number of States face to face with their colonial past and their often questionable acquisition of sovereignty over the national territory and its resources. States are therefore rather unwilling to grant indigenous peoples what is generally termed group rights. Such rights go beyond the scope of rights usually conceded to minorities; they are not exercised by persons belonging to a given group in community with other members of that group, but rather by the collective entity as such; and as I already mentioned, they may entail some form of standing in international law, the most far-reaching group right being the right of peoples to self-determination. In this sense, the Indigenous Peoples Declaration adds a new dimension to an old debate in that it provides for a somewhat complex – and partly unwieldy – juxtaposition of individual human rights, collective rights, and group rights.

To give a few examples : Individual human rights of non-discrimination in the Declaration concern areas such as employment (Art. 17) and education (see below), as well as the right to improve their economic conditions without discrimination (Art. 21). Collective rights of the type provided for in the Minorities Declaration include protection against forced relocation (Art. 10) or the right to maintain and develop their own institutions while participating fully in the life of the State (Art. 5). Finally, special rights to be claimed by indigenous peoples as such include the right to their traditionally owned lands that have been confiscated, occupied or damaged and, if this turns out to be impossible, the right to just and fair compensation (Art. 28) ; the right to environmental protection (Art. 29) as well as intellectual and cultural property (Art. 31) ; and the collective right to freedom and security (Art. 7). Moreover, several rights stipulated by the Indigenous Peoples Declaration are bolstered by special measures to be taken by States, for example ways of combating forced assimilation and the destruction of indigenous cultures (Art. 8), measures for the preservation and protection of religious sites (Art. 12), or measures preventing the storing and

disposal of hazardous materials on indigenous lands (Art. 29).

Is is especially Art. 3 of the Indigenous Peoples Declaration that sets out a group right, for it proclaims the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, that is, to determine freely their political status and their mode of economic, social and cultural development. This right is nonetheless qualified in Art. 4 which stipulates that indigenous self-determination amounts to self-government at the local and regional levels. However, this provision can be read as one of several possible interpretations, for there is persistent controversy over the question which collective entities are the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination. There is general agreement that it applies to the populations of non-self-governing territories and the populations living in occupied territories. It also applies to the population as a whole of sovereign States. However, international legal opinion is divided over the applicability of the principle of self-determination to indigenous peoples, although the wording retained in the Indigenous Peoples Declaration is identical to that of Art. 1 of the two Covenants.

Returning to edcucation, it is worth pointing out that Art. 14 of the Indigenous Peoples Declaration offers a relevant illustration of the three types of rights under consideration here, for it spells out each of them : the right of indigenous indivduals and especially children to have access to all levels of State education without discrimination (Art. 14.2) ; the right to benefit from State measures to ensure that indigenous individuals and especially children have access to education in their own culture and language (Art. 14.3) (this provision is comparable to what is contained in the Minorities Declaration) ; and the right of indigenous peoples to establish and control their own educational systems in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of transmitting and acquiring knowledge (Art. 14.1) (the implementation of this provision cannot be dissociated from the recognition of some form of group right).

As mentioned earlier, one of the challenges of the protection and promotion of indigenous and minority rights resides in the contradictory relationship between identity claims and claims for non-discrimination, the latter being rooted in individual human rights while the former refer, in one way or another, to collective rights or group rights, depending on the situation. A further challenge lies in determining the

scope and substance of group rights, that is, of rights that non-State groups are likely to claim as such, as opposed to collective (human) rights understood as rights exercised by individuals in community with other members of their group.

While the principle of non-discrimination of persons belonging to minorities is firmly anchored and monitored in positive international law, this is not the case of special measures to be taken in favour of minorities or indigenous peoples as collective entities. Moreover, both the Minorities Declaration and the Indigenous Peoples Declaration, contrary to a convention which requires ratification, create neither a legal obligation nor a monitoring mechanism ; and none of the existing international instruments explicitly accords minorities or indigenous peoples subjective rights or a form of legal personality.

How do culture and education fit into the conceptual difference that exists between rights of collective agents and rights to collective interests ? If collective agents matter, the question is whether and how an ethnic, linguistic or religious minority, an indigenous people or a cultural group can exercise specific rights. However, existing international standards and activities rather stress the benefits to be derived from collective interests, such as intercultural education. To understand the implications of this difference, it is useful to return briefly to « culture » for some concluding remarks.

5. About Culture II
I mentioned earlier that the anthropolocal culture concept involves a series of methodological and theoretical premises that contribute to « problematising » culture. In general, this means to avoid regarding culture as self-evident. More specifically, in the context of this chapter, it means that one cannot proceeed as if culture was « out there » or visible to the naked eye, so to speak : a ritual or a manner of dress are not culture, they simply point to phenomena whose observation and analysis allow us to have an idea about a given culture. Nor can one proceed as if culture were an epiphenomenon, as implied by the individualistic perpective on culture alluded to earlier. Yet in international debates, one or the other – and sometimes both – views are generally assumed, based on the often problematic commonsense approach to culture pointed out previously. In addressing the rights of minorities and

indigenous peoples, the challenge then lies in navigating between the Scylla of extreme cultural relativism grounded in a non-critical and essentialist conception of culture, and the Charybdis of excessive individualism including the rejection of culture as a meaningful factor of social and individual life.

There is only minimal consensus among anthropologists as to the scope, substance and significance of the culture concept, as well as the analytical weight that culture carries by comparison with, say, economic processes, political institutions, or class interests. But, by and large, the anthropological culture concept is a holistic one : culture is conceived of as a system, an organised whole, and this both in descriptive and analytical terms.

Descriptively, « a culture » can be defined as an autonomous population unit having distinctive cultural characteristics or shared traditions, as well as a given set of associated values, norms, ideas and social practices. Moreover, when studying « a culture », it is assumed that such a culture is not a natural given but rather constructed by social actors, and that it evolves over time. The focus on the systemic nature of individual cultures (as population units) and the need to understand these on their own terms lies at the basis of the principle of cultural relativism – not to be confused with « cultural absolutism » as a form of extreme cultural relativism, as referred to earlier. Contrary to the latter, the general principle of cultural relativism, above all, puts all human cultures in the descriptive sense on an equal footing and therefore rejects the notion that a given culture – notably one that is dominant in a State – ought to be regarded as « better » or more worthy of protection than others.

Analytically, Culture – with a capital C – is abstracted from observed social practices, and represents as such the main contribution of anthropology. It involves theorising the diversity of human societies, and reflecting on the relations between the individual, society and the natural environment. As an operational concept, Culture it is not random but rather structured around a given set of values and norms governing individual and collective modes of thought and action; it is transmitted from generation to generation and thus perpetuates itself over time. Most importantly, the culture concept makes no sense independently of a collective entity, it is what people share and what goes beyond the individual. Finally, because its constitutive elements (values, social norms,

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institutions, mythology, mode of subsistence...) cannot be addressed in isolation, culture needs to be approached from a holistic perspective: only such an encompassing perspective allows to understand how culture « functions », for the relations between the constitutive elements of culture are not always apparent.

The descriptive as opposed to the analytical concept of culture mirror the opposition between the universalist outlook characteristic of the Enlightenment (e.g. Voltaire, Hume) and a more differentialist perspective associated with the German philosopher-historian Johann Gottfried von Herder. The first tends to minimise cultural diversity by positing the unity of the human species as the bearer of culture; here, culture is what characterises human beings as such and what unites them. The second posits intrinsic differences between groups bearing different cultures and thus rather brings to the fore cultural diversity; here culture is what differentiates peoples or communities. This distinction between culture as a unifying human principle and culture as a principle of group differentiation points to the need for a reconciliation of two apparently contradictory ideas of culture : posit the unity of humankind and hence the equality of all human beings, while endeavouring to understand and highlight the – geographic and historical – plurality of human societies. It is only in weighing these two fundamental principles that the pitfalls of extreme universalism and extreme relativism can be avoided. Extreme universalism is ethnocentric; it means judging everything by virtue of one's own cultural values and habits. Extreme relativism, as we saw in connection with « cultural absolutism », prevents any form of intercultural understanding and analysis.

The question nonetheless remains how identity claims made in the name of respect for cultural diversity can be validated by international legal standards without succumbing to « cultural absolutism », for there can be no act of identification that does not already entail an act of differentiation or even exclusion. By the same token, a folkloristic approach to culture viewed simply as a context of individual choice fails to account for the fact that cultural difference may be ascribed on the basis of appearance for instance, and that under such circumstances individuals have little possibility to escape from stereotyping and

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stigmatisation. Nor does it offer sufficient means to counter the negative effects of globalisation that threaten the cultural survival of indigenous peoples in particular, including their specific modes of transmitting and acquiring knowledge based on living in a given natural environment. Not surprisingly, views about education and the human right to eduction voiced by indigenous representatives consistently place land and resource issues at the fore. In this fashion, they stress the need for a holistic and collective approach to the preservation of cultural diversity.

Editorial Note

The ethnic labyrinth presented in this chapter is indescribable with regard to the ethnic minorities in the current world map. It is the result of a colonization without a prospect of ethnic harmonization, or of mass migrations in the XIX and XX Centuries, there are no alternatives to fit them in any other way different from a slow and painful integration. We shall never be able to know whether biologically this crossbreeding has been positive or negative for evolution.

As regards indigenous peoples, there is the possibility of framing them in bigger federations. Not in America, where twenty million scattered, and to a certain extent isolated, natives are neither dependent nor free. They are simply conditioned by the descendents of the colonizers, and by the Creoles that where created through the colonizing process. But in Africa a federal system can be used, adapting it to the character of the natives, a sort of grouping for a federal system, based on antropologial and territorial similarities.

Besides ethnic minorities and native peoples which cannot possibly undergo a federalizing process that complicates antropological globalization, there is the national factor —natural groups. This labyrinth is the easiest of all. The perseverence of the empires' heir states in their desire to maintain their dominance over these groups is what makes it difficult to find a solution to the ethnic problem of nationalities, which together with the religious problem provoked by Islam, produces the violence that deprives mankind from globalizing harmoniously.

SUGGESTION (2)

The systems of federal coexistence established in the world prove how good they are with regard to the creation of peace and progress in the federated communities. Whether they are small in size as in the case of Switzerland, or whether they are big as in the case of the USA. The following synopsis defines the current situation of ethnic incoherence in the western continents of Europe and America, and at the same time enable us to establish similarities in the species, opening up the labyrinths that have caused barbaric episodes on Earth.

The cultural world generalisation is the only system to eliminate it at this level. This requires the following:

- *The first suggestion. (Page 174)*
- *The ethnic labyrinth created throughout history, as a consequence of emigration, spontaneous or provoked exodus, deportations and other factors which are not so relevant, which combined have affected the whole world shaping the labyrinths that cannot be analysed independently. More than a process of de-construction, the crisis has ignited a process of normalization of progress, also an ideal opportunity to rationalize it. The efforts to overcome the crisis must be planned in order to achieve economic and cultural levels, simultaneously within federations like the one that has been proposed for Europe, with programmes aimed at reaching internal cohesion within each federation, and external ones at a global level.*
- *A process of ethnic identification must be considered as a priority. It would allow establishing States according to the specific character of each people, underscoring language as the first of the identity factors in order to determine the rights and obligations of each exisiting natural human group.*
- *Through public consultation made to each community, the creation of 8-10 great federations parallel to those of Europe and the USA, the amalgamation of which will form a world confederation guided by the UN, made up of commissions of representatives from each federation, with powers to create laws that shall be validated in state consultations made to the global population.*
- *The right of the states to remain exempt from global legislation passed in each consultation, creating differentiated groups of States within the UN.*

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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICAN

NAME	LANGUAGE	LOCATION	POPULAT.	OBSERVATIONS
TARAHUMARAS	TARAHUMANA	MEXICO	122,000	
MAZAHUAS	MAZAHUA	MEXICO	300,000	Extinct groups, and in process of
AZTEQUES-MEX	NÁHUATI	MEXICO	2,500,000	extinction, speakers of their
OTOMÍES	OTOMÍ	MEXICO	650,000	original language: 950.550
TOTONACAS	TOTONACA	MEXICO	400,000	CORAS−KIKAPÚES−HUICHOLES−
HUASTECOS	HUASTEC	MEXICO	200,000	MAYOS−SERIS−PIMAS−YAQUIS−
MIXTECOS	MIXTEC	MEXICO	700,000	GUARIJÍOS−PÁPAGOS−
CHINANTECOS	CHINANTECO	MEXICO	200,000	TEPEHUANES−CHICHIMECAS−
PUREPECHAS	PURÉPECHA	MEXICO	203,000	PAMES−
ZAPOTECOS	ZAPOTEC	MEXICO	777,500	MATLATZINCAS−AMUZGOS−
MAZATECOS	MAZATEC	MEXICO	306,000	HUAVES−
MIXES	MIXE	MEXICO	169,000	TRIQUIS−CHATINOS−
TLAPANECOS	TLAPANEC	MEXICO	140,500	CHONTALES−POPOLUCAS
CHOLES	CHOL	MEXICO	221,000	LACANDONES−MOCHÓS
MAIA	MAIA	MEXICO	1,500,000	ZOQUES−TOJOLABALES−
TZELTALES	TZELTAL	MEXICO	384,000	POPOLOCAS−MEXICANEROS−
TZOTZILES	TZOTZIL	MEXICO	407,000	ACATECO
ACHÍ	ACHÍ	GUATEMALA	217,500	AGUACATECO−MAMES−
QUINCHÉ	QUINCHÉ	GUATEMALA	1,280,000	CHALCHITECO−NASO−
LENCA	LENCA	HOND-EL SALV.	137,000	ZUTUHILES− WOUNAAN−
NGÖBE	NGÖBERE	PANAMA	200,000	CHOROTEGAS−ARAWAK−
AYMARA	AYMARÀ	PERU-BOLIVIA	600,000	PIPIL−EMBERA−KUNA−
JÍBAROS	JIBARÀN	ECUADO-PERU	5,000	=======================
QUECHUA	QUECHUA	VARIOUS	5,000,000	The conversion of the peoples of
OTAVALOS	"	ECUADOR	34,000	Central and South America, in
CHIPAYA	URU-CHIPAYA	BOLIVIA	1,000	their journey from barbarism to
YANOMAMI	YANOMAN	BRAZIL-VENEZ.	9,000	civility, entailed no real human
GUARANIES	TUPI-GUARANI	BRAS-PARA-AR	12,000	disaster like that of North
BORORO	BORORO	BRAZIL	850	America. And perhaps it not only
AMAHUACAS	PANOAN	PERU-BRAZIL	750	perpetuated, but also linked the
MUNDUCURU	MUNDURUKU	BRAZIL	2,000	domination and exploitation of
WAIWAI	CARIBE	BRAZIL-GUAYA.	1,000	people by despotic emperors,
YECUANA	"	BRAZIL-VENEZ.	5,000	rather than those of the empires
17 POBLES	Various	P.N.XINGU	6,000	of the ancient East and Europe.
XAVÁNTE	MACRO-GE	BRAZIL	8,000	The most noticeable
HUAONARI	Unknown	ECUADOR	700	difference compared to North
TICUNA	"	PERU-BR-COLO	21,000	America, is the fact that north
ALACALUFE	"	CHILE	100	European settlers were moving
ASHÁNINKA	ARAWAK	PERU-BRAZIL	25,000	their families with the intention
GUAJIRO	"	COLUM-VENEZ	305,000	of a voluntary and definitive
GUAHIBO	"	COLUM-VENEZ	20,000	exodus. Latinos in the south
MAPUCHE	ARAUCANA	CHILE-ARGENT.	1,050,000	were only warriors and clerics,
SURUI	TUPÍ-MONDE-S.	BRAZIL	800	with lucrative intentions and a
SHIPIBO	CHAMA	PERU	3,000	desire to return to the
YAGUA	PEBA-YAGUAN	PERU-BRA-COL.	3,500	metropolis.
LENGUAS	MASCOIAN	PARAGUAY	10,000	The white Creole
PILAGÁS	GUAICURÀN	ARGENT-PARAG	5,000	population is the result. For the
TOBAS	"	ARG-BOL-PARA	17,000	world, and the West especially,
MOCOVÍ	"	ARGENTINA	3,500	it is painful that civilization was
DIAGUITA	KAKÀN	CHILE-ARGENT.	7,000	not developed with the idea of
YAGAN	YAGAN	ARGENT.-CHILE	70	final exodus across the
WICHI	MATACOAN	ARGENT-BOLIV	75,000	continent. But more painful was
TEHUELCHES	CHON	ARGENTINA	350	that north European clerics did
CAYAPA	CHIBCHA	ECUADOR	2,500	not attempt, as did the Latinos,
IKA	"	COLUMBIA	5,000	to educate the Indians. They

could have been more
successful, and today's world
would be another.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF NORTH AMERICA

NAME	LANGUAGE	LOCATION	POPULATION	OBSERVATIONS
NASKAPI	ALGONQUINO	CANADA	1,000	This list of North American Native peoples is not exhaustive, but includes all those which can truly be considered nations. Not in the concept of Native Americans themselves, as the words "nation" or "people" for them are nouns which refer to human communities in general, even small-sized tribes. Language is for them the true marker of their own identity. More comprehensively, we listed the most significant ones. Some of them gradually ceased to be a people as a result of slow extinction. Others persist in small and scattered populations within the geography of this global region. All together they are: ABENAKI—ALEUTIANOS—ARAPAHOE—PAWNE—KAROK—MOHAVE—POMO—WASHOE—KIOWA—CHOCTAW—SEMINOLE—CHICASAW—TSIMHIAM—MIWOK—NEZPERCÉ—ZYAKIMASPOKANE—FLATHEAD—KUTENAI—THOMPSOM—SALISH—WALLA WALLA—CAYUSE—BANNOCK—KWAKIUTL—NOOTKA—MAKAH—HIVILINGMIUTT—YELLLOWKNIFE—SAUK—CALUSA—NATCHEZ TOLOWA—MODOC—TIMUCUA- WINEWBAGO— DELAWARE—SECOTANO—MARRAGANSET—YUMA—ILLINOIS—CHINOOK CURRENT SPEAKERS OF OWN LANGUAGES 75,000
CREE	"	CANADA-USA	53,000	
MONTAGNAIS	"	RSVA.-CANADA	10,000	
YUROK	"	RSVA.HUPA-USA	4,500	
ALGONKIN	"	CANADA	5,000	
MOHICANOS	"	RSVA.WISCON.-USA	1,400	
OJIBWA	"	RSVA.USA-CANADA	75,000	
KICKAPOOS	"	RSVA.USA	1,500	
POTAWATOMI	"	RSVA.OKLA-KANS.	7,500	
MICMAC	"	USA-CANADA	13,000	
OTTAWA	"	RSVA.OKLA-USA	7,500	
SHAWNE	"	RSVA.OKLAHO-USA	2,000	
WAMPANOAG	"	USA	1,200	
POWHATANOS	"	USA	3,000	
MENOMINEE	"	USA	3,500	
MIAMI	"	RSVA.OKLAHO-USA	2,000	
BLACKFOOT	"	USA-CANADA	15,000	
CHEYENNES	"	RSVA.MONT-OKLAH.	5,000	
ATSINA	"	RSVA.F.BELKNAP-USA	1,000	
KUTCHIN	ATABASCANO	ALASKA-CANA-USA	1,500	
DOGRIB	"	CANADA	3,000	
TANANA	"	ALASKA-CANADA	500	
INUIT	ESQUIMAL	ALASKA-CANADA	33,000	
YUPIK	"	ALASKA	20,000	
CHEROKEE	IROQUÉS	USA	78,500	
HURON	"	RSVA.USA-CANADA	8,000	
IRIQUOIS	"	USA-CANADA	29,500	
HUPA	NA-DENE	RSVA.HOOPA-USA	1,000	
TLINGIT	"	USA-CANADA	9,500	
HAIDA	"	USA-CANADA	2,000	
APACHES	"	RSVA.ARIZONA-USA	18,000	
NAVAJO	"	RSVA.USA	220,000	
CATAWBA	SIOUX	USA	4,500	
YUCHI	"	USA	1,500	
SIOUX	"	USA	103.500	
ASSINIBOIN	"	RSVA.MONT-ALBER.	3,500	
HIDATSA	"	RSVA.DAKOTA-USA	1,200	
CROW	"	RSVA.MONTAN-USA	7,000	
PONCAS	"	RSVA.OKLAHO-USA	2,500	
OSAGE	"	RSVA.OKLAHO-USA	2,500	
OMAHA	"	USA	3,000	
SHOSHONE	UTO-AZTEC	USA	7,000	
PAIUTE	"	USA	4,000	
UTE	"	USA	5,000	
COMANCHE	"	USA	6,000	
HOPI	"	USA	6,500	
PIMA	"	RSVA.USA-MEXICO	20,000	
SEMINOLE	MUSCOGI	USA	6,000	

Idigenous inhabitants of America: 20.00.00

EUROPEAN CONFEDERACIÓN – CE. (9)

	NATION STATES	POPULATION thousands	STATES	MAIN ETHNIC MINORITIES TO BE INTEGRATED
1	Albania	3.600	1	Greeks - Macedonians - Montenegrins
2	Germany (1)	82.000	16	Turks - Exyugoslavians - Italians - Greeks - Poles
3	Andorra	83	1	Portuguese - Spaniards - Catalans - French
4	Austria	8.300	1	Exyugoslavians - Turks - Gypsies - Hungarians – Jews
5	Belgium (2)	10.700	2	French - Italians - Turks - Germans- Dutch
6	Bosnia-Herzeg.	4.000	1	Serbians – Croats
7	Bulgaria	7.600	1	Turks - Gypsies
8	Croatia	4.500	1	Albanians -Bosnians - Hungarians - Italians - Serbians
9	Denmark	5.500	1	Turks - Exyugoslavians
10	Slovakia	5.400	1	Romani - Hungarians - Czhecs - Rusyns - Romanies
11	Slovenia	2.000	1	Serbians - Croats – Bosnians
12	Spain (3)	45.800	4	Gypsies - Moroccans - Rumanians - Latinamericans
13	Estonia	1.300	1	Russians - Ucranians - Belarussians – Finnish
14	Finland	5.300	1	Swedes - Russians - Sami
15	France (4)	64.300	8	Portuguese - Gypsies - Rumanians - Italians - Turks - Maghrebis
16	Gibraltar	29	1	British – Moroccans
17	Greece	11.200	1	Albanians - Vallachians - Macedonians - Gypsies - Turks
18	Hungary	10.000	1	Gypsies - Germans - Slovaks - Croats
19	Ireland	4.500	1	British
20	Iceland	318	1	Poles - Danes – Filipinos

21	Italy (5)	60.000	10	Gypsies - Slovanians - Rumanians - Greeks - Croats
22	Kosovo	1.800	1	Serbians - Gypsies - Bosnians - Turks - Egyptians - Croats
23	Latvia	2.300	1	Russians - Belarussians - Ucranians - Poles - Lithuanians
24	Liechtenstein	35	1	Swiss - Walsers - Austrians - Germans
25	Lithuania	3.300	1	Poles - Russians - Belarussians - Ucranians
26	Luxembourg	500	1	Portuguese - French - Italians - Belgians - Germans
27	Macedonia	2500	1	Albanians – Turks – Romani
28	Malta	400	1	Ingleses - Italianos
29	Monaco	32	1	Italians – French
30	Montenegro	700	1	Serbians - Bosnians - Albanians - Croats
31	Norway	4.700	1	Sami - Romani - Bosnians - Turks
32	Netherlands	16.400	1	Frisians - Indonesians - Turks - Moroccans - Chinese - Jews – Gypsies
33	Poland (6)	38.100	2	Germans - Belarusians - Ucranians
34	Portugal	10.600	1	Azorians - Madeirans - Ucranians - Gypsies - Brazilians
35	United Kingdom (7)	61.700	3	Indians - Pakistanis - Afrocaribbeans - Black Africans - Bengali - Chinese
36	Czech Republic	10.500	1	Germans - Moravians - Slovaks – Poles
37	Romania	21.500	1	Hungarians - Gypsies - Ucranians – Germans
38	San Marino	33	1	Italians
39	Serbia	9.200	1	Hungarians - Bosnians - Gypsies - Exyugoslavians - Croats – Albanians-Slovaks
40	Sweden	9.200	1	Finnish - Gypsies - Jews - Sami - Turks
41	Switzerland	7.700	1	Exyugoslavians - Turks - Portuguese - Spanish - Gypsies - Jews

TOTAL (8)   79

Reference marks (1) to (9) on the following page

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(1) Baden Wurtemberg – Lower Saxony – Baviera – Berlin – Brandemburg Bremen – Hamburg – Hesse – Meskem – Burgopomerania – Renania Palatinado – Sajonia – Sajoniaanhalt – Sarre – Schcesunig Holstein Turingia.

(2) Flandes – Valonia

(3) Spain - Catalunya – Euskadi – Galicia.

(4) France. There are twenty-two departments ant sixteen recognized languages. Language and territory combined, can determine the number of States.

(5) Italy. There are twenty regions and ten modern languages. As in the case of France, the combination of language and territory must determine the number of States.

(6) Poland – Kaszuby

(7) England – Wales – Scotland.

(8) Example of distribution. Many distributions are possible through the combination of cultural factors (especially language), geography, economy and the will espressed in referendums.

(9) Eight-Ten groups like the European one to cover the World Confederation, centralized in a very reduced UN made up of, eight-ten ministerial commissions, from governments identically created. This super government would not have legislative powers. Its proposals would need to be validated through referendums at the States level. This level of States and the Confederation level (UN) would exist together with the groupings of States which in their level would be able to organize referendums for specific issues affecting the Groups.

At all levels, there is the right to refrain from the proposals. They will be recognized by those who accept the confederal proposals, constituting legislated groups of entry and exit.

Three factors that pose an obstacle to evolution are located within the ethnic labyrinth: indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, and the most disastrous of them all, the nations which are hijacked by the Nation-States. To focus on the ruling of independent States through federation, would avoid the ethnic conflicts that still survive and which are the cause of a violent inter-ethnical relationships, and also the size of these States would make world government easier since political accountability would be shared.

Territorial base for the European Confederation - CE

Now that the confederation of the USA is to a great extent finished, although Canada is still to become a member of it and the powers of the States is yet to be enlarged, there is a first cohesive human and territorial core, which is only waiting to be formalized in order to become a part of a global confederation.

Given that a unifying process has already begun in Europe, the EU, through the experience of the federated and confederated existing States, it is now possible and it is even easy to finish this process turning it into a confederation.

The association of both confederations would give way to a core that would span over 24.253.261 sq. km of land, with

a population density of 77,7 inhab.X sq. km with a GDP per person of 22.370 $ (2004). Its practical result (both economical and cultural) and the will to grow would provoke a tendency to create other similar cores like the Ex-Ussr – China - India –Latin America – Oceania, including Japan, at least ten of them.

In Europe the de-centralizing process is in an initial stage. Until now the territorial and political rationalization has been extremely complicated, and it has occurred thanks to the debilitating condition of the Nation-States caused by the globalizing process. Also as a result of the internal and external wars which have been lost by the empires that formed them, the last of them being the USSR.

The operating political factors in this process are complex, and this complexity becomes clear with the difficulty to harmonize differentiated ethnic groups established by the mixing of the unknown, not the africans, but the native europeans, with the non registered immigrants from prehistorical times and those from historical times which have been hardly studied. All of them having different natural characteristics. Unknown european natives, bred in climates that range from the glacial to the warm with central asian immigrants. These in their turn have been bred in climates that differ greatly from European ones, because of the continental character of the territory. All of them during a very long period of time, spanning from the process initiated simultaneously with the creation of the species and the historic era, a period over a thousand million years. All of this occurring with territorial changes that even provoke the disappearance of internal seas. As probably occurred in the case of the Gobi desert.

The survival of empires and Nation-States is understandable if we consider its diffent aspects, — sentimental-patriotic and political grandeur or simply grandeur— of the Nation-States. This is how many peoples have been wiped out. In the third millenium which will be more rational, dominated peoples persist which still maintain their own patriotic sentiment to a greater or lesser degree. And they also have a political consciousness when they have created a differentiated culture, a strong economy, or both qualities at the same time. The European Confederation —and others after it— must establish themselves slowly, without traumas and with the necessary time to assimilate immigrants.

At least through assimilation, which is possible, through the economic factor, but essentially through the verification of countries which are small in size (territorially and demographically), and are susceptible of being governed conveniently according to the interests of the population in general and not just according to the cores of dominance of the Nation-States. The sentimental factor will also be operative in the newly created independent states.

9
Over-population and its diversity

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(Barcelona)

The dangers of over-population

The continued and accelerated growth of Earth's population is one of the major current issues, to the point of compromising the very survival of the human species. For over two hundred years there have been repeated cries of alarm about the disparity in rates of growth of the population, and the food necessary for its survival. At present, the consequences of economic development in the availability of natural resources cast doubt on the Earth's capacity to accommodate all humans who can potentially exist. In developed countries, the availability of resources and advances in medicine and hygiene, as well as a series of changes in family structure and sexual behaviour, have allowed for the reduction of both mortality and birth rates, and more than stabilize the population, this has diminished it. Nevertheless, in most of the world, over-population is still one of the greatest challenges of our time.

1. Population grows geometrically

The work of clergyman Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) has not always had a good reputation. Some of his predictions about the disastrous consequences of continuing growth of the population have not been met in the periods and to the extent he seemed to calculate. However, over two hundred years after the publication of his *Ensayo sobre el Principio de la Población,* and of *Cómo Afecta al Progreso Futuro de la Sociedad* (1798), some of Malthus' ideas are very up-to-date.

The great twentieth-century economist, John M. Keynes, who is also being reread at the present time of global economic crisis, stressed the importance of certain ideas of Thomas Malthus. In particular, he mentioned his analysis of savings and investment and its positive implications for the generation of wealth through the 'aggregate demand', which includes public spending to tackle unemployment of large masses of population. For Keynes, "the almost total neglect of the line of thought of Malthus and the complete domination of Ricardo's

for a hundred years has been a disaster for the progress of economic science. If Malthus instead of Ricardo had been the trunk that sprouted the science of economics in the nineteenth century, how much wiser and wealthier the world would be today!" he exclaimed.

Malthus was, first and foremost, an anti-utopian, that is, a realist who warned against hoping for the indefinitely continued progress of mankind without adequate public intervention. His analysis started from two basic assumptions about human nature:

• first, food is necessary for the existence of humans;
• second, sexual passion between genders is necessary and will remain almost as it has always been.

These two laws, according to Malthus, have governed since the earliest times of human knowledge and appear as immovable laws of nature, so any prediction about the human race and any proposed economic, social or political organization must take them into account. The first law states that population growth has certain limits; the second, that outside intervention may be required to reduce growth rates that are the result of natural human impulses and passion.

Based on his postulates, Malthus argued that "the growth capacity of the population is infinitely greater than the earth's capacity to produce food for the human race." In words made famous, he summed up his prediction as follows:

> "If the population does not come up against obstacles, it will increase in geometric progression. Food will only increase in arithmetic progression. Even with the most elementary notions of numbers" he added, "in order to appreciate the vast difference in favor of the first of these two forces. To fulfill the law of our nature, by which food is essential to life, the effects of these two forces which are so unequal, must be kept at the same level".

The implications of the analysis of Malthus have the highest relevance for trying to find our way out of one of the biggest labyrinths of today's world. To secure the future of mankind, two things must be achieved, or as the author put it: First, we must put "obstacles" to increasing population,

particularly with late marriages, "moral restraint" and contraception (which Malthus the cleric called a "vice"). Second, there must be increased food production at higher rates than in the past. If these goals are not sufficiently met, humanity will suffer "disease and premature death, misery and vice" in the words of the English economist.

Malthus noted that hunger and poverty were common in the past of human history. Extrapolating numbers of his time, in the late eighteenth century, regarding an increasing population and food production, he predicted that such disasters would again extend to the mid-nineteenth century. In this he was wrong because precisely at that time great economic and social changes that were unprecedented had begun to take place. The so-called "industrial revolution" that began in England and similar changes that occurred in agriculture, specifically in the early and mid-nineteenth century, produced a great increase in available resources. At the same time, the colonialism of the major European countries brought the exploitation and removal of food and basic materials from Africa, Asia and South America, so that the catastrophe predicted by Malthus was averted in Europe and North America, but was extended in colonized countries. Later on in the twentieth century, the so-called "green revolution" of fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation provided by hydrocarbons in the years 1940-1960 also led to a transformation of agriculture that generated large increases in food production. However, large parts of the world are rife with the "disease and premature death, misery and vice" that Malthus in general predicted.

2. Population growth
The biggest increases in world population have occurred in modern times. From the origins of civilization around 10,000 BC to 1,000 BC, world population was relatively stable at around 5 million people. In the year 0 there were already 200 or 300 million people on Earth. But in the following centuries, growth was slow and often interrupted by plagues and famines.

The biggest change in the rate of population growth on Earth began around 1800, the time of Malthus, from an initial figure of about one billion people. In the following two-hundred years birth rates remained very high, around 5 children per woman. But suffering, disease and infant

mortality did not appear in the expected measures, thanks in large part to increasing food production, the overall improvement of living conditions and advances in hygiene and medicine. As these changes have also reduced mortality rates, life expectancy has increased from 46 years around 1950 to 65 at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and with it the total population. Specifically, in developed countries, current life expectancy is about 75 years, which is expected to increase to about 82 by mid-century, causing the proportion of people of working age, between 16 and 65 years, to decrease, while increasing that of people of advanced age. In poor countries, it is estimated that the current life expectancy of 50 years can reach 66 around the same time.

Globally, population has increased many times over. At the middle of the twentieth century there were already about 2.5 billion people on the planet, in other words, population had multiplied by two and a half in 150 years, while at the beginning of the twenty-first century world population has again multiplied by two and a half, but in a space of only fifty years, and is currently around 6.7 billion inhabitants. According to Malthus' predictions, population increases "geometrically" (i.e., exponentially).

Projections for the future depend on anticipated changes in behaviour and technology. If the current birth-rate, which is 2.6 children per woman as a global average (in other words, half the mid-twentieth century level) were to continue, the world's population could reach 11 billion by 2050. However, the birth-rate might continue to decline in coming years to less than 2.1 children per woman, in which case world population would reach about 9 billion people, because of the lengthening of life.

These predictions show great variation in different parts of the world due to the fact that in developed countries the increase has slowed down as a result of reduced birth rates. Currently, the average birth rate in developed countries is only 1.6, below the rate of reproduction. But in the so-called "Third World" overpopulation continues to create misery, disease and high infant mortality. So, hopefully, in Europe, North America and Japan, as well as in Russia and the former Soviet republics, the population remains stable, more or less around 1.2 billion people, with possible increases due mainly to the immigration of people from the poorest countries. The exception among the rich countries is the United States, which

could go from 300 million today to 440 million by the middle of this century.

By contrast, in the poor countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the current population of 5.3 billion people could become 7.8 billion by 2050. In fact, most of the foreseeable increase of the population would take place in just nine major countries: India, which would reach 1.7 billion people, China, with relative stabilization at around 1.4 billion, Pakistan and Bangladesh in Asia, Nigeria, the Congo, Uganda and Ethiopia in Africa and the United States of America. Over 85 percent of the world's population live in the "Third World". Within this framework of continued and "geometric" growth of the population in most of the world, some estimates of Malthus' regarding food shortages could become relevant once again.

3. Limiting resources
In the last two hundred years food production has increased at a great pace and has allowed an enormous increase in the population with relatively few disasters, pandemics and famines. However, other changes have called into question the earth's capacity to accommodate all humans. Specifically, mankind now faces the following risks for the future:

- Depletion of natural resources, energy and food sources. Alternatives should include changes in the use of energy sources and in criteria for the movement of people and goods. They should also promote fish farming, agriculture and the production of meat by transgenic means.
- Shortage of fresh water due to extraction in excess of the cycles that permit natural replenishment of aquifers. Contamination of groundwater due to chemical treatments of land and salinization due to the infiltration of seawater. Pollution of surface, maritime and inland waters as a result of waste production.
- Deforestation and desertification due to the expansion of urbanization and population concentration in large cities. Depletion of fertile land, difficult to recover after being stretched to the limits with the use of nitrates. The concentration of population in deltas and regions that had been productive, complicates their

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regeneration. Since the forced transfer of large masses of people is unthinkable today, the problem can only be addressed through enhanced production of material resources.

- Destruction of ozone and global warming due to carbon dioxide emissions, along with those of chlorofluor fuels. These emissions are the result of using hydrocarbons in transportation in excess of levels supported by oceanic reserves. The only possible solution is to stop interfering in the troposphere and wait for rainfall to regain the lost cycle.

- Global warming and climate change that cause melting of ice masses of the two poles and the resulting interference with ocean currents; levelling of temperatures, and changes in the distribution of precipitation and meteors. Increased ocean levels with the consequent threat to plant and animal life, especially that of humans, and especially of those living in the large deltas.

- Epidemics and global pandemics and diseases related to malnutrition and lack of health resources.

- Hunger, malnutrition and poor diets that produce ill health and disease, despite the rich countries and also the democratic poor ones having avoided the traditional crises resulting from famine.

- Poverty due to lack of education and lack of hygiene. High levels of crime and violence, conflicts over access to scarce resources due to overpopulation.

The significance of these problems cannot be measured. Current geophysical knowledge is insufficient to predict all the implications and time frames in which such disasters could occur. It is not impossible that the troposphere might be able to withstand natural imbalances caused by humans, as happened with changes of much greater magnitude in the carboniferous period. Although stocks of some of the energy sources currently being used, especially coal and oil and other raw materials are finite. The petrochemical industry will generate, sooner or later, new products that replace some of the ones most used today. But precisely for this reason it is unjustifiable to continue to use fuel at the current rate. In the twenty-first century, humans must solve energy problems through the use of renewable and non-polluting sources.

Above all these risks are the differences between birth rates in rich countries and poor countries, as well as poverty and economic and cultural inequality largely caused by overpopulation. Addressing these problems requires changes in sexual and family behaviour as well as agreements and public plans of action at the worldwide level, aimed at establishing birth rates of humans at a level which is appropriate to the earth's capacity to sustain them.

4. Changes in the family

The reduction in birth rates that has taken place in developed countries has been caused, firstly, by changes in the activity of women and their new role within the family. Economic development and expansion of education has greatly increased opportunities for women working outside the home, compared with traditional societies in which women devoted most of their time and their lives to running the household and caring for children. To the extent that women get education and training, along with the capacity to practice a profession or hold an attractive job outside the home, the cost of domestic work increases which induces the technically unskilled to stay at home, doing work which is very time intensive, low paid and physically demanding. These changes tend to alter the relationship between husband and wife, eroding the traditional patriarchal hierarchy within the family, and reduce the number of children.

For most of human history, the institution of the family has ensured the reproduction of the species and has provided protection and security through mutual affection and material support among its members. The traditional family model involves a strong division of labor. The husband is the head of household, in charge of providing income for basic needs such as housing, food and clothing. The wife must accept regular sex-oriented play with the objective of reproduction, in addition to raising children and keeping house. Boys provide additional income through work (which in rural societies included chores like fetching water and firewood, carrying messages, caring for younger siblings, sweeping and washing the dishes and some agricultural work). The family also takes care of grandparents and other relatives without protection. This model of the extended family was very stable in most

societies over the centuries, only slightly challenged by the occasional emergence of eccentric witches and libertines.

The massive incorporation of women into work other than domestic has resulted in noteworthy changes in relationships between men and women. It also modified the benefits and costs of various activities within the family and eventual decisions of its members. To the extent that real wages are rising, it is less profitable for the family unit that one of its members fully specialize in domestic work and childcare. At the same time, the spread of education and the rewards available to educated people increase the desire to give children a formal education, which tends to be costly and is therefore limited to few children. Thus, some of the traditional economic and social functions of families are transferred to other institutions such as kindergartens and schools, private companies, nursing homes, clinics, cultural centers and public agencies.

As a result, the value of having children changes completely. In rural and traditional societies with a strong division of labor between husband and wife, fertility was and is considered a potential source of income for the family. In this context the children, especially if they are male, work from an early age, first at home and then bringing their income to the family finances. The cost of having children is very low, barely exceeds that of their contribution to the household and may be an investment in the economic future of the family. In contrast, in developed societies, having children tends to be considered primarily a source of emotional satisfaction, in other words, expensive consumption, which can only be satisfied with a small number of them.

The actual decline in birth rates motivated by the family changes referred to in developed countries has been possible despite the maintenance of passion between the sexes as a law of nature, thanks to innovations in contraceptive techniques. The oldest forms of fertility control that are recorded include contraceptive instructions in ancient Egypt. In fact there have always been such mechanisms. But the dissemination, use and efficiency of birth control methods have increased dramatically in recent decades. Currently available techniques include the condom and the diaphragm, as well as spermicides and the hormone pill popularized beginning the decade of the 1960s.

Much more controversial have been the legal changes with regard to abortion. The critical turning-point was its

legalization in circumstances such as health hazards to the pregnant woman, not only physical but also psychological, or her socio-economic conditions, in other words, with flexible clauses that were open to interpretation. The first such law was passed in California in 1967 and today there are similar laws in most countries. Although there are often time limits that are imposed on medical abortion, normally around three months into term, in many countries this is much more liberal.

Empirical observation confirms the trends outlined above. Indeed, in developed countries and with better education, marriages tend to take place at a later age. Until 1950, more than 90 percent of men and women married at some point in their lives, while in the early twenty-first century only 60 percent in Sweden ever married, and 70 percent in Germany, for example, and the rates decrease in most countries.

On the other hand, divorces are on the rise. A key innovation was the introduction of "no-fault divorce", which was first legalized in California in 1968. In Western countries, in the middle of the twentieth century only 6 percent of first marriages ended in divorce, while at the present the time the divorce rate is just over 40 percent, and the number of break-ups and separations is increasing. As a result of all this, the number of children per woman is going down, as we have outlined above.

5. The demographic transition

The demographic transition model represents the process of change in each country from high birth rates and mortality, passing through a reduction in mortality (and thus, a large population growth), to a reduction in the birth rate which stabilizes population at a higher level than the previous one. These demographic changes are based on the economic and family changes discussed above.

In the first phase, corresponding to poor agrarian societies, with traditional large families, both birth rates and mortality rates are high and fairly balanced. There are many births, but also a high infant mortality rate at early ages. Life expectancy is short. As a result, the population stabilizes at a reduced level.

In the second phase, corresponding to a country in the process of development, the mortality rate decreases rapidly

due to improvements in the supply of food and hygienic standards which reduce infant mortality and disease and increase life expectancy. These changes require new agricultural techniques, health care and an expansion of education. Since the birth rate is not reduced or increased significantly, there is a large increase in population. The infant and youth population grows. Changes of this kind got underway in some European countries in the eighteenth century, although at a slow pace. From mid-twentieth century, the decline in mortality rates has been quite a bit faster.

In the third phase, the birth rate decreases due to a reduction in subsistence agriculture and the reduced value of child labor, an increase in real wages, the expansion of education for women and access to contraceptive methods, as commented above. As a result, population growth begins to slow down. In some countries there are also family planning programs introduced by the government and obligatory restriction of the number of children.

The last stage is reaching low birth and mortality rates. Most of the countries of the world have reached this phase. The birth rate may even fall below the rate of reproduction as has occurred in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan, which leads to a decrease in the population. As those born during the second phase age, the passive population becomes an increasingly large proportion of the total population. The population of some countries that have reached this stage only increases as a result of immigration. The total number of inhabitants is high, but stable.

This model of demographic transition is a good simplified representation of processes that have taken place in Europe, North America and Japan over very long periods of time. In other parts of the world, the demographic transition has been very rapid, as in China and Brazil, due to sudden economic and social changes, and the possibility of adopting technological changes and customs imported from other countries. But some under-developed countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, seem stuck in the second phase, which involves an ongoing increase in population due to the lack of economic development, as well as new diseases caused by immunodeficiency virus. Most African countries still have fertility rates above 5 children per woman. The extreme case is Nigeria, which has followed a path opposite to the

demographic transition, with a birthrate of 7.5 children per woman, increasing the proportion of young people in the total population since the 1970s.

6. Population policies
Collective action can alter the conditions of population growth so as to intensify or minimize the aforementioned trends or even modify the course of demographic change in a given country.

In traditional societies, a pronatalist ideology can promote the production of children and take form in specific government regulations such as restricted access to contraception and abortion, as well as the concession of financial and social incentives to large families. Opposition to family changes that have generated a falling birth rate has been promoted in particular by churches and religious groups which generally have defended the traditional role of women in the family while at the same time condemning contraception. As a result, among wealthy countries, the strongly religious countries of Israel and Saudi Arabia have the highest birth rates. The Catholic Church, in particular, argues that morally acceptable sexual activity must be open to procreation. The only form of birth control permitted is abstinence, and the methods called the "period" whose efficacy is dubious. Some faith-based groups advocate the elimination of no-fault divorce, policies to reduce taxes for families with children, the promotion of sexual abstinence and adoption.

In some countries in the process of development, governments have implemented far-reaching policies to reduce the birth rate and thus accelerate the demographic transition to the third phase. In the 1970s, India imposed a program of forced sterilization of men with more than two children. However, this type of measure was subsequently abolished after heavy criticism due to abuses in the sterilization of unmarried young people, political opponents and ignorant men.

In China, the policy of "birth planning" introduced beginning in 1979, limits the number of children of each couple to one. This policy is implemented through propaganda, inspections and fines. In rural areas, families can apply to have a second child if their first is a girl or if the child has physical or mental disabilities, but only within three or four years after the first. Taxes are imposed to obtain permission to have

additional children, and parents of large families may see their access to certain rewards in the workplace greatly restricted.

The birth control policy was established in China with the official aim of alleviating the economic, social and environmental issues that were the result of overcrowding. The birth rate, which until 1970 had been five children per woman, has dropped from about three children per woman in 1980, which already implied a sharp reduction, to less than two in 2008. The Chinese government estimates that as a result of its family-planning policy, about three or four hundred million people were not born (although the total population of China exceeds one thousand three hundred million). It is believed that this has reduced the severity of some problems of overpopulation, including epidemics, overcrowding of cities and excessive demand for social services and environmental damage. Overall, the reduction in the rate of population growth may have contributed to the country's current economic development, but poverty persists in large sectors.

Nevertheless, the Chinese policy of one single child per family is also subject to criticism because it resulted in an increased number of forced abortions and female infanticide, which seems to be a cause of the current imbalance in the number of men and young women in the country. In fact, many couples continue to have more than one child.

Lastly, other countries have opted for a policy of education about overpopulation, family planning and methods of birth control, including availability and easy access to contraception.   It is estimated that about half of all pregnancies are unwanted, both in developed and underdeveloped countries. But many women lack access to information and adequate resources and services for planning the number of children and the age at which to have them. Many women also die from complications resulting from pregnancy or abortion.

7. Migration
The population is very unevenly distributed between different parts of the world.   In 1900, 30 percent of the world's population lived in Europe and North America, but now however, these two continents barely account for 10 percent of the total population.

Developed countries have experienced the aforementioned "demographic transition" towards a brake or

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cancellation of population growth. But in most developing countries high birth rates remain, and overcrowding continues to create misery and disease. This results in massive migration from poor countries to rich countries.

According to 2005 worldwide statistics, there are currently some 191 million migrants between countries, which is three percent of the world's population. Most of them are concentrated in developed countries, where about 115 million people from other parts of the world currently live. In some countries, international migrants exceed 10 percent of the total population, as in Canada and the United States, Germany, France and Spain, Australia and Saudi Arabia. The reunification of families is an important part of migration to developed countries, but this also increases illegal immigration.

By contrast, migrant flows between developing countries, which were formed mainly by refugees from natural disasters and civil wars, have practically come to a halt. In recent years, the return to countries of origin compensate and cancel the effects of new emigration.

Until the mid-twentieth century, European colonial powers, especially Britain and France kept their borders open to nationals of their colonies and former colonies who claimed citizenship rights. In the U.S., immigration flows have also been massive, due both to the demands of cheap labor by businesses, as well as to the demands and pressures of already resident ethnic groups whose cohesion has been a characteristic feature in the training and development of the country. A large proportion of the population of Great Britain, France and the United States might feel uncomfortable with a high number of neighbors from Africa, Asia and Latin America, people with physical features, languages, religions and customs that are very different from their own. But the cost of these massive immigrations was very diffuse and discomfort was politically difficult to be articulated, while some politicians and governments could achieve significant benefits in the form of political support from small concentrated active ethnic groups.

Attitudes towards immigrants from the so-called "Third World" began to change beginning in the nineteen-sixties when the flow of migration became massive following the independence of colonies, and with subsequent economic and political failures, and even more so after the economic recession of the 1970s. Firms in developed countries reduced

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their demands for labor. Governments introduced more restrictions on labor migration, family reunification and citizenship, as in Britain, they imposed sanctions on companies employing illegal immigrants and introduced incentives for immigrants to return to their countries of origin, as in France. In Germany, borders remained more open for a period, especially for Turks. In the U.S., a series of pardons or amnesty legalized a large percentage of illegal immigrants during the 1980s. However, demands for immigration control would finally triumph everywhere.

Right-wing parties argued that it was necessary to preserve national identity and social cohesion. The left-wing parties argued that closure of the borders was appropriate in order to facilitate the integration of earlier immigrants. Some parties and candidates used racist or ultra-nationalist arguments and promoted the outright rejection of immigrants from former colonies, to the point of making the immigration issue become a high-profile political and election issue. The political benefits that could have been derived in the past from the support of certain ethnic groups and certain candidates and parties were offset by a higher concentration of the complaints of the natives who had previously suffered the cost of immigrants' presence in a more diffuse way. Since the late twentieth century, and more so since the economic crisis of the early XXI century, most developed countries have adopted strong measures restricting immigration. Also the European Union as such has led to the closure of borders and a common immigration policy aimed at preventing major migrations. There have in fact been some significant movements of immigrants returning to their countries of origin. However, the most important result of these measures has been an increase in illegal immigration.

Historical experience shows that most of the emigrants, although they keep in touch with their "roots" and their habits for a while, tend to adapt to the culture, customs and lifestyles of the society of adoption, especially people from the second generation. This adjustment involves, in particular, a sharp decline in birth rates of the children of immigrants compared with their parents and grandparents, as has been observed, for example, in the United States over time. A moderate flow of immigrants to developed countries could therefore lead to an extension of the "demographic transition" previously pointed

out, to more extensive layers of the population and, overall, a decrease of overpopulation on Earth.

However, the vast majority of the overcrowding is located in underdeveloped countries lacking economic opportunities, and with family and social structures of the old regime, which in turn continues to generate over-reproductive behavior that threatens the earth's capacity to accommodate all humans.

On the one hand, in recent periods mechanisms and processes which could resolve the crisis of overpopulation, pointed out as long ago as the late eighteenth century, have have been identified, as seen in developed countries and as we have compiled in this work. But on the other hand, the populating labyrinth in most of the world is still far from finding a way out.

Language, Education and Civilization

The ethnic and linguistic diversity of mankind is the result of a lengthy process of biological and cultural evolution. If we look at civilization as a stadium of intercommunication and the peaceful coexistence of humans, was not been the result of a early lofty project, but has derived from the self-teaching of humans and the resulting accumulation of knowledge. At the current stage of development of science and technology, preventing the destruction of living things and moving towards a world federation of free peoples that culminates in the evolution of civilization requires a conscious human project, which is, first and foremost, a project of education.

8. Language
The evolution of humankind towards a system of peaceful coexistence requires, above all else, a common language. Currently, several thousands of languages are spoken in the world. But there are only a few linguas francas or universally understood languages that are tailored to the current requirements of communication. A universal federation of peoples should combine a number of local languages, which are an expression of cultures and different lifestyles, with a universal language of communication, which in the current

configuration of the world can only be English.

9. The evolution of languages

Over time, humans have alternated between the stabilization of local settlements, which produce local dialects, and successive waves of population dispersion, exchange and communication across large areas, which lead to corresponding common languages. Numerous language systems have been formed and then disappeared through successive waves of human migration and settlements in different parts of the world.

In the original history of our species, a small group of intelligent beings capable of creating a primal language began to fan out to vast territories from somewhere in Africa (or possibly several groups appeared in various places, only one of which gave birth to current languages). Through the expansion of agriculture in new lands, and from territorial conquests, some new common languages came into being. This process created some broader areas of communication in which people spoke in an understandable manner. But as the number of humans on Earth was increasing, they tended to become more sedentary and to concentrate in areas that were increasingly dense and reduced in size. Thus, the extensely circulated common languages were divided into many small languages and dialects. This disintegration of major languages into a multiplicity of small languages was probably the basis of the myth of Babel: earlier, people all understood each other, but after a while, like a curse, they began to speak different languages.

Specifically, a few thousand years ago, the people we refer to today as Indo-European expanded their domain and its influence from a small area located somewhere north of the Black Sea to Europe and parts of Asia. Since the so-called Indo-European way of speaking that was very wide-spread, were derived the more remote but still widely spoken German, Slavic, Latin, Greek, Celtic, Persian, Sanskrit and Hindi. Linguists tend to recognize some 20 language groups which spread across very large areas, from which came the majority of today's languages through the formation of separate branches.

While a few of all these languages tended to become languages for large-scale communication, writing allowed the other languages of a more reduced scope to also be able to

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survive at the local level. Then a new dual model developed which in a certain sense has lasted until today, despite attempts by sovereign nation-states to impose a single language. In this model, which in today's increasingly globalized world has the greatest effect, many people use a local language, which can survive if it is a written language, and also some major lingua franca for communicating in the larger marketplace or in areas of exchange and communication.

Latin is the best example to study. In the Roman Empire, the Latin language spread throughout an area in which up to one hundred local languages may have been spoken. Beginning in the year 500, the many different ways of speaking Latin in different parts of the old empire became differentiated. A multitude of local dialects eventually became written languages, including Castilian, Catalonian, Corsican, French, Moldovan, Occitan, Piedmontese, Portuguese, Provençal, Rhaeto-Romansh, Romanian, Sardinian and Tuscan-Italian. For several centuries a dual language system remained stable: Latin was the "lingua franca" for international contacts, science and higher education, while a series of pre-Hispanic local languages derived from Latin prevailed in everyday life and in communications and trade within small areas. Similar to the evolution of Latin, the Germanic language, as well as the Slavic and other widely-spoken languages, eventually gave way to a high number of languages.

Currently somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 languages cann be identified throughout the world. Specifically, the latest edition of Ethnologue, the most widely used source of information on these issues, lists and describes 6912 languages. It is predicted that about a thousand languages will probably disappear in a couple of generations, and about three thousand or so are in danger, but all these are unwritten languages. In fact, only about 300 languages have vocabularies and rules capable of producing standardized spelling dictionaries online.

10. The advantages of different types of languages
To understand the evolution of languages, the disappearance of some and the more or less widespread use of others, and the chances of a language becoming widely used in the future, it must be borne in mind that a language is both a mode of expression and a tool for communication. On the one hand, all

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languages have the same expressive power, which permits the argument that everything can be translated into any language. Thus, the diversity of local languages linked to a variety of cultures related to different modes of expression in the world is an accumulated heritage of mankind that must be sustained and preserved.

However, different languages have different worth for communication, which means that there are languages with many more advantages than others for survival, and even more for becoming a lingua franca or common language in the world. At first glance, one could assume that the communicative value of a language depends on the number of its speakers. Currently, more than half the world's population speaks one of the following eleven major languages, here listed in descending order of the number of respective speakers: Chinese, English, Spanish, Hindi, Arabic, Bengali, Russian, Portuguese, Japanese, German and French. However, it is doubtful that Chinese, for example, would have greater communicative ability than English, or that Portuguese would be more useful than French for global communication.

Among these great languages with many speakers, the number of them is not decisive. The advantages and disadvantages of one or another depend, first of all, on their adaptation to the communication functions for discourse and the exchange of technical, scientific, commercial and legal information. This adaptation can be measured by the availability of different tools: general and specialized dictionaries, computer programs for writing, software for automatic translation, databases and knowledge systems, and the adjustment of computer language to human language. This last requirement is very difficult, for example for written Chinese which lacks an alphabet, using thousands of different graphic signs, and is not even correlative to spoken Chinese.

Secondly, the spread of languages also depends on the cost of learning. This means certain types of language have many more advantages than others for being adopted by many people and becoming widely used languages.

The classification and typology of languages have given rise to various scientific alternatives. One of the most fruitful was in the nineteenth century, that of the German linguist August Schleicher, who adopted evolutionary theories to the study of languages. Schleicher attempted to establish some guidelines, such as the regularity of phonetic mutations and the

tendency of irregular forms to become regular by analogy, to explain the evolution of language and the predominance of one or another. More than classification of "families" or "groups" of languages according to their respective origins or their relative proximity, it is the morphological structure of language that can give us clues about its usefulness and communicative usefulness and value, and ultimately, their dissemination in the past and likely future expansion. Morphology studies the internal structure of words, which largely explains the formation of new words, and thus the evolution of a language. According to the first classification of Schleicher, there are two broad categories of languages that can be distinguished: analytical and synthetic.

In "analytical" or "insulating" languages, most words have a single morpheme (basically equal to one syllable). The relationships between words in a sentence are expressed by other simple words, without additives, compounds or derivatives. For example, the plural is not formed by adding an s, but rather by another word (like 'many' or 'some'), the masculine and feminine forms are not made through a change of ending (such as 'o' o 'a'), but with another word added, and so on. Chinese is the most analytical language, and the biggest within this category. English has evolved throughout modern times to become a rather analytic language.

In synthetic languages, however, words are formed by the addition of morphemes. Some of these languages, called "binders", just stick some morphemes to other morphemes. Among these are languages from different "families" such as Japanese, Turkish, Basque, Quechua and Swahili. By contrast, in "inflected" or "fusional" languages, there are mergers of morphemes which result in different forms. The best examples are the Latin declensions and the endings of the tenses and persons of verbs in the current Romance or Latin languages.

The American linguist George K. Zipf established in the mid-twentieth century, the "principle of least effort" as a key to making individual adoption and eventual collective spread of languages. According to this principle, languages that require less effort to learn and use are the ones that have few words and are used very often (and those with many words are used infrequently). The most frequently used words are usually short words (with a small number of letters), which also explains the tendency toward abbreviation. From this point of

view, analytic languages may have an advantage. The risk is that frequent use of a few short words brings a great polysemy among them. However, this can be avoided by internal permutations of the letters in a word, as well as by the addition and the merger of morphemes and the formation of derivative words and characteristic compounds of inflected languages.

In fact, no language corresponds solely to one of the types mentioned above, but all are both analytic and synthetic to one degree or another. English, in particular, while having evolved in modern times into a more analytical language than in the Middle Ages, with a predominance of short words, has also adapted with considerable flexibility to "inflected" variants such as the conversion of nouns to verbs and vice versa.

11. Towards a universal language

Overall, the languages that are better adapted to communication and which imply lower costs of learning are more likely to be widely disseminated. The spread of languages is in fact a result of military and colonial conquest and political impositions of countries. But it is also a result of trade, of the use of mass media and human beings' capacity for intellectual enrichment, all of which give an advantage to the most efficient languages for communication.

The invention of a "lingua franca" had already taken place in the late Middle Ages being used by the merchants and crusaders who travelled to the eastern Mediterranean and used a mixture of Italian and Provencal and odds and ends borrowed from other languages to try to be understood by the inhabitants of the Near East. Also, for several centuries the rulers and merchants of the various countries of Europe were able to be understood through the use of adaptive variants of their own languages. European languages evolved according to the communication needs of modern society through a long-lasting processes of differentiation and standardization.

The action of the great modern nation states to establish and enforce their official languages, on the one hand corresponded to the delimitation of relatively large specific areas of trade and human relations, but on the other, it also brought losses of communication with respect to the former medieval universalism. By setting standards and standardizations that rigidly differentiate each of the nation-

states' languages, communicating over large areas became more difficult. People who lived near one another, but who were located on different sides of the state's borders, became less and less able to understand each other. But this created a movement in the opposite direction. Just when Latin was declining as the language of general communication because it was replaced by the various languages of Latin origin, increasingly separated from the latter by the standardization promoted by the states, the search for new universal languages was generated.

The belief that there is a common underlying grammatical structure in all languages or a "universal grammar" led in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the creation of artificial languages like Esperanto and Interlingua. In some regions of the world fusions of languages have been adopted that come up as neutral tools of communication between peoples speaking different languages. Thus in China, relatively simplified Mandarin has been functioning as a standard on a continuum of dialects since the mid-twentieth century. In India, Hindi allows the communication between many people who speak one of the more than twelve officially recognized languages, and another thirty that more than a million speakers each. In Indonesia, the former colonial language, that is, Dutch, was replaced not by one of the most widely spoken languages such as Javanese, or Sudanese, but by Bahasa Indonesian, adapted from Malay, which is more neutral because it is the first language of only a small minority. Similarly, in Africa, the neutral languages of the ancient settlers, especially English and French, are official in many countries and are widely used, while Kiswahili is also widespread in central and western Africa among the inhabitants of hundreds of small villages with their own local languages. Creole languages in the Caribbean and other parts of the Americas emerged with a similar function, although in smaller areas.

In today's world, the global scope of human relations requires a single world language. The English language is certainly the most successful transnational one. The spread of the English language derived largely from the military and political victories of two successive English-speaking empires, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America. Conquests and journeys across the seas imposed

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English as the main language in North America and Australia. Afterwards, this was accompanied by the spread of new technological media throughout the world. But the widespread use of English as an acquired language has made it a non-ethnic tongue detached from any culture, and this allows many of those who speak and use it to do so freely without identifying it with any country in particular. For those who speak English as an acquired language, it works in much the same way as Latin did when for quite a few centuries it was a lingua franca for the educated community.

English has become the global lingua franca in science, technology, medicine, higher education, academic publications and meetings, as well as in diplomacy, business, trade and international finance. English is also the language of airports, sports, pop music and advertising.

In addition to being the mother tongue of more than 400 million people, English is official or semi-official in over sixty countries and occupies a prominent place in another twenty countries. Specifically, in Europe, English may appear to many as a more "neutral" language than French or German. Thus, English is spoken regularly by most of the adult population in the Scandinavian countries and Holland, but certainly not at the expense of Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Finnish or Dutch, which remain as vigorous local languages. English may develop a similar attraction in other parts of the world.   In Latin America, it doesn't even have rivals for educated individuals. In total, people able to speak English, either as their first language or as an acquired language must be a quarter of the world's population.

Currently, most humans share a dual language system that consists of a small local language and a great "lingua franca". Only a minority of people in the world today can live speaking only one language. After many centuries of linguistic evolution, the path is marked out to indicate the widespread adoption of a global language.

12. Education
The evolution towards a world in which human relationships are based on empirical knowledge and rationality, with a common language of communication, requires a collective project of teaching and education. Education is the transmission of knowledge, which is the result of accumulated progress by the human race through its biological and cultural evolution. In

particular, the learning of languages, that is to say, both of local languages as well as the global language, should be a core element in the teaching of children right from an early age at which their assimilation capacity is enormous. Education also includes the development of both the physical and mental capacity of each individual as well as the formation of moral attitudes of people living together as a society.

13. Education and training

The main actors in education are the family and school. Each has its specific role to promote the development of thoughts and feelings that make up the human soul. But the two must work together to act in the same direction in the formation and training of responsible and active citizens.

Historically, the main obstacle to the advancement of unrestricted knowledge and education related to science has been the church. Supported by dogmatic belief, as opposed to rationality and empiricism, the Christian church and especially the Catholic, tried for a long time to exercise a monopoly on education, even above the family. However, there are clear signs of a shift in this tendency in today's world.

At the present time, teaching as a way of transmitting knowledge can greatly benefit from the new technologies available, especially computers, internet and other means of communication. Educational efficiency can be increased at all levels, from pre-school to university as well as vocational training. The standardization of knowledge can be carried out today on a worldwide basis. The best textbooks, websites and even master classes are already available in many countries largely through electronic means.

But the efficiency of education would be nothing if not accompanied by clear criteria in the formation of personality. In this respect, the example set by parents and teachers is essential. Education involves a transfer of values, including the cultivation of individual effort is the key to social success and even the effectiveness of simply imparting knowledge.

An important reference for structuring a new system of education is higher education in the United States. More than half of young Americans leave the parental home at around 18 years of age to study in a college or university. This rite of passage is lived very intensely by the whole family, because, among other things, it normally involves a large investment of

accumulated savings. The physical distance from parents is crucial for the autonomy and responsibility of young people who are accountable for their academic performance both to their teachers as well as to their parents. The coexistence of young people in a well-regulated setting for study, requiring sustained effort and discipline, without a doubt conditions their attitudes for much of their adult life.

14. Educational reform in Europe

Unlike the U.S., in many European countries the majority of young people have tended to study near the parental home, in public universities funded by taxes and with low registration fees, in an atmosphere of greater tolerance and permissiveness. Many young people do not begin to live on her own until about thirty years of age. This has undoubtedly had negative consequences for the formation of moral and social attitudes of many individuals and their coming of age.

In this day and age, the so-called "Bologna Plan" has begun to introduce significant reforms in higher education and continuing education at the European level. This plan was born of a declaration of the Ministers of Education of the member states of the European Union in 1999. The main objective is the formation of a European Higher Education Area by 2010. Specifically, the plan seeks a renewal of the contents of educational programs in accordance with the new demands of economic and social changes in the world. Thus, accreditation of degrees and qualifications has required standardization of study structures, similar to the American scheme. There also is a tendency to the elimination of the division between professional and academic studies, inherited from the German model.

The restructuring of programs and curricula is turning out to be a good opportunity for making major changes in educational methods that give priority to the individual and team work of students, their active participation in small seminars and meeting schedules for carrying out periodical tasks and the output of knowledge. In the interests of applied science, cooperative agreements are established between traditional universities and the most recent polytechnical institutions. Partnerships between universities also appear in order to offer joint degrees.

Ultimately, the goal of the Bologna Plan and the reforms that each country effects is to facilitate the mobility of

professionals across the European Union thanks to standardized basic training. One important consequence of this operation is already taking place with the mobility of teachers and students. For teachers, the regular exchange with colleagues from other countries with different traditions is the key to becoming part of the global scientific community and improving the quality of teaching and research. Among European students it has become increasingly common to regard as a fundamental element of their professional training, almost a duty, to spend about a year in a study center in another country. This experience is essential not only for raising academic and professional achievement, but also for progress in the moral formation of European citizens towards having common values, the learning of other languages, especially English as the language of teaching, and the encouragement of a cosmopolitan spirit.

Raising the levels of quality and high standards of education entail certain costs. But the general availability of grants and loans means this factor should not make equality of opportunity incompatible. The interim results, although still partial, of the recent European experience, clearly point in the direction of a stronger link between education, research and work activity. The most important thing that has come from this experience is that the current reforms have introduced a dynamic of change that portends continued innovation toward ulterior goals. The structuring of a European system of higher education, as the prior existence of an American and international system, are advances in the direction of the formation of active citizens in a global environment.

15. The training and selection of leaders

The current shortcomings and perverse deviations of education that have been dragged along for an extended time, not only have a negative impact on professional skills and attitudes, but upon the moral behaviour of most people as well. Social harm is a result, above all else, of the poor training of public leaders.

In previous centuries, the typical method of leadership selection was the rise to power of the military victor in war, who used to be invested with some magical or religious power. In modern times, the selection of leaders in democratic regimes is based on the vote. The emperors and popes of the

past have been replaced by presidents and prime ministers; the leaders, bishops, prophets, shamans and sorcerers have been replaced by ministers, MPs and leaders of political parties. The current mechanisms for selecting leaders are different from those of the past. However, electoral democracy does not guarantee that political leaders will have the education and training appropriate to the challenges of today's world.

In most countries with democratic regimes, parties dominate the political process. But the parties today have very low membership, composed almost entirely of professional politicians and people who practice or aspire to public office in the institutions. In many countries political parties are structured in a very centralized and rigid way, with a chain of command from top to bottom. Political parties are therefore very much minority groups and quite closed with respect to society. But at the same time, the parties have interventionist tendencies and ambitions of expansion in their fields of activity. They not only control the parliaments and governments, but also aspire to handling the justice system, media and social and cultural organizations.

The result is that in each country or political community, a handful of people at the head of political parties can develop enormous power over the collective affairs of the state, although officially the decision-making processes pass through a network of relatively complex institutions. The problem is magnified because the selection of party leaders often produces an adverse selection. People who aspire to public office are not necessarily the best prepared professionally, nor have they necessarily greater vision of the social challenges in today's world. The individual decision to start a political career or try to stay in public office depends largely on the cost of opportunity. Thus, the most capable professionals, entrepreneurs and intellectuals are only willing to give up their career opportunities and engage in politics if they encounter very favorable conditions with high expectations to influence collective decisions. In general, political professionals tend to be people with few career options and inadequate education and training for the tasks they face.

The inadequacy of the leaders to the challenges of today's world raises a big question about the validity of systems and education projects now in progress. In a project for a future system of education, studies of economics, politics and ethics for future leaders should be checked even more than

scientific, technical and professional studies aimed at the majority of the population. Knowledge of English should be required for access to high public office. A new education system with global ambitions must culminate in the establishment of schools and leadership programs capable of passing on knowledge, developing intellectual skills and forming moral attitudes of rationality and cosmopolitanism that correspond to the current stage of the evolution of humanity.

16. Civilization
Civilization is the capacity for peaceful intercommunication and coexistence among humans. The civilized arena is a result of both biological and cultural evolution and of the development of human consciousness. Just as biological evolution has not been the result of a preconceived project, but of the combining of chromosomes, civilization has not been the result of a previous plan, but rather has derived from the self-learning by humans and the resulting accumulation of knowledge. To achieve universal peaceful coexistence, there must be a conscious human effort, that is, above all, an education project.

17. The evolution of multiple civilizations
Human evolution has produced a variety of cultures and civilizations, some of which were defeated or overcome, and others that coexist today. As in plant and animal species, human civilizations suffer the process of natural selection. The most important factors in this selection depend largely on the geographical location of each human group on the planet. This includes its proximity to the sun, the elevation above sea level, the continental nature or access to inland seas or oceans, the climatic condition caused by air and sea currents, and the availability of natural resources (including energy sources).

The first great civilizations flourished in the valleys of large rivers: the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris and Euphrates in the Middle East, and the Yellow and Blue rivers in the Far East. The subsequent processes of exogamy or mixed marriage included contagion and imitation, military conquest and migration, particularly from regions that were soon populated towards the north of Europe and the Mediterranean.

European civilization spread to the rest of the world through colonization, from the beginning of the mid-first

millennium AD, when it had reached a relatively high level of human development and self-awareness. In the Americas, Europe's most robust and well-equipped people were succumbing to the natives, as later occurred although to a lesser extent in Africa and parts of Asia. But, overall, colonization was a missed opportunity for the culmination of human civilization worldwide. The colonists ignored the equality of the human genome and often acted as rulers by force rather than as transmitters of rationality.

The work of dissemination of European civilization would have been much more positive and conclusive if the monarchs of the day had had greater knowledge of human nature and if the leaders of the churches, especially Catholic, had been faithful to the basis of Christianity. The pope, for example, could have conditioned the granting of colonization in the newly discovered lands to the respectful treatment of indigenous peoples. But ignorance prevailed. Subsequent scientific and technological advances have created new opportunities for completing the process of civilization worldwide. But they have also created tools for the possible destruction of mankind and all living things.

18. A world federation

Current political and government systems do not allow us to expect them to come up with any proposal or ambitious plan for the future for a global federation. Current systems are based on the destruction of some peoples, the conversion of others into groups without recognized rights of existence and independence, the reduction of some satellite peoples of the dominant group in a nation-state and the nostalgia for imperial ambitions of states.

Many of the changes in education, culture and institutions necessary for the advancement of civilization are blocked or hindered by the incompetence and professional incompetence of politicians and rulers, as well as the continuity of many religions and churches, whose mutual rivalry allows them to survive as blocks and thus avoid total rejection, and by misguided selfishness and resistance to change in established interests within existing institutions.

To move towards the Kantian project of a universal society in perpetual peace, which in essence is very apropos at this point in time, involves adopting transitional rules of behaviour in international relations very different from those

which governed the imperial conquests and foreign politics of countries over the past four centuries. The most important points can be summarized as: no independent state, large or small, may be acquired or occupied by another; no state should intervene by force in the constitution and the government of another; standing armies should be eliminated; no state should borrow to finance foreign operations; in case of conflict, diplomacy should prevail.

Through a process of education of leaders and peoples, and of institutional reforms along the lines outlined here, a political organization of the peoples of the world based on the principles of freedom and equality of all human beings in the eyes of the law should be achieved; respect for small nations and the formation of a federation of free nations; a global representative government and the right of world citizenship, which implies global hospitality, including the right to immigrate and settle in another country through bilateral agreements between nations.

Achieving the goal of peaceful world coexistence can only be the result of a conscious project devised by humans. There is no destiny. There is no force greater than that of humans. Nowhere is it written that we can avoid an end of human civilization caused by that very civilization. But current scientific and technological advances also allow for educated rationalization.

To build a global society, we must first eliminate the stubborn error that refuses to disappear: the classification of humans into different categories according to the degree of access to European civilization that they have acquired to date. To repair the imperial and nationalist disaster, we need a realignment of ethnic and other human groups with their cultures of their own that allow the recovery of their identities. The linguistic, cultural and ethnic labyrinths of the modern world can find a way out through a project of human coexistence based on rationality and supported by scientific and technological advances. Teaching and education, the instruments of culture, should be the basis for the peaceful coexistence of humans that we call civilization.

19. The ethnic labyrinths
The complex ethnic labyrinth of the world today is the result of linguistic, cultural, educational and civilizing evolution of

mankind we have reviewed in this chapter. According to the classification presented below, in today's world we can distinguish several hundred peoples with their own respective cultures, the vast majority of which have not been recognized as having rights, nor do they enjoy their own institutions which should be the pillar and foundation of a universal federation of free peoples.

The native peoples of Europe had a very slow evolution of civilization, but they developed a strong civilizing foundation by mixing with the most evolved immigrants from the shores of the Black Sea and Central Asia. Ten millennia of important changes made Europeans the leaders of humanity. However, in the process of building large sovereign nation-states in the modern era, destructive policies of linguistic and cultural assimilation were applied which were successful in different countries to a greater or lesser extent.

Virtually no European state today is internally homogenous in the ethno-linguistic aspect. In fact, there are more than forty stateless peoples on the continent. In particular, the Bavarians, the Catalonians, Corsicans, Scots, Flemish, Piedmontese, Sicilian and Basques among others, have expressed their desire to maintain a cultural identity and the self-government they deserve.

At the same time, the European nation-states engaged in frequent, ever more deadly wars, in part caused by their colonial expansion and the subsequent rivalry between them. Europe has only reached a more stable situation of peace and prosperity since after World War II, construction was begun of a federation that should be and is not, in the style of the United States. This formula would allow for a wide junction and at the same time, wide recognition of territorial diversity. If instead of this project the centrality of states predominates, the result could be an even greater break-up than seen in the past.

About five centuries of European settlement with a religious background have led to the supplanting of government of native Americam peoples, Africa and parts of Asia by individuals of white European origin. The burden of colonization in America includes several million non-integrated people, resentful and even hostile (see table pag. 222-223). They are considered indigenous inhabitants, although of uncertain provenance. There is indeed a very controversial issue that has never been clarified about the origin of the

original inhabitants of the Americas. In North America there are a variety of pre-Columbian peoples, whose marked differences compared to the inhabitants of the Tierra del Fuego (at the southern tip of the continent), as well as the Arctic Inuit could be explained if their origin could be situated in a very remote period, before the last glacial period of the Quaternary, so that differences in climate would have produced a notable diversity over a long period of time. Conversely, other hypotheses contend that Asian immigrants arrived in several parts of America, both by the Bering Strait and by sea to the south of the continent, the most recent period being only 14 to 30 thousand years ago.

The most powerful ancient civilizations in the Americas were the Aztecs in the heart of modern Mexico, the Mayans in Central America and the Incas in South America, the first of which, especially, was much more evolved than that of the indigenous inhabitants of North America during the period of conquest by Europeans. These differences in the degree of evolution of civilization of the various indigenous peoples led to a clash of civilizations with the Spanish conquistadors, manifested in the lack of communication and major confrontation. In fact, large sections of the indigenous population in Hispanic America were never incorporated into the new political communities. To date, a majority or a very large portion of the population in the current states of Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and parts of Mexico can not communicate beyond their small communities because they only speak local languages. These include the Nahuatl, Zapotec, Maya and Quinchés in Mexico and Central America, and the Aymara, Quechua and Arawaks in the southern part of the continent. Even when indigenous groups generate social movements or even political parties, they tend to operate outside the established rules. In general, segregation and discrimination, exclusion, rebellion and racial conflict have remained enduring features on the continent.

By contrast, the less evolved level of indigenous people in the rest of North America, as well as their small number and high territorial dispersion, facilitated genocide by the English settlers and the imposition of a European lifestyle having to face less effective resistance. However, ethnic conflicts came to an extreme degree of conflict in the United States from the beginning of forced importation of the African population and

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extensive organization of agricultural and domestic work dependant on slavery. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the politicization of the issue of slavery generated one of the bloodiest civil wars in history. This was rather paradoxical, since, at the outbreak of the American Civil War, it had been more than fifty years since the British Empire had abolished slavery in the rest of their dependencies, usually by peaceful means.

Only Canada in the north and Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean came late enough to independence from Britain and Spain respectively, to avoid having to deal with this issue via recently improvised institutions not yet well established. Also, relatively high levels were reached of peaceful coexistence and intermarriage in Brazil with the Portuguese influence, since it is a country of great dimensions which tolerates internal diversity better that some of the smaller countries with mixed populations in which separation between groups is the norm.

Ethnic diversity has different forms in Asia. It is often said that China has a high level of ethnic homogeneity based on the "Han" compensated only by residents of the Arctic, Mongols and Manchus. However, the conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang, among others, seem to suggest that diversity is greater than officially recognized and that, as in the communist Soviet Union, ethnic conflicts, though seemingly muted and remaining only latent, could turn into a larger force of disintegration.

Resident populations of other countries around the Pacific and Indian Oceans have developed outstanding processes in their evolution. But there is in them a high ethnic and cultural fragmentation. In India, four hundred languages are spoken, with twelve alphabets, many of which are not officially recognized. In the Middle East and North Africa, where the Islamic religion predominates, up to a thousand distinct peoples can be identified. Fragmentation is extreme in sub-Saharan Africa. The ethnic diversity of the various parts of the world can be seen in detail in the tables included at the
 end of this chapter.

20. Current world challenges
The resistance to colonialism and the recent advances in Japan, Australia, China and Southeast Asia, have put Europe in a secondary position in the current configuration of the powers that be in the world. This poses some dangers for the future

advancement of civilization. If international economic changes were unfavorable to the development of China and a sufficiently democratic regime were not established, the great Asian power could feel the neo-colonial temptation to try to lead the Third World. If the European Union is unable to assert itself as a power with a single voice, and if the divorce between Europe and the United States which became more accentuated at the beginning of the current century were to persist, Africa could fall under a strong Chinese influence, while Russia and Japan would achieve the greatest global influence. This perspective is the furthest from the possibility of a world federation after Kant's model.

Several million years of evolution have not overcome the linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity of humanity. The great empires and nation-states seek to maintain their territorial limits, regardless of the possibly dubious nature of the historical context that created them and the arbitrary basis that remains for its current boundaries; maintain the domination of groups within the territories, which in many cases are also divided between two or more states; with the approval of international bodies and churches, violent repression is applied to contain so-called separatists. Many of those dispossessed of their collective identity, and also a large part of their personal identity, do not actively stand up to defend their recovery. But there would be few opponents to any territorial reorganization that were respectful of the variety of languages, cultures and ethnicity of today's world. The peaceful integration of indigenous peoples of the world (see box on following pages), throughout the world, as in those of America, requires a correction of conduct in the Second World. Regarding an evolutionary state, it must be established that this has not been cultivated by the colonizers and their descendants. This rectification would not be impossible if their will were moved via economic incentives. More difficult is to move the will of the colonizing states to change their attitudes towards ethnic and cultural minorities of the peoples conquered in wars of domination that were considered legitimate in the past.

Respect for multicultural states with the aim of avoiding conflicts of interests and hurt feelings, must be overcome. Only through the brotherhood of species can this be attained. In this light, a question to consider through education, is a slow

but steady process. The complexity of the parallel coexistence of peoples of various backgrounds anywhere in the world, as has taken place in North America, may become possible.

The construction of a system of coexistence based on the acceptance of differences among individuals and groups requires financial means and knowledge. The change in conservative mentalities is a priority for making other changes viable. But the rulers, even those who may have sufficient knowledge to understand the key to this labyrinth, lack will-power. A large part of the educated population of the First and Second worlds, has fallen into laziness and king-making. The massive mobilization of citizens would be very difficult and would entail the risk of generating violence. The media could play a big role, but have become allies of the ruling class.

Editorial Note

Biblioteca Divulgare

The problems of overpopulation in poor countries and the low levels of education in the Third World contrast significantly with the stagnation of the population in the developed and better educated countries. The cultural differences between the different parts of the world beome more noticeble with the emigration of the more hard-working and sharp individuals of the poor countries to the rich ones, which also generates social and cultural conflicts in the receiving countries. World overpopulation implies a problematic shortage of resources, including the lack of fertile land and water, together with the incontrolled pollution of the atmosphere and climate change.

The world's population problems cannot be solved simply by orally promoting procreation in the developed countries and restraint in the underdeveloped countries. Religions have refused to plan human birth rate. This seems logical, since they all appeared during times when the world had few inhabitants. But holding on to these anachronistic dogmas has provoked the decline of religion. This is not an irrelevant issue. Religious doctrine has an impact on the birth rate of the poor and uncultured world, filling it with unfortunate beings who are unable to reach the average levels of wealth and culture of global human society, and crating a threat for the welfare of the more developed countries. To confront the fatalistic religious dogmas is now even more urgent than it was during Malthus' lifetime. The biblical "be fruitful and multiply" guideline was proclaimed at a time when there was no demographical knowledge, which was later established by Malthus, an anglican pastor who was an example of a thinking priest.

New public policies with more direct incentives are much needed, as the so called "pro-marriage tax", which can be understood as a pro-children tax, and reducing the taxes and grants to families with children in rich countries that have a low birth rate. And also with fiscal measures and grants in the opposite direction in the countries which have overpopulation.

It is unacceptable that in our time which has very important global problems, that can only be faced with

decisive global action, something as irrational as religion continues to play a role in education and demography. Defensive measures must be taken, for offensive ones would only aggravate their resistence.

Outstandingly intelligent people have pertained to churches. Some of them were typical of the cultural state of the world in which they lived. Othersm strangely enough were forerunners of knowledge which was acquired much later. Their greatest shortcoming has been created by an excess of dogmatic arrogance which being born from Abraham's imagination, has deprived them from corrections as the ones that constantly occur in the fields of science and rationality.

The consequences of assuming infallibilities destroy faith. The worst part of it is that besides being applied as an invitation to reject thinking, they have determined —and still do— the cultural evolution and the demography of an important part of mankind.

SUGGESTION (3)

The First World is obliged to alleviate the terrible consequences of cultural intervention and demography, which churches uselessly try to utilize in order to extend their power beyond what is reasonable. Birthrate must be promoted wherever it is waning, and it must be decreased wherever it is excessive, fiscally taxing voluntary sterility in the First and Second Worlds and, simultaneously, subsidizing it in the rest of the world, where the most lethal and dangerous bomb for mankind is being manufactured.

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The political class

Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella
(Il Corriere della Sera)

1. European degradation

The issue of political malfunction, its high costs, and of the gradual falling of quality as the ruling class, has been the subject of discussion in areas of the European Union. Recently, during the summer of 2007, the Commission acknowledged that throughout the continent, the relationship between institutions and citizens-voters was going through a very critical phase. However, any working hypothesis that has reached Brussels comes up against the principle that European treaties do not allow interference in matters which concern the sovereignty of individual member states.

Much less, therefore, in the rules relating to the remuneration of elected officials and other aspects, for example incompatibilities, penalties and immunities. All different from one country to the next, similar to their respective electoral systems. This continental disorder in the fundamental rules has also been reflected in the activity of the European Parliament, where only recently, at a distance of more than 30 years since its founding, has it been established that the compensation for the representatives elected by the people must be the same for all and not, as was the case until the 2009 elections, with parameters for each one regarding the expected wages of national parliamentarians. A principle based on good sense. But it is indigestible for those who acted otherwise. You can read the reaction of a "professional" of pure politics, namely the MEP Clemente Mastella, accustomed for decades to staying afloat by moving from right to left and from left to right without the least moral conscience. With his new first envelope of wages in Strasbourg he said screaming: "Two hundred and ninety euros a day in wages! What cheapskates! ".

Before moralizing rules were introduced, the continental parliament was for a long time a faithful mirror of the political distortions of European policy. The first scandal came about in

1981 when the Court of European accounts commissioned a survey of an alleged embezzlement of about 90,000 ECU (European Currency Unit). The newspapers carried the news that two deputies and two officers had been accused of having inflated claims for reimbursement. According to the information sources the former head of the British Conservative Party, Sir James Scott Hopkins, was also called in, although of course he publicly denied any sort of debt. The president of the assembly, Piet Dankert, defended tooth and nail the behaviour of the parliamentarians, although he could not deny that some of them had to return some "unjustified" advances they had received over the course of the year. On that occasion Dankert announced a tightening of the screws regarding the rules related to refunds and compensation in order to restore transparency to the use of funds which each Euro parliamentarian is entitled to compensate their own employees. Some funds which often, had already been denounced by parliamentary assistants, and which were used for "other purposes".

Some years ago many people were upset about the charge that the presence in the hall of some parliamentarians had been certified via forged signatures on the records, with the objective of collecting the 262 euros a day (at that time) even on days they were not in attendance. In 2004 the German weekly Stern also revealed that many members in Strasbourg had named their wives and children as assistants with stipends exceeding 10,000 euros per month. The survey included the names of parliament members Robert Atkins and Neil MacCormick; a widespread practice even at the highest institutional levels.

Nepotism has always been a factor more or less present in European politics. A bad habit that few have tried to uproot. What's more, important leaders of large countries with long democratic tradition have fallen into this vice as well. Typical is the case of Jean Sarkozy, 23 yeas old, son of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the father's candidate to the presidency of EPAD, the public body that manages the Paris suburb of La Défense offices, central Europe's largest directional facility. Obviously, for the young son of the president, this is a springboard with a view to the future for launching prestigious commissions. After the fierce controversies after the fact, with intense confrontation between the press and the Elysee, Jean Sarkozy withdrew his

own candidacy but was named all the same to the administration board of the Ente. This was a decision by the president of the French republic that was the first real setback of his mandate with regard to public opinion. The issue came even more to the forefront since it matured after a revolt by militants of the same party who had denounced Sarkozy's nepotism via social networks and in blogs.

But the unpleasant practices of French politics are not limited to cases more often than not of nepotism. Recently the newspaper Le Monde revealed that over 87% of Members accumulate in the mandate of the Parisian National Assembly at least one other position, such as mayor or president of a union of municipalities.

At the top of the rankings published by the French newspaper there are three MPs who are currently are mayors of major cities: Pierre Cohen (Toulouse), Jean Marc Ayrault (Nantes) and Maryse Joassains-Masini (Aix en Provence).

Some episodes have certainly contributed to a decrease in citizens' confidence in politics. In the 2007 legislative elections in France the highest rate ever of abstention during the Fifth Republic was registered

Voter turnout is gradually decreasing in most of Europe. The report "Generating a 2008 Managerial Class" of the University of Italian Confindustria Luisa contains a detailed account about the skills of the citizens of some European countries with regard to politics. The percentage of those who claim to express "great interest" is on par in Italy to 20.6%, but this value drops to 16.4% in Germany to 14.9% in Sweden, to 12.6% in France , to 11.7% in Great Britain, falling in Poland to 6.5% to 5.8% in Spain and 5.3% in Portugal. In Spain, the percentage of those who in 2006 expressed "little" or "no" interest in politics was 73.9%, on a par with 71.2% in Britain, France 54.5%, 46.3% in Germany and 44.7% in Italy. Very disappointing statistics which are found in several European countries, even including trials concerning citizens and involving various institutions. The same report, built on Eurobarometer data, indicated that in 2007 barely 14% of British citizens trusted the national parliament, against 44% of French citizens, 51% of Germans, 39% of Italians and 52% of the Spaniards.

This data should come as no surprise, considering the repetitive scandals that cast long shadows upon many

institutions, even in countries with a long democratic tradition. Many controversies have arisen in the United Kingdom with the announcement that in 2009 the House of Commons had only worked 128 days out of 365, a poor record that never came about in the post-war period, but only in election years. Strong polemics resulted in light of the fact that in 2008 the English Parliament had already had a long holiday over the summer (76 days) and this was while an incredible increase of 2.3% of allowances for Members was being decided and the above-mentioned resounding scandal of the receipts was emerging.

A scandal that has spared neither the Conservatives nor Labour, and prompted Gordon Brown to ask the nation's forgiveness on behalf of all parliamentarians, and propose a very strict code of behaviour. To tone down the offensive of the British national party, the walls of Great Britain were plastered with posters bearing the image of two pigs identified as David Cameron for the Tories, and Brown for the Labour party, with the slogan "Punish the pigs".

It is true that the scandal of the inflated receipts has forced the resignation of House Speaker Michael Martin. But it is even true that no egregious situations were not pointed out with the tradition and reputation of the United Kingdom. One needs only to think of the resistance, in which case the real rejection, where parliamentarians have opposed the requests of Sir Thomas Legg, invested with the responsibility of clarifying the issue of the receipts of the people's representatives elected to the House of Commons in order for the sums to be returned.

With the demonstration of the fact that "every world is a people", German parliamentary representatives years ago had to give up increases in their wages already negotiated but which had triggered strong criticism from both within the CDU and the SPD, the two parties that had given life to the Grosse Koalition of Angela Merkel. As a result, the ministers were also forced to accept that the increase in salary was blocked, fixed at 6% every two years. "We need more time for this measure to be accepted by public opinion," wrote Peter Struck, group leader of the social democratic party in a letter to its 222 parliamentarians.

A statement that says a great deal about the difficulties that even a country like Germany can have, where the parties have to face the electorate with regard to increasing resistance to the ruling class itself. Even the story of Luisa Confindustria

revealed how the number of German citizens who claim to be "a lot" or "somewhat" interested in politics has declined from 2002 to 2006 by more than 9.6%. Is this not a troubling sign for Europeans?

2. The non-Italian government

"Governing the Italians is not a mission impossible. It is simply useless." The first person to say these words, according to some historians, was the liberal Giovanni Giolitti, chairman of the board four times in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is true that Benito Musssolini took them as his own in 1932 in answer to questions from a famous German journalist Emil Ludwig, who published for Mondadori a long interview with the head of fascism. Eighty years later, it can be said that Italy may be considered the least governed country of Europe. Provided we take "governed" to mean being managed according to a patriotic, selfless and unified plan for the nation, and not primarily motivated by the interests of one single party. Or if only because of the growing closeness of the election. If "governing Italians is useless", it is because Italian politicians often find no "use" in governing in a serious manner. Because that would mean taking on some responsibility, defying public opinion if necessary, risking the loss of a percentage point in the polls...

Make no mistake, the country has had some excellent periods dominated by men with high moral standards and who were devoted to the common good. If not, there would be no explaining how it was able to leave behind many centuries of foreign rule, of harm to various small states often at war among themselves, living in indescribable misery such as that described by Charles Dickens in his reports in the "Daily Mirror" of 1844, concentrated later on in "Visions of Italy" and evolving into the second post-war period after a very complex unification followed by the Risorgimento (contemplate for a moment just the difficulty of consolidating seven different currencies), and after the work of two decades of fascism and the global conflict, one of the major economic and industrial powers of the planet.

What are some examples? Quintino Stella, scientist, economist, liberal, justly praised as well by communist Antonio Gramsci for being a man of integrity, having been sworn in as Minister of Finance in 1862 sold the textile industry that

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belonged to his family because he did not want there to be even so much as the suspicion of a conflict of interests. Sydney Sonnino, who became minister of the treasury in 1893, sold off shares inherited from the father who made him the owner of the Monte Amiata and its mines. And a letter from 1954 from Biancarosa Fanfani to his sister, wife of the "strong man" of the Christian Democrats in the years following the Gasperi phase, deserves to be re-read: "Amintore is happy to have become President of the Council but I cried all night. He demands I sell my treasury bonds, so no one thinks that I could possibly have an interest in government policy with regard to savings." And the same is noteworthy with regard to Alcide De Gasperi, eight times the head of government in the early years of the Second World War. A Catholic man with principles so clear that in order to show the outside world his dignified respect for the impoverished Italians, in 1947 he went so far as to fly to America, suffering and covered with rubble that was the legacy of fascism and war, where he would meet with the highest U.S. authorities, wearing a coat his government colleague Atilio Piccioni had lent him.

The self-same republican Italy was born from the generous efforts of Catholics, communists, and laymen who, in the difficult months following the World War put aside ideological divisions and co-wrote the constitution in just 270 days, the fundamental law of the land even today among the most modern people on the continent. An episode that speaks volumes about the common devotion to the good of their country. At the last moment Giorgio La Pira, who later would become mayor of Florence and whose religious faith was inversely proportional to his thirst for to power, was tormented by one doubt: in the supreme law of the Republic, in the introduction, he had forgotten God! That same God who was in the Albertine Statute ("By the grace of God, King of Sardinia, Cyprus and Jerusalem, Duke of Savoy, Genoa, Monferrato, Aosta ...") and even in the Constitution of Mazzini of the Roman Republic in 1849. So, he requested that the prologue should read: "In the name of God, the Italian people are granted this Constitution." Oh no, replied the Communists: we've already voted the Concordato! The issue threatened to disrupt everything that had been done before, but no one wanted a standstill, as journalist and historian Mario Cervi explains: "Terracini the Communist urged La Pira to withdraw his proposal "with the same nobility of heart with which he had

felt compelled to put it forth", and Francesco Saverio Nitti took sides with Terracini. (...) Subject to friendly but insistent pressure, La Pira finally gave up with a shrug of the shoulders. He appeared discouraged by the lack of acceptance of a formula that seemed so necessary and obvious to him, and the left applauded his resignation, Nitti lumbered a few steps up from the floor to shake his hand, then Togliatti also approached him with a consoling air".

These are just a few examples. And we could cite some other virtuous cases, both from ancient times and more recent ones. And this above all else is the greatest mystery of Italy that always stirs the passions of historians who study the historic deal with what Johann Wolfgang Goethe lovingly called "the land where lemons bloom." The incredible mix of vices and virtues, genius and disorder, wealth and poverty, honesty and informality. A mixture which often has permitted Italy to grow "despite everything." Although the lack of interest with respect to the backwardness of the South, which can be summarized in the fact that the first Chairman of the Board to visit the deep South (Basilicata) was Giuseppe Zanardelli in 1902, almost half a century after the Unification. Despite a dynasty, that of the Savoia-Carignano, not exactly of the same level of other European houses. But the corruption that appeared after the Unification in 1868, with the scandal of the so-called "Regia Tabacchi", reveals the decision taken by the government to cede to a private corporation rights to the production and sale of snuff for twenty years in exchange for an advance to the Treasury of a sum of 180 million in gold, a disastrous decision accepted only thanks to the purchase of many parliamentary votes. Despite the continuing reversal of governments and alliances, which can be summarized in the indignant complaint of H. Bolton King and Thomas Okay in the book "The Italy of today" in 1901: "Since 1860 there have been 33 Ministers of Education, each one wishing to distinguish himself by reversing the work of his predecessor. Money has been damaged, and the state and municipalities, lavish with anything else, have economized in the most successful way when it comes to national investments."

In short, the whole history of Italy, like that of any other country, is made of light and shadow. Of periods of impetuous pushing (think of the 755 miles from the Autopista del Sol that crosses the peninsula from Milan to Naples, built in just eight

years and at a very low cost considering the enormous difficulties presented by a largely mountainous route) and of hangover. And it would be not only ungenerous but incorrect not to recognize who had the responsibility of government as has often been noted, even in the most miserable periods, some acts of pride and efficiency which have allowed the country to keep pace, despite everything, with the others. No less incorrect, would it be to ignore a phenomenon day after day more and more obvious and disturbing: the gradual decay of the political class, at both the central and peripheral levels. A degradation which, although there have been many who theorized ironically in the years when Italy runs even better when charging ahead like a "runaway horse" (those horses that after being dismounted, are still able to win the famous Palio of Siena thanks to some old law) venturing to accompany the country into an inexorable decline. To understand anything, you have to take a step back. Our insistence on the Italian case is not coincidental. Nor is it dictated by provincialism. In answer to a journalist who asked him how he had become a world famous writer without even having moved from his neighborhood in Cairo, Nagib Mahfuz replied, "there are those who travel the world as if it were the alley-way below his house, and there are some people in the alley below who see the world." This is the Italian case: the paradigm of drifting from a parliamentary democracy, of the role of political parties, of a managerial class. A paradigm that helps to understand the parallel degeneration, but less obvious than others. To understand anything, we need to take a step back.

"In Rome a small group of eternal parents are in charge, who are convinced, along with some minister, that they have induced wisdom in their out-sized brain." These are not the words of the movement's comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, nor of that Guglielmo Giannini who in the first years of the Second World War created the "Any Man's Front" managing to bring 30 members to Parliament, nor Corrado Tedeschi who invented the Fillet Party nor even the leader of the Northern League, Umberto Bossi in the days when you could hear "never again give money to the shit Romans." The indictment is by Luigi Einaudi, today revered in Italy as one of the fathers of the country and one of the cleanest of our history also for those who for a time regarded him as an adversary. It was the first of February 1919, the Great War had ended only a few weeks earlier, Guglielmo II had fled to the Netherlands, in Berlin they

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had just kidnapped and killed Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, in Paris the peace conference was being held and in Italy, where Luigi Sturzo had just founded the People's Party, the "red biennial" had begun, which would end the tough confrontation between the left and the rise of fascism. As guide of the Italian government there was the Sicilian Vittorio Emmanuele Orlando, in Foreign Relations Sydney Sonnino, Bonaldo Stringhe in the Treasury and in the Justice Department Luigi Facta. People who Einaudi considered, to use a euphemism, in large part inadequate. As is shown by what he wrote in the Corriere della Sera.

The future head of state, on the side of the "furious" industrialists, accused the executive: "He does not keep promises, because of his ties he prevents the movement of those who would have the will to do things, and he causes the loss of markets which Italian industrialists had been able to win, he is preparing disasters for the country, he engages in ever new levies on industry...". For what reason? Because of his obsession with getting his hands into everything, imagine "monopolies that no one knows how to manage", taking over duties that cannot then be resolved, making it impossible for "private parties to intervene". Not to mention ties and bonds such as "consumer institutes, thanks to which judges, teachers, secretaries of prefecture, post, telegraph, etc., will waste their own time smelling cheese and negotiating for fish." Or even the decision to "overburden homeowners of new fruitless prototype properties and prevent partial adjustment of rates."

Quite simply, he wrote: "We have to fire these proud leaders (...) who are convinced they have the divine gift of guiding the people in the art of procuring their daily bread. We have suffered them for too long. Teachers must return to teaching, state counsellors must go about their business, the military to their regiments, and if they pass the age limit, they must take a well-deserved rest. In short: "Let each one return to work." And "we must get rid of commissariats, dump commissaries and ministries" so that "little by little all this annoying squirming may be removed. Those who work are tired of being led by the clerks who manage the file cards", superior in number to the society governed "only in pride and incompetence." Some harsh words but very to the point. No one was spared. But they have historically continued to be left untapped.

Of course, some even today who are still nostalgic for fascism hold the view that the two decades, aside from mistakes and crimes such as the racial laws of 1938, would have in any case represented a hiatus in efficiency, honesty and patriotic devotion to the interests of the country. All synthesized into a cliché often cited by the neo-fascists: "When Mussolini was hanged in Piazzale Loreto, no coins spilled from his pockets." It is still only the last remnants of Mussolini's propaganda. In fact, behind the façade of an uncorrupted system circulated by the newspapers of the time subject to punctilious regulations (one in particular, that of June 1, 1939: "Restrain the news of bad weather"), it certainly seems right that the Fascist political class was not better but quite to the contrary, it was probably worse than the previous one. This is what studies say about the killing of Socialist Giacomo Mateotti, murdered (as is well known the act was claimed by the Duce: "I declare here, in this assembly and to the Italian people, that I myself assume, the political, moral, and historic responsibility of what has happened. If fascism has been a criminal conspiracy, I am the head of this criminal conspiracy.") after having written an article that came out posthumously in "English Life", which denounced the conduct of the Banca Comerciale with respect to the Polish loan as "one of the cases of unbridled greed condoned by fascist rulers", and the assignment to the Sinclair Oil Company of large tracts of land in Emilia and Sicily as a result of "treason and corruption, or rather the most ignoble gesture" on the part of "many fascist leaders, leading to a stifling fattening work on private and semi-public properties with the aim of funding fascist newspapers and other organizations, for absolutely profitable benefits and interests."

This is confirmed by studies of the private interests of Marcello Piacentini, the most famous architect of the regimen who used marble everywhere, and also because he was a partner in a wine-cellar. And also continuous correspondence between Roberto Farinacci and Mussolini himself, in which the Duce fed up with the generic complaints of the Cremonese leader who aspired to a career at the expense of the mayor of Milan, Ernesto Fleece, accused of being corrupt like other "parasites" who "as rancid as myself in October 1922, are now in wonderful economic conditions", and he wraps it up like this: "In regard to begging and fortunes, I do not contest that you were the unlucky one in 1922. But I deny in the most pointed

way that you have still remained unhappy in the year 1928. The truly unfortunate are not going by car nor do they frequent luxury hotels." Furthermore, perhaps more than any other document, is the weight of a trial "above all suspicion." Nazi officer Rudolf Likus, a colonel in the SS and special advisor to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, wrote during the last days of the '40s and early '41 in a report to Berlin against the fascist managerial class: "That has failed completely: the mediocrity of the previous generation was offset by honesty and rectitude, the latter along with mediocrity has added dishonesty."

The Resistance, the Liberation of Nazi-fascism, the reconstruction, resulted in an incredible and virtuous twist. And it was not by chance that between the second half of the forties and the second half of the sixties, the years of the spectacular Italian renaissance which led to the so-called "economic miracle", the industrial boom, the Oscar of the currency known as the lira. What was it that marked the managerial class in those years? There were many determining factors. It was a generation that had suffered fascism and had formed deep convictions about the value of democracy and freedom. A generation that had made the Resistance and therefore, as written by constitutionalist Michele Ainis, had taken on true legitimacy. A generation growing up day by day within the two great schools. On the one hand the parishes, the Catholic charity and other religious associations. On the other hand, the sections, partisan brigades or also the school of the Frattocchie on the Roman hills, which Indro Montanelli himself, perhaps the greatest Italian journalist of the Novecento, liberal, conservative, recognized beyond the limits (the young men were pushed to build or destroy brick walls so they would know "the hard work of the proletariat" rid themselves of "bourgeois incrustations") as "the most serious and rigorous school there ever was in Italy". It is true that this ruling class, Catholic, communist and secular, accompanied Italy in an extraordinary economic, cultural and social recovery, until they agreed to move from being a nation defeated in war, to a kind of soft "protectorate" of the United States, one of the main players of the precursors of European unification.

For this virtuous period to be interrupted, has been a matter of animated debate since years ago. Nevertheless, when it has been interrupted, however, is quite clear: between

the late '60s and early '80s. Coinciding with the ferment of '68, the race to enrichment of those who had left behind poverty, social tensions, terrorism on the right and left, the progressives' sunset dream of the rescue of the Mezzogiorno, the pathological dissemination of clientelism and corruption, the hermetic seal upon itself of a political class that was becoming more and more distant from society, even physically, with the progressive turning-out of police cars, armored cars, palaces of power increasingly inaccessible.

There is always a testimony that says it all. Speaking in an interview with "Corriere" Fedele Cova is the engineer, who for fifteen years had led the company Autostrade and was proud of having built arteries in 2200 kilometers which had made Italy (where fascism had built the first of the autostrada in the world: the Milano-Laghi) a country with much more modern road infrastructures than those of France, Spain or even Great Britain: "The signal change came in '64. Before that, they let me along, perhaps because they didn't believe in the highway, perhaps because they had not even realized what was happening. But in '64, with the end of Autosole, began the appetites, interferences... They wanted this and they wanted that, and it was difficult to live in peace. Until the '70s, for me, it was a continuous, strenuous state of defense due to an endless state of siege."

"Before", what mattered was to make the roads, make them well, make them quickly. Then other things began to matter: the assignment of contracts, fees for dealing out and the electoral choice of paths, the "clients" to take on and situate. The word of Cova: "In '68 politicians no longer wished to discuss, but only command. They listened to you in a distracted way and got rid of you with "okay, we'll think about it." The technicians were no longer anyone. It was a wall of rubber and you felt that decisions were already taken. You also understood that were annoying and intrusive... If you got out of the way, they were happy."

It must also be said that recent decades have seen the presence of valuable men with undeniable dedication beyond the interests at hand, situated at the edges of politics, Parliament and Italian administration. Representative of all of them (although several could be cited) is one name: Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Governor of the Bank of Italy, president of the council of the "technical" government that took Italy out of the pockets of the economic crisis and Tangentopoli of the early

'90s who was also a beloved head of state. But it is beyond question, by the protagonists' own admission, that the Italian ruling class has undergone a rapid, traumatic and progressive deterioration. Intellectual, political and moral. A deteriorating course, which obviously can not be redeemed for any enlightened exception.

3. An out-of-touch political class

In this way, a political class has been able to grow in Italy, that is increasingly introspective and detached from reality, and which has introduced, nearly always by agreement between the majority and the opposition, rules and regulations with the single aim of preserving their own privileges (including economic) and of making it difficult, if not impossible, to be substituted. The most recent and glaring example is the electoral law adopted by the Italian Parliament since the beginning of 2006. With that law, Italian citizens were deprived of the opportunity to directly elect their own representatives in the national assemblies. You no longer vote for the candidate: you only cast your vote for a list. This is composed of individuals determined by the head of the party according to a predetermined order. Furthermore, each candidate may be present in all the electoral colleges, and can be elected in more than one of them. This allows the leaders of the coalition, the party and its allies, in other words a narrow circle of people, to be candidates everywhere and then choose the outcome of this or that other electoral college, freeing up the post here and there for the first of the those not elected. This is yet another mechanism that contributes all the more to creating a parliament made up of those most loyal to the leader, in which confrontation and debate are absent. A few diligent troopers whose only function is to press the green button to pass a law, or red, to reject it. The goal of the rest has been explicit since 2001 when in an interview with La Repubblica newspaper Marco Pirri, head of the head-hunters commissioned by Silvio Berlusconi to find candidates for politics, declared: "I do not care about having a Nobel prize-winner on the list, but I need to know whether he will vote for a law he knows nothing about." Approved at the beginning of 2006 towards the end of the Cavaliere mandate, and ironically dubbed by the components themselves as "a dirty trick" (the copyright belongs to the current Minister of Simplification

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Roberto Calderoli, of the Northern League), electoral law has not been changed in the following two years during which time the center-left Romano Prodi has ruled. And it remained in force in June 2009 thanks to the disastrous result (23% turnout in the polls, a failed quorum) for a referendum designed to repeal certain provisions of the law and push for a reduction in the number of parties.

Of course, the objectives had already been overcome in part with the birth of the PD (the result of the merger of the Democrats of the Left and the Margherita) and of the PDR (Forza Italia and Alianza Nacional), to the point that some promoters of the center left and center right, had already confessed their initial position. The very low voter participation further confirmed the growing suspicion that now surrounds the popular referendums.

There is legitimate distrust. Too often it has happened in Italy that after a referendum approved by citizens, everything stays the same as before. As in the case of a popular consultation among the most recent ones which reached quorum, that of 1995 regarding the RAI. 54% of voters were in favor of privatization of public television finances to by-pass political parties. But after nearly fifteen years, not even a single share has been ceded to private enterprises or individuals. In 1993 another referendum, accepted by more than 80% of the vote, had decreed the abolition of public funding to parties. Result: zero. It has never been abolished, only the name has changed and it is now known as "electoral reimbursement."

A confused tangle even in the vocabulary. "Reimbursement" is the restitution of funds spent, while in this case it is an amount assigned to the parties, not only regardless of what they paid for posters, ads and transport but also unrelated to the number of those who actually went to the polls. The numbers are easy to work out: one euro per year for every Italian citizen registered with the electoral lists of the Chamber of Deputies. Fifty million potential voters for the regional elections (even when there are none), plus another 50 for European elections (even when there are none), plus another 50 for the House Policy and 50 more for Policy of the Senate.

In the arc of a term, which lasts five years, the collection of political parties is about one billion euros. But that's not enough. Another small law passed in 2006 with the

affirmative vote of the majority and of almost all the opposition, established that the electoral "reimbursement" must be repealed by the parties despite the anticipated outcome of the legislature. To give a specific example, in the legislature during which Prodi ruled, which began in 2006 and closed in 2008 with new elections, the parties still have the "reimbursement" until the 2011 elections including the elections already held in 2006. To clarify: from 2008 to 2011 the old parties present in Parliament from the old legislature are entitled to contributions even if that term has expired, was buried and was replaced by the current one. And even including if they have disappeared along with the parties, as in the case of Udeur de Clemente Mastella. For those who remain, there is a double helping.

4. Italy, the (financial) paradise of the political parties

Italian parties are obliged to submit regular balance sheets and present them publicly. But in fact there are no sanctions in the event of irregularities, even those identified by the Court of accounts. This is troubling. Even more so if we look to other countries. The 200 million euros per year set aside for Italian political parties is an absolute record. Public funding of parties in France (more or less the same number of inhabitants as in Italy) has been steady in 2006, with 73 million euros. Unchanged since 1995, it was supposed to be 80 million and 264 thousand euros, but it was been reduced from almost 7 million because of the sanctions inflicted on those who had not applied the rules of equal opportunity with regard to men and women. But there's still more: the parties that do not reach even 5% of the votes in the first round (an innovation recently acquired in Italy as well, amidst much controversy) are not entitled to reimbursement of even half of what was spent, not even with the looming specter of the sale of works by artists who are friends, obtained as gifts in the good years, to make a showing before the glorious though troubled French Communist Party. And what about controls? French law prohibits public funding of parties within the jurisdiction of the Court of accounts. But there is still a National Commission in charge of controls, and if irregularities were to be detected, they have the power to decide to revoke a party's rights to receive retribution for the following year. And they don't joke around.

In Spain, where there are 575 parliamentarians, almost half the number of Italians, about 119 million was planned to be spent on parties in 2009. Originally it was to have been about 136 million, but the economic crisis which broke in late 2008 has led the government and parliament to send a signal, reducing the budget. So, every French citizen contributes to the maintenance of parties with nearly 1.25 euros, and every Spaniard, 2.58 euros. Much less with respect to Italians who contributed 3 euros and 38 cents in the "normal" years like 2006, and as much as 4 euros and 91 cents in those years like in 2008 with a double ration. Not to mention the embarrassing confrontations with countries like the UK where public funding, excluding some services made available to the state during the course of the election campaigns, is limited by tributes accorded to the opposition parties of Parliament. Total in 2006: 5,603,779 pounds sterling, which is about 7,374,000 euros. Or the United States, where public funding of politics is limited to the financing of the presidential campaign and in 2004 cost $206 million US, nearly 50 cents of a euro per capita. Then too, considering that in the USA there are always elections every four years, it comes to 12.5 cents per year. Forty times less than in Italy.

Germany is a special case. The federal government applies a maximum fund of 133.4 million a year to state allocations for the parties. So every German contributes to the survival of organizations and political movements with 1.61 euros. But the real figure would be decidedly higher if we consider the conspicuous funding allocated by the Lander to the foundations of political parties and youth movements. According to the Italian Democratic Party treasurer, Mauro Agostini, the sum of 133.4 million must be multiplied by three. But Germany has 23 million inhabitants, so taking this estimate as valid, the expenditure per capita would be less than the Italian one calculated from the years of the "double portion": 4 euros and 80 compared to 4 euros and 91. And all this without taking into account the fact that public funding in Italy is "integrated" by the parties through more than a thousand mechanisms, public contributions to the conventions and to the systems in administrative boards of public finances of "friends" who had a seat in Parliament or in the regional councils and who in this way are "recycled." All the money that properly should be in the accounts, along with the distribution of finances and with customers, to politics.

Why does the Italian political machine turn out to be the most expensive in Europe? Political parties continue to have a large overloaded organizational structure, with many salaries to pay. Then there are the instruments of publicity such as newspapers, eventual recipients of grants over the "electoral expenditure." There are also political initiatives such as conventions, demonstrations and congresses of which we spoke before. Then there are the elections which, taking into account the fact that the "income" of the "profession" of politician has become very high, have invested more and more money. Both public and private.

Also, the law of the "par condicio" required by the center-left, by which the government rebalances the forces in the field sharpening their weapons to Berlusconi, who owns a television empire, has come to have effects other than those which were budgeted. And thanks to the policy of "discounts" on advertisements, the formations considered closest to Cavaliere are promoted. In fact Forza Italia in 1966 had declared election expenses of approximately one million three-hundred and fifty thousand euros (to which must be added some 2.7 million in costs of the Coalición Casa de las Libertades), and in 2006 the amount shot up to 62 million 465,000 euros. Forty-six times more. A huge increase with respect to the opponents, as the costs of Olivo de Romano Prodi had risen from 2.9 to 10.1 million.

And yet the cost of politics, as mentioned, can not be limited to expenditures for election campaigns, wages of the employees of the parties, the organization of conventions and demonstrations. Some people have calculated that political activity employs at least 600 thousand Italians. But there are those who expand these statistics to a million. Beyond the Presidency of the Republic, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the presidency of the Council, where the exquisitely institutional aspect too often conforms to the interests of the parties, there is a conglomeration of other public administrations scattered throughout the territory. There are twenty regions, each of which has its own government and legislative assembly with a number of representatives that varies from a minimum of 30 to a maximum of 90. The provinces, of which there are 190 and still increasing, although they were supposed to be abolished after the institution of the Regions employ close to 5,000

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people between presidents, advisers and counsellors. In addition to the 8,100 municipal governments, with 150 thousand people, between advisors, mayors and counsellors, control other local entities of more than 5152 companies (often created for the sole purpose of placing relatives, friends and family in salaried positions) each one with its own board of directors, a self-supervisory body, and other highly-placed persons. Just taking into account these companies, the Court of Accounts has calculated some 38,000 seats, in part occupied by former parliamentarians and local politicians, with about 5.6 dependents per "commissioner". And that is without getting involved with the hundreds of companies and public entities still controlled by the central government, a safe haven for men and women chosen by the parties who were deprived of an occupation. And all the while, as if all that were not enough, we must add the mountain communities (some of them at sea level), the bonus pools...

For the Italian taxpayer, it is a very expensive machine. Starting precisely with the constitutional bodies. All together they cost the taxpayer nearly 3 billion euros, a sum which has increased in recent years, despite economic difficulties, at an impressive pace. The idea of the situation in Italy comes out well compared with that of Spain. Spain also has, along with Italy, a bicameral parliament (although it is for four, not five years) with a House and a Senate. But the similarities end here. The Madrid Senate (264 members) costs Spaniards about 60.5 million euros, the Palazzo Madama (315 representatives plus life-time senators of whom there are now six, for a total of 321) weighs in the pockets of Italians to the tune of 570.6 million. This means that each senator costs Spanish citizens about 229,000 euros, and Italian citizens lay out 1,775,000, eight times more.

The story is more or less the same in the House. The "Congress of Deputies" (350 elected individuals) has a balance of 98.4 million and that of Montecitorio (630 members) has ten times more: one thousand and 27 million. Moral: every Spanish deputy costs the community in total, the whole package, from rents to wages of employees, from secretaries to the costs of representation, about 281,000 euros. Each Italian "honorable" as the members are called, costs a million and 630 thousand euros.

We understand the objections: they are different countries, with different history, different traditions. It's true.

They also have a wide variety of costs. The Spanish parliamentarians' stipend is the same for everyone: 3,020.79 euros per month. A figure to which we must add about 1,762.18 per month for members with a residence outside Madrid, which becomes 841.12 euros for those in the capital. In total, therefore, an honorable "pawn" (provided he is not an assembly president, vice president or head of a commission) is entitled to 4,783 euros per month. Gross total. An Italian colleague receives a gross subsidy of 11,703 euros per month. Plus 4003 euros for expenses. More than 4,190 euros for the "helper" and this is the real scandal. On March 13, 2007, a television service of the satirical program "Le Iene" on the Italia Uno channel showed that of about 683 accredited employees of the House only 54 had a formal contract. The others were working with black money. Immediately afterwards, the chairmen of the House and Senate, former union men Fausto Bertinotti and Franco Marini, announced a serious effort. Within two months only employees tied to a formal contract would have been able to enter Parliament.

Promises. Made to gain time while waiting for the outrage of citizens to abate. Just as had happened on the same subject two years earlier. A few months, and as planned, in July 2007, then came the little deal that was worked out: in addition to those with a formal contract, people who developed some sort of "training" and "entities with income from pensions" and those "dependent on public or private entities stating that they carry out collaborative activity free of charge for the deputy" could also have the access card to palaces. In short, everyone.

Result: two years later, in April 2009, everything was exactly as before. Out of 516 accredited assistants, only 194 had a contract. The other 322, or 62%, were still in black. The worst thing is that of the 4,190 euros for the House, and the 4678 euros for the Senate who are paid to well enough to pay employees decently, Italian parliamentarians do not have to answer to anyone. The senator of the Alleanza Nazionale Antonio Paravia, having asked an explanation from the Secretary-General of the Palazzo Antonio Malaschini Madama, reported the answer he had heard which was that the "contribution to support the activities and duties of the honorable senators linked to the development of the parliamentary mandate, which is paid monthly, has no

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connection with respect to any services rendered by third parties or possible contractual configurations." Translation: the choice of how to behave belonged only to Parliament. A substantial difference with respect to Europe. After several controversies, including cases of Giles Chichester (head of the British Conservatives forced to resign because he had found a way to transfer money to a company belonging to his relatives), or that of Umberto Bossi (who was contracted by two MEPs from his league, his brother Franco and his son Riccardo), the Euro parliament decided in fact for the legislator. And if the system was more rigid than in Italy, given that the European parliamentarian had to submit supporting parts (a sort of contract of employment or consultation) in order to have the money designated for assistants, since June 2009, the rules have been inflexible.

The European Parliament recognizes that whomever is elected in Strasbourg is entitled to choose their preferred partners. The contributor does not always speak languages, is not always familiar with the rules of the hall, is not always familiar with the different subjects. And it is only fair to bring along someone who can be trusted. There's still more: Europe, knowing how expensive travel, accommodations and other expenses are in Strasbourg, is generous. And they go so far as to give up to 17,000 euros per month (an absurdity if given in Rome) for the staff of each deputy. But here's the problem, the MP does not see that money in his wildest dreams. People who are hired at the same time as the mandate of the MEP must have a degree (or at least a diploma and good experience), and they are pegged with set wages set based on 19 different levels of professionalism. But above all, they are paid directly by Parliament. As a result, for the parliamentarian respectful of the rules, nothing changes, but the slick character can only find ways to play around; the money for employees must go directly to the employees.

A provincial president costs the same as four United States governors. Let's recapitulate. Between the compensation, the daily contribution for the employee, the Italian parliamentarian receives 19,896 euros gross per month: that's 13,709.69 euros net. Then there are the 3,098 euros per year for telephone costs. And also a pass for free circulation on highways, waterways, railways and the entire area around the whole country, and they also receive a payment of up to 3,995 euros to get to the nearest airport.

The Spanish Congress website states that while serving, Members are entitled to transport, and to the following benefits: a card (like ours) for free movement especially throughout the country, and a payout of 0.25 euros per kilometer should they use their own private car with proper justification. What if they don't have a car or prefer not to use it? Since May 2006 they have a credit card valid for taxi service up to 250 euros per month. As for the financing of parliamentary groups, the comparison is no less embarrassing: 9 and a half million euros to the congress in Madrid, and 34 to the Roman House.

But it is the entire "Palacios" thing which appears very virtuous. The salary of Jose Luis Zapatero is 91,982 euros gross per year, paid in twelve monthly installments. This figure, coupled with the parliamentary allowance, an amount which allows him to collect some 149,377 euros if the Spanish premier (who has the right to a residence with full coverage of all service costs) did not regularly renounce his rights to this amount.

With papers in hand, the Italian premier, despite the 30% reduction mandated by Romano Prodi in salaries of members of the government, still manages to earn, between the compensation and parliamentary benefits, some 324,854 per year.

Not even for ministers is the difference is less sensitive.

People will say that these are unfair comparisons. It's true. But with an even higher per capita wealth in Spain as compared to Italy, it is not possible to highlight the gap between the salaries that correspond to who is on top of some institutions parallel to the palaces of politics. A couple of examples: in Madrid the presidents of the Supreme Court (the Italian cassazione) and those of the Constitutional Court (the Rome Consulta) have a gross annual salary of 146,342.58 euros. Their Italian counterparts earn, respectively, again speaking in gross figures, about 274,000 to 444,000 euros.

Also the Italian representatives in the European Parliament have also for many years enjoyed a superb economic deal. This is thanks to the fact that the allowances of MEPs have always been equated with those of the respective national parliamentarians. Until 2009. From then until now the new statute has gone into effect which has been set at 7,665 euros gross (taxed at 20%), the monthly salary of all

parliamentarians. With a small difference for the lucky few who were elected for the first time in Strasbourg but were already there from the first legislature. Thanks to a small clause, the latter individuals will be able to choose between the new compensation (7,665 euros) and old (11,703 euros gross).

For those who also insist on regarding the comparison with Spain as unconvincing, there is a cognitive inquiry that was carried out in the summer of 2007 at the Chamber of Deputies which compared their own expenditure with that of the German Bundestag, the British House of Commons and the French Assemblée Nationale, reaching the conclusion that, in the five years from 2001 to 2006, these Italian expenses turned out to be 27% higher that those of the Bundestag, 32% higher compared to the Assemblée Nationale and as much as 51% with respect to the House of Commons.

Of the rest, among the accounts of European parliamentarians, you hardly find anything like the balance of the Italian Senate in 2008: 260 thousand euros for the agendas of 2009 made by the fashion house Nazareno Gabrielli. Just this: 260,000 euros. A figure which exceeds by 28,000 euros the yearly salary of the governors of four American states together: Maine, Colorado, Arkansas and Tennessee. It is true that according to a study by Professor Antonio Merlo of the University of Pennsylvania, that these are among the lowest paid of all the governors of the United States. But it is also true that Arnold Schwarzenegger, governor of a state like California, in seventh place in the world according to gross domestic product, has a salary (not actually collected but retained, as he is rich enough) of 162,598 euros, lower than that which corresponds to a member of the Regional Council of Abruzzo. On average, the "poor" U.S. governors pocket about 88,523 euros gross per year: one fourth of the amount that corresponds to the President of the Autonomous Province of Bolzano, Luis Durnwalder, who takes home about 320,496 euros per year. Almost 36,000 euros more than what Barack Obama president of the United States of America makes.

But if the Italian Parliament has the primacy of costs among all elected assemblies in Europe, the situation is not more comforting when it comes to the presidency of the Republic, whose expenses, despite the efforts of current President Giorgio Napolitano and his predecessor, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, are still quite far from the standards of transparency in

other European countries. Suffice it to say that the accounts of the British royal house (since ten years ago they are available in full detail, including wages to the nearest cent of the Queen's main collaborators, in addition to the list of trips carried out with a list of accompanying individuals and the value of the wine bottles that are in the canteen), and today the figure is around 60 million euros: approximately a quarter of the amount of the presidency of the Italian Republic, which is about 240 million.

Also in 2008 French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced the decision to make the Elysee "a house of glass walls" revealing for the first time not only the number of dependent individuals, of flowers purchased, of blue cars in the parking lot (62 plus seven scooters), but also the figures for "wages and benefits, including homes, of the dependents." And he explained that to maintain the palace, which perhaps is not as nice or as big as the Quirinale but does have 147 offices, 1,500 square meters of meeting rooms and many chambers and smaller rooms, gardens and pavilions, in addition to "secondary residences" such as the Pavillon de la Lanterne, the hunting lodge in Souza-la-Briche and Fort Bregancon, French citizens spend 112.3 million euros a year. One euro and 70 cents per person. It is a lot, considering that the Berlin federal presidency (with a balance of 19.5 million euros) annually costs each German citizen about 23 cents, the Madrid monarchy (estimates are from the magazine The Economist) about 54 cents each Spaniard, and the British ruler costs each Englishman 90 cents. But in any case, it is less than half what the Quirinale costs each Italian: 4 euros per year. And that's not the whole story, because the former papal residence is the largest regal house in Europe. The fact is that the employees, aside from being very numerous compared to European counterparts, are better paid. No matter how you look at it, it's comparable to Buckingham Palace. Each one of the 331 dependents of the Civil List cost, in 2006, some 38,237 euros gross per year. If we add the 108 workers in addition to the royal residences, the cost comes to 40,739 per capita per year. By contrast, the average cost per person who is employed in the Quirinale is 73,256 euros. Nearly double. And do not forget the most prominent leaders. The one paid the most of all Englishmen is Sir Alan Reid, Keeper of the Crown Treasury, who in 2006 received, at the current exchange rate, about

252,000 euros. Less than what a stenographer gets in the Italian Senate. As far as the general secretary of the Quirinale, all comparison is impossible. The balance of the presidency of the Italian Republic, despite the cautious opening, is still shrouded in secrecy, at least in regard to these "details." In fact, already in 2006 Queen Elizabeth was proud, and with reason, of having reduced since 1991 the costs of the British monarchy by 61% in real terms, over and above inflation. The comparison with the Quirinale, which has recently highlighted a cut of 3 per thousand, is indicative. The astronomical costs and rising deficit of Italian politics are the consequence, as we said, of a gradual deterioration in the quality of the ruling class. Starting from the nineteen-eighties, the thing of becoming a politician has turned into a profession practiced by people who only seek to be appointed to a post, while preparation and merit count for less and less. In the Italian parties there are no mechanisms to incentivate merit. Or what's worse: as recently came to light in the news, in Italy the realm of politics is more easily accessed passing through a TV studio than through a university classroom. The devastating effects of this state of affairs drag down the whole society.

According to a survey contained in a report in 2008 from la Louisa, the University of Confindustria, 72.7% of the Italian population is convinced that "the collective interest is just a nice word that hides some private interest groups, economic groups, political groups and class interests." Furthermore, 68.9% of respondents also do not believe that today Italy is a country that is any healthier than when it exploited the Tangentopoli, which in the early nineties laid bare the deep and widespread corruption of the Italian political system. Another survey carried out in 2009 by the university itself had troubling results. Only 20.9% of respondents said that in Italy a political career is built on merit. This percentage is only 22.9% for the sindicates, and 26.2% for civil service leaders. According to the report, one of the factors which is among the greatest obstacles to competition and merit is the existence of a "net elite" of half a million people, made up of politicians, journalists, managers and academics. A "happy oligarchy that blocks the processes of renewal thanks to the revolving doors" says the director of the Luisa, Pierluigi Celli. This is a system that makes political and managerial responsibilities be always assigned by rotation to the same people, preventing the turnover and growth of professional skills.

In the same report is a study of the compositions of the various Culture of the House of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic from 1996 to 2008. In the study it comes to light that the weight of those who come to be considered "competent" thanks to their education, occupation and experience has declined considerably: from 64% to 44%. This is an impoverishment that affects the entire Italian Parliament and is in complete contrast to economic enrichment. In 1983 the person who landed at Montecitorio or the Palazzo Madama saw their profits rise by an average of 33%, and thirteen years later that amount doubled: 109.2% more than what had been declared the previous year. To the extent that, after having sampled the privileges of the Palace, those who decided to leave of their own volition (and not because they were expelled) to go back to exercising their former respective professions, have become fewer than ever. Even 37% of entrepreneurs, once they were "in the thick of it", choose to leave what they were doing before, to remain in the banks of Rome. Not to mention the doctors (who decide to stay in politics in 45% of the time), journalists (44%), the self-employed (49%), workers (61%) and representatives of professional categories: only one in five returns to the office from whence he or she came, while six out of ten grab the seat and never let it go again.

This is from the investigation entitled "The Labor Market of Politicians", carried out by a group of economists: the aforementioned Antonio Merlo of the University of Pennsylvania, Vincenzo Galazo of the Bocconi, Maximiliano Landi of the Singapore Management University and Andrea Mattozzi of the California Institute of Technology. For the study, which takes for sampling all those elected between 1948 and 2007, there is no doubt: the parliamentary class of the First Republic was clearly better: "The new members were younger and better educated. The average age at which they entered the parliament was 44.77 years, as compared to 48.1 years in the second one. The percentage of newly elected individuals in possession of a degree has declined significantly over the years: from 91.4% in the first legislature, to 64.4% at the beginning of the fifteenth Legislature." A disaster of 27 points. Which is all the more outstanding and worrisome when compared internationally. As in the United States where, by contrast, the percentage of graduates present in Parliament

has risen from 88% to 94%. Thirty points above us. Then we are surprised that the University (not to mention the school) has sunk into total indifference on the part of governments to the point that in international rankings of the London Times and the "Shanghai Joao Tong University" Italy does not manage to place any university among the first hundred or even one among the first three hundred of the Mezzogiorno.

Merlo and his colleagues write that almost two parliamentarians out of three "remain in Parliament more than one term, even if only one in ten stays for over 20 years" and that "after leaving, 6% retire, almost 3% en up in prison, but almost one out of every two stays in politics." And yet, as cultural, political, and managerial status goes down, Italian parliamentarians have always been blessed by a flood of money. How many times in Italy have we heard that "I'm in politics because I feel it strongly, because economically I used to earn more"? False. With data in hand, those who lost in the First Republic to become deputies instead of doctors, notaries or attorneys were 24% of Democrats, 21% of the Socialists, 19% of Republicans. Today they make up only 15% of the exponents of Forza Italia, 11% of those elected to the center-left, 8% of the neo-Demochristians of the UDC, 6% of the parliamentarians of the National Alliance, a party which merged in 2009 in the Pueblo de la LIbertad under the guidance of Berlusconi. The others, from the representatives of the Communist Refundación (no longer present in 2008 in the Italian Parliament as a result of not having won the elections at the last minute) to do away with the leghisti, they come winners and that's all there is to it. Real winners!

From 1985 to 2004, says the search, landing on the benches of the Chambers "has been very profitable. Moreover, the real annual revenue of an MP has grown between 5 and 8 times more than the average annual real income of a worker, between 3.8 and 6 times more than an employee, and between 3 and 4 times that of a manager." There's still more: thanks to the possibility of accumulating other work, excluding the exceptions of serious countries like the United States, "since the end of the 90s, 25% of parliamentarians earn extra annual income which exceeds the income of most managers."

In the Italian Parliament the accumulation of orders is something no one pays any attention to. Not even when it is the law that expressly prohibits over-extension. Furthermore, there are a couple of cases to prove it. The first: for two

years, between 2006 and 2008, a senator in charge of the Lega Nord, Dario Fruscio, remained as counsellor of the Eni, a company registered on the stock exchange with great international projection, controlled by the state of Italy but among whose shareholders participate the main British and American investment funds. When he was gone, the spot was left for another politician who took charge: the group leader of the Lega Nord in the province of Verbano Cusio Ossola, Paolo Marchioni.

Second case: also in the guide of the Expo 2015, the public company that will have to manage the great issue of the Universal Exhibition in Milan, with investments valued at 15 billion dollars, placed as administrative delegate a deputy managing director of former president of IBM in Europe, Lucio Stanca, member of the Italy-USA Foundation who had already been minister of the second and third Berlusconi governments.

Experience shows that situations such as these can hardly be resolved except through voluntary resignations of the main player. For one simple reason: even though there is a law prohibiting the superimposition of certain commissions, a special committee is required to assess the actual incompatibility of parliamentarians dealing with it. But given that this Commission is composed of the parliamentarians themselves, the decisions become very difficult and have very long time periods.

As a result: the "forbidden" heap of institutional orders is always widespread. Beyond the opportunity to occupy more seats, the law prohibits components of the House and Senate to simultaneously be mayor of a city with a population exceeding 20,000 inhabitants or a president of a province. Well, in the parliament elected in 2008 there are about 80 deputies and senators who have a second institutional post. Some of them even have three. There are also 16 MPs, who after the local elections of June 2009, found themselves in a situation of incompatibility punishable by law. Such as senator Raffaele Stancanelli, Mayor of Catania (313,100 inhabitants) or deputy Adriano Paroli, mayor of Brescia (187,567 inhabitants). Not to mention the honorable Daniele Molgora who, in addition to being a parliamentarian, not only is the President of the Province of Brescia, but also the sub Secretary of Economy. How it has been possible to reach this situation of legal illegality, is a typically Italian story. The law says that whoever

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is mayor of a community with more than 20,000 inhabitants or president of a province can not be a member of parliament. But it does not specifically prohibit a parliamentarian from being elected mayor or president of a province. The in-road was first opened by the Forza Italia deputy Diego Cammarata, elected mayor of Palermo in 2001. Then the floodgates were opened and the dam fell, also dragging behind the brake of "political opportunity" to cover certain commissions. So, in the Italian Parliament there are vice mayors of cities such as Milan (Ricardo De Corato) and Rome (Mauro Cutrufo) and the health advisor of the City of Pescara (116,286 inhabitants). But also an adviser to the City of Monza (120,204 inhabitants) in the person of Paolo Romani, Vice Minister of Communications. And the mayor of a charming city of 15,000 inhabitants, Orbetello, on the Tyrrhenian coast, whose name is Altero Matteoli, who incidentally is also Minister of Infrastructure.

Needless to say, in a system like this, which is self-referential, and protected from any political, judicial or moral sanction, even for those who clearly violate the law, the world of politics is always closed, increasingly dominated by the norm of friends or relatives (even the son of former judge Antonio Di Pietro, founder of the "moralizing" party, the Italy of Values, has made his political career by causing himself to be elected as provincial counsellor on Daddy's lists), ever older and ever more immutable.

Just think back to Silvio Berlusconi, at the time he won in 2008 his fifth political elections from 1994 (three wins, two losses) he was 72 years old. He says he feels very young, he smiles when his personal physician Humberto Scapagnini (previously tax as mayor of Catania and then Senator) says he is "predisposed to immortality, according to his immunological profile", he surrounds himself by pretty girls who are often promoted to be deputies and allows himself absurd statements ("I sleep three hours a night, then have sex the other three") of the sort no other leader in the world could afford. The fact remains that at the time of returning to the Palazzo Chigi he was 17 years older than Tony Blair and Jose Maria Aznar, who were both out of active politics after serving eighteen years respectively at the head of their respective countries, 16 years more than Vladimir Putin who could not be re-elected president of Russia having served two terms, 10 more than Bill Clinton who after being elected to the White House at the age

of 46, left it in the distant year 2000.

5. Elements for radical reform

To remedy this state of affairs a new electoral law that has been repeatedly invoked is not enough, although in reality, no political force has shown any interest in changing the "hogwash" currently in force. And even so changing the electoral law is absolutely necessary to resume the broken thread of the relationship between politics and the Italian citizen.

A radical and comprehensive reform could not come from the parties. Article 49 of the Constitution adopted in 1948 states that "All citizens have the right to associate freely to develop a democratic method for determining national policy." But this principle has never been regulated to establish mechanisms that promote a democratic comparison, nor internal formations of political parties, the transparency of elections or financing. In the "far west" atmosphere of Italian politics everything is possible. Small parties born of individual initiatives are only interested in accumulating public contributions or promoting fragments of personal power. The breaking-up of historical parties into ever-smaller pieces with the sole objective of providing for the survival of the machine, as has happened on the left. But also the birth and death of a party converted in a short time to become the largest party in Italy, without there ever having been even one single congress. This is the case of Forza Italia which Berlusconi founded on January 18, 1994 (three months earlier he had declared in "Epoca": "If I am going to found a party? I have always declared the opposite, this must be the twentieth time I've repeated it. This is written by people who have an interest in pitting me against the current political bosses. Therefore, this time I will not re-read my denial, and avoid having to repeat it a twenty-first time, and who knows how many times more") and dissolved on March 29, 2009 after the merger with Alleanza Nazionale, never having had to put his leadership to the test in so much as one traditional little congress. A step considered completely useless and superfluous on the basis of what was was explained by my friend and collaborator Cesare Previti, excluded repeatedly from Parliament (a case which is more unique than strange) after two convictions: "Forza Italia is a party founded on charismatic centralism."

It is a fact that in Italy there is no rule requiring a party to organize congresses with a specific expiration date. In fact there is no law at all that regulates the activity and organization of political movements: the exception, of course being the highly detailed mechanisms regarding finance. And it still would not be so hard to finally implement the famous Article 49 of the Constitution by introducing for example a rule that would force the vertices of the parties to convene a congress every two or three years. Determining in this way the conditions of internal concurrence and democratic verification of the political line and leadership. A similar provision would need to be accompanied by specific sanctions for those who do not comply. Whosoever did not respect this obligation would certainly not lose the right to be represented in the national or local legislatures, nor the right to participate in elections: on a more trivial level, public financing would be lost. This is what Italian politicians fear most. Some economic sanctions could be introduced, for a transitory period, even by parties with no room in the control bodies themselves, for women or young people, similarly to what happens in France. At the same time, a cash prize could be conceded, on the other hand, to the parties that introduced in the statutes a limit on the number of elective mandates (parliamentary, regional or community advisors), favoring in this way rejuvenation and internal renewal. Naturally, the application of economic sanctions supposes a form of public financing of political parties. But clear and transparent, not bound to the ghostly "electoral reimbursements." Public funding must necessarily be linked to representation and therefore to consensus received, both nationally and locally. In a country like Italy, still adverse to the culture of alternation, it would also be a good idea to provide for some form of economic advantage for the opposition, following the example set by existing provisions in the United Kingdom. Private contributors, who represent a consistent part of the income of political parties, should be fully transparent, eliminating the 50,000 euro limit introduced via a 2006 law, and below which anonymity is currently permitted.

In short, perhaps, it would be essential to at least align tax releases for donations to charities and non profit organizations to those provided for in Italy by private contributions to parties and individual politicians, which today are about 51 times more generous. If today an Italian

association decides to fund a search for the cure for cancer or childhood diseases, it can deduct 19% from taxes, but only up to a maximum of 2,065 euros. If instead they decide to finance a political party, they can also deduct 19% but in this case the ceiling would be 103,000 euros. This means that a donation of any amount, with charitable destinations can save a maximum rate around 392 euros. By contrast however, if money is given to a party or a politician, the savings can be as high as about 19,570 euros. A nasty disparity and even foolish, especially because, as demonstrated by Bill Clinton in his book "Give more," charitable giving such as in the United States provides tax relief to the point of becoming a formidable accelerator of economic growth in the areas of high social intensity: school, health and assistance.

The balance sheets of Italian political parties are opaque, they do not correspond to a specific accounting obligations which must be obeyed not only by private companies but also by all public bodies. This is an important circumstance, because if political organizations can not be regarded as public bodies, but as private associations, they still have a public profile. And above, they all handle the money of taxpayers. And quite so, because the accounting entries of the parties must meet the highest standards, such as the requirement for certification which was applied for the first time in 2009, voluntarily, only by the Democratic Party. High standards also mean maximum transparency. On internet websites the parties and the House would not only have to publish their accounts, but also the list of private contributors. Updated in real time of course.

Furthermore, for many years, there have been discussions about the excessive number of parliamentarians, considering this fact as one of the major causes of the high cost of Italian politics. The number of representatives elected by the Italian people is 945: 630 Members of the House and 315 senators. To these must be added the life-term senators, a maximum of seven. It is a distinctly higher number compared to other European countries, except for France, which in any case has fewer, 577 deputies and 346 senators (in 2010), for a total of 923. In Spain, 575, Germany 682 and Great Britain 743. Not to mention the United States which with a population five times that of Italy, has 435 components in Congress and 100 senators, for a total of 535. Some people will certainly say:

but there are also parliamentarians from the various states. It's true. But if you calculate the members of the regional Italian parliament, the relationship is again out of all proportion…

Each political party acknowledges that the number of Italian parliamentarians is too high, but they have never set out to deal with this anomaly with the intention of truly resolving it. Or rather, constitutional reform has been attempted with the idea of reducing the number to 500 deputies and 200 senators, coming to a standstill in 2005 because of the the center right lack of agreement with the opposition, but it did not pass the acid test of the popular referendum provided for by the law in which case constitutional amendments must be approved by Parliament with a simple majority.

Since then, the right has always repeated: "We've tried." And it's true. Beyond the fact that the popular suspension was determined not by the rejection of the reduction of parliamentarians, but by the presence in the "package" of reforms that were indigestible at that time for public opinion (because of increased powers for the president of the Council regarding certain federalist forces imposed by the Lega) one detail that is not irrelevant must be emphasized: the slimming-down treatment for Parliament would have only become effective beginning in 2016. In this way, immediate interests, not only of the deputies and senators now in office would not be affected, but not even those of two successive legislatures. Of course, since then, apart from some extemporaneous remarks and some proposed bill to come out of Parliament, everything has remained quiet.

In the same way that everyone is silent on another front, even more vital to Italian democracy. The reform of perfect bicameralism. What it's all about can be summarized in a few words: the High Chamber and Low Chamber are duplicates of each other. A law passed by the deputies must be launched in the same way by the senators: if one single comma is changed, the text has to start all over again. This means a very long time for the approval of laws. But also numerous opportunities are offered, if your offensive is rejected by the House, it can always pass in the Senate. Or vice-versa. There has not been a Bicameral Commission for reforms (there have been three: in 1983, 1993 and 1997) that has not theorized about a change in this state of affairs. But not a single one has managed to avoid failure.

Why? The answer is not easy. And more than with words, almost all the players of Italian politics in recent decades have indicated their ability to overcome the perfect bicameralism as a priority for making the country more governable. But this is just the point: How sincere is this manifest willingness to make a governable country? A few years of reciprocal and warlike parliamentary obstructionism on the left and on the right (Berlusconi supporters and law-makers in the legislature managed by the center-left from 1996 to 2001 came to introduce 74,652 amendments all-told, which is equivalent to 14,930 per year, 287 a week 85 per session) leaving little doubt that in actual fact there is a background of hypocrisy. Whoever is in government must, on the one hand, strengthen the powers of the majority, and on the other, does not want to leave the possibility of holding back for a successive legislature the possibility of interdiction in the case of becoming the minority.

It always comes back to the same thing: over the years, the unstated objective of the mass of parliamentarians seems to have become more in favor of its own survival. The maintenance of privilege. The soft but net resistance against radical changes. Just look at the failure over time of actually managing to get one of the phenomena that most irritate and puzzle Italian citizens, that of parliamentary absenteeism. The data are unequivocal. The link between the historical absence of Italian parliamentarians and their American counterparts, explains for example the findings of Antonio Merlo mentioned above, which is ten to one: 31.4% is the average of empty seats in the last three decades in our houses of government, 3.1% is the average of the absence of senators in Washington. As far as the European Parliament, the official data of the presence in the plenary assemblies indicate that not only the Italians have three MPs (South Tyrolian Sepp Kusstatscher, Francesco Ferrari and Pasqualina Napoletano) among the hundred most assiduous regulars, but they have only 10 among the top three hundred. Compared to the 17 Spanish (who have fewer than twenty seats), 25 British and 39 Germans. In return, they dominate the positions of the tail-end, beyond the 900th place, where half of the last twenty are.

But it remains to be shown that this depends only on its excessive numbers. By contrast, another phenomenon is more important: the proliferation of too many conflicts of interest. For fifteen years the attention of media around the world has

been centered on the figure of Silvio Berlusconi, head of the Italian government and owner of a television empire. Even that is only the most surprising case. As has already been seen, the rules regarding incompatibilities and those regarding the ineligibility of members of parliament, which have existed since 1953, are systematically circumvented. With the result that the House and Senate are full of people who would have to resign if the law were applied.

But there are other situations not covered by the laws, that are perhaps even more complicated. If a public or private clerk is elected to parliament, he is required to temporarily leave his job and is suspended without pay for the entire term. A university professor, for example, would not be able to teach, in theory, even for free. The liberal professions, however, may still quietly (like businessmen) exercise their own activities. With just one limitation: they can not deal with disputes in which the state is one of the parties involved. End of story. The result is: over the years, many lawyers have been able to get involved in the implementation and adoption of laws that their counterparts, in other words the judges, will then have to apply.

It's a paradoxical situation. Perhaps unique in the world. Triggered in all its absurdity especially in some circumstances in which lawyers who double as parliamentarians under Berlusconi have lobbied to push through laws to avoid the levelling of processes against the leader. The right says: we had no way of avoiding the judiciary anger of the left. Future historians will be the judges. It is clear that in the legislature from 2001 to 2006, during which several laws were stalled that were condemned by the opposition and the mass media as "ad personan", were denounced to the presidency of the Justice of the House committee, and were placed in the hands of one of Berlusconi's legal advisors, Gaetano Pecorella, also famous in the past for having been the lawyer for many left-wing extremists. As to whether or not this public-private mess can be harmful for democracy, only history will tell. It may be fruitful for lawyer-parliamentarians as evidenced by tax statements. Often, revealing strong income gains and triggering the nagging suspicion that for many lawyers (and not only them; the conflict refers to other categories as well) parliamentary activity also comes to and end, if not exclusively, at least professional activity.

How to avoid this? It would be enough to copy the rule that is in force in the United States: the parliamentarian can not engage in any other gainful employment except within the taxable limit of $10,000 per year. And with precise limits to cultural and educational activities. The same rule would also have to apply to regional directors and the elected representatives with special responsibilities, such as the mayor of the town halls of a certain size. But then, who regards politics as a "job"?, because the problem of waiving wages would have to be addressed.

For example, an interview published toward the end of October, 2009 by the newspaper "Il fatto", with actor and deputy Luca Barbareschi, who along with his parliamentary activity (47.7 attendance rating), also does theatrical tours, is illuminating: "the UD has often denounced the bad issues in Italy, the political disregard. Do you not think the complexity of the state machine deserves a little more attention?" "Nooo. In any case, I could not afford it, I would not be able to continue with only the salary of a politician." "But it's nearly 23,000 euros gross per month, plus all the benefits." "So what? I was not born into a wealthy family. Nobody has ever given me anything." "For you, Montecitorio is a second job." "You have it easy to talk among yourselves! You journalists are the true breed, the riff-raff. Now you want to single me out as if I embodied absolute evil." "We were intrigued by your versatility." "No! The enemies are the thieving journalists. They're the biggest part, it's just that no one can ever get them. They're untouchable. Besides there are other problems in life." "Such as what?" "The thieves, and everyone like them." "Anything you would like to add?" "No."

And so we enter into the chaotic state briefly described in our chapter.

Editorial Note

Biblioteca Divulgare

Taking into account the panorama of humanity as a whole, culminating in the reality of being ungoverned or poorly governed by a scattering of politicians mostly unable to open doors to the maze they have unwittingly created, does not invite optimism.

However, the high level of knowledge acquired by large number of citizens in the First and Second Worlds, reduces the impression of being on the verge of absolute chaos. And on the growth of this sector depends on the breakage of the human set of labyrinths that deprive society of the desired evolution which is certainly possible.

Knowledge of the realities, both positive and negative, is the necessary precondition for the actions of the citizenry of the world, to develop any type of activity, especially teaching, to establish a decisive revolution that will distance us from the chaos. And this movement exists and is at work making life possible, and even bettering it, by the spread of culture, although all of it is within the labyrinths which chaotically constrain development and human evolution.

As far as the educational maze, it is the most significant one. But the rest of the mazes must be considered with equal attention. And for all of them, there must be discussion about various options which must suppose corrections with practical field trials.

Raising the cultural level of politics and politicians, does not go beyond arbitrary action. But managing the educational activity of all sectors, the poor and uneducated and the more or less wealthy and enlightened, is the only way out of the current situation.

The authors' ideas in this book, with the inevitable and necessary opposite points of view, indicate that the length of the study programmes favour the production and productivity of students. And this is what churches and political parties will need to consider: reforming schools, remaining in them for a longer period of time, and adapting the faculties of political sciences, sociology and philosophy to provoke a mental change in those that aspire to enter politics professionally.

Political activity derives from the strong differentiation and individualization of people. The unattainable and

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undesirable equality, would turn the practice of politics into something unnecessary and would also make life impossible. We would all be oneself. The "equality" revolutionary guideline needs to be renovated, exchanging it for "affinity".

The morphological and mental affinities create communities. And the differentiated ones, by possessing superior qualities, have been the guides of evolution. All activities have cycles. Politics shows signs of decadence. The mental affinities of human beings are increasing and in the extent that this happens through education, the values of politics decrease, as do the guides of the naturally and artifically created communities. Only by increasing the affinity of the species shall democracy thrive. The right to be what each person and each natural community is, and at the same time the obligation of respecting the individuality of the rest of people and their communities, formed by affinities which are created through formal coexistence and genetic proximity, is the base to overcome labyrinths.

The process of disrepute suffered by politicians stems from the fact that the process of democratization in the more evolutioned communities. The guides who in the beginning and in the evolutionary process were priests —who married and had children—, by not knowing how to adapt the ideas of the first novelists in human history, have progressively yielded their prerrogatives to politicians. And these are already showing signs of ignoring the point at which the democratizing process is, which is promoted by education —and not by them—. And this is how the political labyrinth, described by the different authors, has been created. The constructive process of the labyrinth has become chaotic, it has evolved without a project. The professions of the priest and the politician are becoming obsolete. Not all over the world. Within the Third World they find the shelter to persevere in their own structures. And this is an unforgivable mistake. Their corresponding teachings must be unified, without trying to make the journey that made by the First World, both regarding religion and education, resorting to the tabula rasa strategy. And with the technological means that are now available, to establish the adequate education, simultaneous to the other education, that of the civilized countries, placing them both in one same line with a common project of maximum rationality, according to the knowledge reached in each moment.

The qualities of priests and politicians are important enough for us not to appreciate them and make the most of them.

The communities which have been spontaneously created —family, peoples, ethnic groups, races, mankind— have not had and still do not have a guide to examine the chaotic result of their system of interrelationships. Of the seven thousand million people that make up the human community, besides the communities previously mentioned, they have sought shelter in other artificial communities that have not been useful in order to interrelate in a better way. These are the churches which have been personalized in clergies, at first, and now in the political parties which provide the government of the more or less labyrinthic nation-states with their inviolable frontiers, according to agreements which are respected by the world political class, paying no attention to the communities which have been spontaneously and naturally established. The religious communities —what remains of them which still is a lot and too much— and politicians, survive by inertia because they are sophisticated organizational bodies, as opposed to other communities whih are more or less "natural" and lacking organization. The best examples among them are the three established worlds, Third World: per capita income —up to five thousand dollars—; Second World: per capita income —ranging from five thousand to ten thousand dollars—; First World: per capita income — more than ten thousand dollars—. The fact that they have been ignored has provoked the global labyrinth. Not just because it is chaotic and lacks organization. It has become a dangerous labyrinth, and if it continues to evolve negatively, it can generate conflicts between all the communities: the organized and the informal.

Lacking preparation and with a very limited efficiency, professional politicians have monopolized the devices of communities' decision making. Through political parties, where a small minority controls not only the legislation and the government's actions, but also interferes in the course of justice and the armed forces and aims to intervene in the activity of businesses, media, cultural movements and social organizations. Acting as if it were a new aristocracy, a great part of the citizens remains alienated by this activity. In some parts of the world competitive elections or governments that depend on a voting process do not even exist. In the

democratic countries, electoral non-participation is increasing, while political parties affiliation is extremely low and it has been decreasing since several decades ago. Internally, the majority of political parties are dominated by a very small oligarchy; they function from the top to the bottom, through the control of a small group of politicians who are protected by the system.

A great part of today's political problems which have been analyzed in this chapter can be explained through the recruitment of politicians in parties, which is not based on the professional, technical ability, or the vision of the potential candidates, but above all on the faithfulness to the ruling leadership. The people that choose professional political activity are usually those that have less opportunities, that is, those that have fewer professional, economical, and private activity alternatives, who can find in the world of politics a remunerated and recognized activity.

Political parties work like great businesses that provide their members with means to make a living. Many politicians, as a consequence of their technical-professional and public management weaknesses, cling on to their positions and design institutional devices and strategies to avoid more qualified competitors from entering the scene. The scarce political education that is given in schools and the meager professional specialization offered by universities for public service have been insufficient to face the challenges of real politics in today's world. As in other labyrinths which are analyzed in this book, education is a potential guide, but it is still scarce and disoriented. It demands greater attention.

SUGGESTION (4)

With the preservation of the system that has created the labyrinths, topped by corrupt governments which hinder the adequate pace of human evolution, a pace that would be commensurate with the cultural level of the First World and part of the Second World, the change that can enable us to exit this chaotic global labyrinth cannot be tackled. We can only establish a tendency that through an awful economical and cultural scaling, without de-construction, interrupts the growth of the territories which are in a better condition, and connecting with what could be the end of the crisis, operates

as if the latter still continued existing. All the human activity focused on the aim of reasonably levelling culture and economy, within the territories of the First and Second World on the one hand, and in the totality of the Third World.

A slow process, during which the tendency towards a new system is applied in the first stage essentially to a profound reform of education. Intellectualizing fraternity in a similar way as the love between couples is being spontaneously intellectualized. Half a century of rational education can create a rational society which is free from labyrinths.

Epilogue

Refusing to observe the established realities in the world is the origin of all malfunctions, incoherences and calamities suffered by mankind. We consider the following:

- *Nobody and nothing has made us individuals. "We are individuals by nature".*

- *Individuality unavoidably requires an acceptance for each individual, and the acceptance of everybody, not retorically. Cordially and sincerely. This means that the relationship between human beings must be established emotionally: therefore intelectually and sentimentally. That is what fraternity is all about. It needs to be learnt. And it is through a general and intentional education how it can be learnt.*

- *Education must not only consider the Earth and the Universe through science, which discovers and creates realities. It must also be directed towards our own individuality. Making us autonomous and free from guardianships and solidarities. An education conceived in such a way cannot admit esoterical foundations of any type. It must therefore avoid teaching beliefs. It must teach the labyrinthic result they have created.*

- *Besides being individual by nature, we are symbiotic. Different, but similar when it comes to relating to one another and coexisting peacefully. Affinities exist. We don't need to create them. It is through affinity that sexual couples, families and all communities exist: peoples, ethnic groups, races, and mankind. All of them, like individuals, need to be autonomous. And this is the only equality that must be pursued. Not in order to create clones. But to make the acceptance of realities possible, realities which are now located within labyrinths like the ones that have been described by the authors of this book, which force us to become unnecessarily and unconsciously belligerent, through an unnatural relationship —which does not accept the right to self-esteem, fraternity and equality— tens of millions of indigenous peoples kept out of human evolution; hundreds of millions of people pertaining to ethnic minorities embedded without an assimilation in the*

communities that exploit them and simultaneously rejects them; and thousands of millions of human beings living in a political system that does consider the natural differences that stem from race, ethnic groups, and characters created by the geographical and climatic diversity of the Earth.

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